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Abstract 
The police use of Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) remains an under-researched and under-
evidenced topic of ongoing socio-political concern. This thesis answers an urgent academic call to 
address a number of gaps in scientific knowledge and understanding of this area. Particular attention 
is afforded to the current standards of training, and operational use of these controversial devices. 
This research aims to further advance the extant use of force literature through the exploration and 
analysis of ethically disclosed, operational CED use. Using a qualitatively driven, single case study 
approach, two quantitative surveys were conducted before a series of semi-structured interviews 
with fifteen Specially Trained Officers. The content and sufficiency of initial training is critically 
explored, as are the officer’s perceptions and interpretation of the pedagogical process. The results 
indicate that initial training is currently robust and delivered in the manner intended by governing 
organisations. The exacting standards are being applied broadly in-line with policy and scientific 
expectation but improvements are urgently required in order to better safeguard vulnerable 
population groups from unethical exposure, clarity is needed on the position of CEDs within the use of 
force hierarchy and officers could benefit from additional decision making guidance.   
 
Keywords 
Police use of force, policing by consent, culture, discretion, Tasers, Conducted Energy Devices, 
Conducted Energy Weapons, less-lethal weapons, equipment, technology, decision making, training.   
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
 
The recent introduction and ongoing proliferation of Conducted Energy Devices1 (CEDs) such as the 
Taser, is arguably the most controversial technological advancement in the recent history of the 
British police service (De Angelis & Wolf, 2013). This thesis comprises a qualitatively driven, single 
case study approach which investigates the so called Taser phenomenon by using the real-world 
perspective of 15 CED equipped officers employed by a single police organisation based in Southeast 
England. This current research focuses specifically on the guidelines for initial CED training which are 
developed and disseminated by the College of Policing (COP) but also critically examines the extent 
to which these exacting standards are operationalised in the live-policing environment. This thesis 
comprises eleven chapters in total, which are summarised below. 
 
Chapter one provides an overview of CEDs (specifically the Taser X26) and gives some relevant 
background information on these controversial devices. It then introduces the COP approved less-
lethal weapons training curriculum. This chapter concludes with a section on deployment and use 
statistics which discloses how, and how often, CEDs are being used by police officers in England and 
Wales.  
 
Chapter two highlights the specific gaps in academic understanding which form the reasoning for 
this thesis. The research aims and overarching objectives are then discussed, before an exploration 
of the key research questions. The strategy used to identify and obtain relevant academic material is 
also provided.  
 
Chapter three comprises the overarching theoretical framework within which this current research is 
situated. It focuses on the fundamental principles of policing by consent in the United Kingdom with 
an emphasis on the use of both lethal and non-lethal force; in addition it addresses the causal 
correlates which are known to influence a forceful police-citizen encounter.  
 
                                                          
1 Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) may also be referred to generically in-text as Tasers, Conducted Energy 
Weapons (CEWs), Electronic Control Devices (ECDs), Stun-Guns or Electro-Shock Weapons.  
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Chapter four explores the concept of police decision making including a critical discussion of training, 
legislation, the National Decision Model (NDM) and use of force continua. This chapter also discusses 
the array of less-lethal weapons available to the police service. It describes exactly how uniformed 
response officers are deployed to a call for service and the command structure within which they will 
operate. Both of which are capable of informing their operational decision making particularly as it 
relates to the use of force.   
 
Chapter five analyses the literature relating specifically to the police use of CEDs in both the United 
Kingdom and abroad. The chapter begins with an in-depth critical discussion of key academia, 
beginning with the limited material available in this country. The medical consequences of CED use is 
then considered followed by the ethical concerns associated with the use of these devices.  Chapter 
five finishes by discussing the seemingly juxtaposed position of CEDs in our society, as effective 
police accoutrements on the one hand, or instruments of death on the other.  
 
Chapter six outlines the research methodology. It begins with a description of the research setting 
and the strategy used to select the research sample. This chapter continues by describing the various 
research instruments used during the project and also explains how the data was analysed. Chapter 
six concludes with a summary of the most pertinent ethical concerns. 
 
Chapter seven begins by analysing the results of two self-completion surveys which were used to 
assess the initial feasibility of the proposed research and to explore the content of initial training and 
the current standards of operational CED use. This chapter also explores the application and pre-
joining process.   
 
Chapter eight reports on the content and sufficiency of initial CED training. It includes a breakdown 
of various elements of the curriculum, including theory input, weapon handling, the classification 
and scenario based role-play exercises. Throughout this chapter, an enhanced understanding of how 
the exacting standards are received by prospective STO’s is provided. Overarching academic richness 
is provided by reflective observations from the sample population and where appropriate, this data 
is analysed against the core base of academic literature. 
 
Chapter nine examines the under-researched topic of CED operationalisation. It scrutinises a number 
of operational examples of CED use, assessing the dynamic nature of each encounter against 
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academic and organisational expectation. After briefly addressing post-incident procedures, chapter 
nine pits this information against the existing scientific data on the use of force, specifically the 
relevant force predictors.  
 
Chapter ten addresses the decision making guidance. There is a general under-use of the NDM and 
an evident disconnect in officers opinion of where CEDs ought to lie as a use of force option. This 
chapter also assess the protection of vulnerable population groups, concluding that not enough has 
been done to mitigate the risk in what is an area of high liability for the police service.  
 
Chapter eleven concludes this research. Firstly, by passing comment on its limitations, most notably 
generalisability, the position of the researcher within the research setting and the problem of future-
proofing. There follows a number of evidence-based suggestions for institutional improvement and 
change. These, if implemented, would help inform professional practice and provide a solid platform 
for future research in this dynamic and exciting area.  
 
An overview of Conducted Energy Devices  
Conducted Energy Devices belong to a class of tactical options known as “less-lethal”,2 meaning they 
are intended to subdue or temporarily incapacitate a non-compliant subject rather than cause 
serious harm or death (Bozeman & Winslow, 2005). The brand of CED predominantly used in the UK 
is the Taser3 which was named by inventor John Cover as the Thomas A Swift Electric Rifle, in a 
jocular salute to the Tom Swift Fantasy Stories written by Victor Appleton (Sousa, Ready & Ault, 
2010).  
 
Tasers are manufactured exclusively by Arizona based global conglomerate Axon®.4 The model 
commonly deployed in the UK is the Taser X265(see Figure 1.1. below). The X26 is bright yellow in 
                                                          
2Common less-lethal weapons include the extendable baton (also referred to as an ASP, a truncheon or a 
nightstick) and chemical spray. Law Enforcement Agencies use a variety of brands of chemical spray. All of 
which are designed to temporarily incapacitate a subject by causing localised pain and a temporary inability to 
open the eyes. Common brands include OC, CN, PAVA, Captor™ and CS.    
3 When the term Taser is used in this thesis it relates specifically to the brand of CED manufactured by Axon 
(i.e. the M26, X26 or X2). The term Taser is not used generically to refer to all brands of CED unless this is 
expressly stated by the author, or the term forms part of a quotation.    
4 Formerly Taser International®. 
5In December 2014, production of the X26 ceased and the Scientific Advisory Council on the Medical 
Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons (SACMILL) were tasked to find a suitable replacement. SACMILL 
considered several viable options, but eventually categorised the Taser X2, the only viable candidate. On 2nd 
March 2017, this device was authorised by the Home Office for future UK use (Police Federation, 2017b). 
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colour which distinguishes it from a conventional firearm and is designed to be carried in a holster 
on the non-dominant side of the body. This helps to prevent it from being drawn and used in the 
same manner as a conventional firearm (Martin, 2016). A standout feature of the Taser is the 
integrated red-dot laser sighting system which illuminates automatically when the device is armed6. 
This operational aid (which is colloquially referred to as “Red-Dotting”) may be used as a visual guide 
for accurate shot placement or offered tactically as a deterrent to a non-compliant aggressor (Home 
Office, 2014).  
 
Figure 1.1. Taser X26 with associated nomenclature 
 
When the trigger is pressed the Taser X26 uses compressed nitrogen gas to emit 2 sharp probes 
attached to copper wires. The probes naturally spread when the device is fired and will connect with 
a subject up to 6.4 meters (21 feet) away. At the point of initial deployment 50,000 volts of pulsed 
electricity are generated. If both probes make firm contact with the subject the peak voltage will 
drop to around 1,200 volts which is passed through the body in a straight line between the 2 points 
of contact. 
 
On average, the Taser X26 will generate 0.0021 amps. The shock duration is factory pre-set at 5 
seconds. This can be extended or shortened at the operator’s behest by maintaining pressure on the 
trigger or de-arming the device respectively. Successful Taser use will result in a condition known as 
                                                          
6 The proposed upgrade to the Taser X26 (the Taser X2) provides a red-dot for both top and bottom probe 
which assists the operator with point-of-impact prediction (SACMILL, 2017). 
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Neuro Muscular Incapacitation (NMI) which is a temporary but complete loss of motor function 
(National Police Chiefs Council [NPCC], 2016).  
 
The Taser timeline  
CEDs were first introduced into the British police service in 2003 after a Home Office request to 
explore the market for a suitable less-lethal alternative to the rudimentary plastic baton round7 
commonly deployed by Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs), (Donnelly, 2001). During this 
exploratory research the Taser model M26 was identified, assessed and subsequently recommended 
for operational trial (Boatman & Mitchell, 2002).  
 
On 23rd April 2003 a 12 month trial involving 5 police forces began. General oversight of the trial 
period was provided by professional services firm Price Waterhouse Cooper® (PWC). The direction 
from the Home Office was that the Taser M26 be made available to AFOs for use during 
spontaneous or pre-planned firearms operations. AFOs were asked to complete a questionnaire and 
participate in a semi-structured interview each time the device was used. During the trial period the 
Taser was deployed on 58 occasions, usually when the encounter involved a knife or firearm. In 26 
cases (44.8%) the incident was resolved when subject was red-dotted. The Taser was only 
discharged 14 times (19% of cases). Of the 56 uses the suspect was arrested 53 times which equated 
to a 95% successful arrest rate.   
 
At the conclusion of the trial PWC disseminated a survey to the general public which received 1164 
responses. The survey aimed to establish a baseline for public awareness of, and tolerance towards, 
CEDs. The results indicated that public awareness of CEDs was low. Only 36% of the respondents 
knew what a CED was and no-one had witnessed one being used. Eighty one per cent of the sample 
population considered that CEDs should be available to more police forces and 90% thought that 
only AFO’s and / or suitably trained officers should be authorised to carry one. Public opinion was 
against routine availability with only 38% of the sample supporting this position (Price Waterhouse 
Cooper [PWC] & the Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], 2004). 
In 2004 the Defence Scientific Advisory Committee on the Medical Implications of Less-Lethal 
Weapons (DOMILL) assessed the medical implications of CED use. Specifically, adverse cardiac 
events and a heightened risk to those under the influence of intoxicating substances. DOMILL 
                                                          
7 Also known as an Attenuating Energy Projectile (AEP) and sometimes referred to colloquially as a “rubber 
bullet”. 
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concluded: “The risk of life threatening or serious injuries from the M26 Taser is very low.” (2004, p. 
32) 
 
In the same year, the then Home Secretary, David Blunkett allowed all UK forces the option to 
routinely issue CEDs to AFO’s (ACPO, 2013). A recommendation which was officially actioned on 
behalf of the Home Office, by Caroline Flint MP on 15th September 2004. This event marked the first 
wide scale roll out in UK history (Martis, 2005).  
 
In March 2005, an upgrade from the Taser M26 to the more superior X26 was proposed by the 
Home Office. DOMILL supported this technological advancement reporting that: “The risk of a life 
threatening event arising from the direct interaction of the currents of the X26 Taser with the heart 
is less than the already low risk of such an event from the M26 Advanced Taser.”(2005, p. 27- 28)  
 
In 2007, ACPO proposed a trial allowing unarmed officers from Specially Trained Units access to 
CEDs. This previously unprecedented shift in national policy, was fully backed by the Government 
who funded a 12 month trial which began on 1st September 2007 and involved 10 police forces 
(Bebbington, 2007). DOMILL predicted a general increase in CED use but concluded that the training 
packages provided by ACPO were sufficiently robust and “. . . provide a common foundation to 
minimise the potential for adverse medical effects from use of. . . Tasers in non-firearms incidents.” 
(2007, p. 22) 
 
In 2008, the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith announced that an additional 10,000 CEDs would be 
issued in Britain for general use by unarmed officers. A radical development which was reported to 
have cost in excess of £8 million (Mason, 2008). DOMILL assessed the potential medical implications 
of allowing non-specialist officers ready access to CEDs and concluded, “. . . the risk of serious 
adverse medical outcome from exposure to the Taser is low, provided the system is employed by 
trained users in accordance with ACPO policy and guidance.” (2012, p. 11 emphasis added)  
Since this development a steady increase in the number of Specially Trained Officers officers can be 
seen.The Police Federation declares that 25% of officers now carry a CED and strongly campaign for 
the device to be standard issue (The Police Federation, 2016). At the time of writing, routine 
armament is not a stance supported by the NPCC. They do however, support the government 
proposed increase in overall numbers, a process which remains on-going (NPCC, 2016a). 
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On 12th September 2016, a briefing paper was delivered to the House of Commons. This document 
formed the basis of a nationally recognised Authorised Professional Practice (APP) governing CED 
use. It provided a summary of medical implications as well as various social and ethical concerns 
raised by the IPCC. The most important inclusion was the auditable list of risk factors which must be 
considered by an STO prior to using a CED most notably:  head injuries caused by unsupported falls, 
flammability, repeated and / or prolonged use, avoidance of sensitive areas, pre-existing medical 
conditions, Acute Behavioural Disturbance or excited delirium, vulnerable citizens, children and 
people of small stature (McGuiness, 2016, p. 8). 
 
In January 2017, the results of a survey conducted on behalf of the Police Federation by Ipsos Mori® 
were published. CEDs received broad support with 82% of surveyed officers stating that such devices 
should be routinely available, an increase of 8% since 2014. This proposal was also supported by 71% 
of the general public (Ipsos Mori & the Police Federation, 2016).  
 
On 2nd March 2017, the Home Office authorised use of the Taser X2 as a replacement for the X26 
which is no longer manufactured (Police Federation, 2017b). The X2 is technologically superior to the 
X26. It is also more versatile, has a higher maximum power output, a separate laser sight for top and 
bottom probe, a 25 foot maximum operating distance (as opposed to the 21 feet offered by the X26) 
and a warning signal when the 5 second cycle is approaching completion. Crucially, the X2 allows 
arcing with the cartridges attached and gives the operator the option of an immediate second shot 
in the event of a miss. Under these circumstances both the top and bottom probe can invoke NMI, 
provided the spread is sufficient (SACMILL, 2017).  
 
This significant development was preceded by a comprehensive medical statement from SACMILL 
who were “. . . broadly satisfied by the evidence it has examined, and is of the view that the medical 
implication of the Taser X2 system – when used by trained operators in accordance with UK policy 
and guidance – would be in line with those expected for a less- lethal system of this type.” (2017, p. 
1) 
 
 
CED training  
The authority for a non-firearms officer to carry a CED operationally, is dependent upon successful 
completion of a nationally accredited training course developed by the College of Policing (COP). 
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This course is widely considered to be one of the most robust training programs in the world (NPCC, 
2016a). Unlike many overseas jurisdictions, officers in the UK are not instructed on the use of CEDs 
during probationary training, neither is there currently an automatic right to undertake such training 
at any stage during an officer’s career.   
 
The training curriculum is developed by a small group of specialist instructors employed by the COP. 
The content is delivered to a lead instructor from each individual police force who will further 
disseminate the information to nominated in-force trainers (McGuinness, 2016). Whilst the specific 
content of CED training is regarded as sensitive data (COP, 2016), open-source searching discloses a 
rigorous pre-selection process and suggests that not every officer who undertakes the training 
course will necessarily be successful (NPCC, 2016). 
 
The time officers spend training in the use of less-lethal weapons is referred to as ‘contact time’. The 
current minimum period for initial CED training is 18 hours over 3 days. A minimum of 6 hours 
continuation training per officer, per year is further mandated. The UK curriculum is widely regarded 
as robust especially when compared internationally. Some countries (e.g. the USA) complete CED 
training in a single day and provide no further refresher training (Chesterman, 2013).  
 
When an officer has passed the training course they are designated a Specially Trained Officer (STO) 
and are permitted to carry a CED whilst on duty. STOs are usually front-line, uniformed response 
officers. They will carry the device openly on a utility belt or tactical vest. Although STOs will 
generally conduct routine police work they may also be deployed in circumstances of heightened 
risk which do not fit the criteria for a firearms-led approach. This may be the planned arrest of a 
violent offender or a more spontaneous incident such as the response to a person brandishing a 
potentially lethal weapon (COP, 2013).  
 
The ongoing operationalisation of CEDs is overseen by the Home Office and governed nationally by 
the COP, the NPCC and a National Less-Lethal Weapons Working Group. Medical and scientific 
oversight is provided on behalf of the Home Office by the Scientific Advisory Committee on the 
Medical Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons (SACMILL) and the Centre for Applied Science 
Technology (CAST) who have published a series of open source medical statements (see Defence 
Scientific Advisory Council on the Medical Implications of Less-Lethal Weapons [DOMILL], 2004; 
2005; 2007; 2012; NPCC, 2015; SACMILL, 2017). If death or serious injury occurs as a result of CED 
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deployment the Independent Office of Police Conduct8 (IOPC) is the lead agency responsible for the 
investigation of the incident (Chesterman, 2013).            
 
Statistics on CED use in England and Wales  
At the time of writing, the only quantifiable statistics on CED use in England and Wales are published 
on behalf of the Government by the Home Office. The data is gathered from individual police forces 
before amalgamation into a single document which is published annually via open source forums. 
The fact that the Home Office is responsible for gathering, analysing and presenting the data would 
appear to be somewhat of an ethical risk, because this body also has ultimate national oversight of 
CED operationalisation. In addition, the primary data relies on timely submissions from deploying 
officers, accurate recording mechanisms by individual police forces and a degree of consistency in 
ongoing dissemination to a centralised agency. Somewhere along this seemingly fragmented line, it 
is not inconceivable that a true variance in the published statistics may exist. It is perhaps for this 
reason that certain commentators have called for a single use of force database which is utilised by 
every agency and accessible to a wider audience such as the academic community (Dymond, as cited 
by Amnesty International, 2016, para. 8).  
 
For the purpose of Home Office recording and analysis, an STO will have “Used” a CED in one of 
seven possible ways. The device is “Drawn” if an officer removes it from the holster. The unit is 
“Aimed” if it is drawn and pointed at a subject. “Arcing”, sends a visible and audible current of 
electricity between the contact points and serves as a warning. “Red-Dotting”, occurs when the laser 
sight is placed on the body of the subject. The “Drive-Stun” technique can be applied in two further 
ways. Firstly, by removing the front cartridge and pressing the device hard into the subject’s body 
whilst maintaining pressure on the trigger. This allows the device to operate like a conventional so-
called “Stun-Gun”, relying on pain not NMI to control the subject. Secondly, the “Angled Drive-Stun”, 
may be preferred if, after a full-probe deployment, one dart misses the target or becomes displaced. 
Under these circumstances, the device may be pushed into the body with the expended cartridge 
still attached. If in the execution of this tactic, the operator allows sufficient spread between the 
head of the device and the accurate probe then secondary NMI may follow. Finally, a CED is “Fired” 
with a full-probe deployment. 
 
                                                          
8 Formerly the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 
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According to the Home Office, CED usage has followed a predictable pattern of low use during times 
of scant availability and higher use with increased availability. The relative paucity of deployments 
during the initial trial in 2003 is a prime example, the low statistics being attributable to a limited 
trial period involving only AFOs taking part in spontaneous or pre-planned firearms operations.  
 
An increase in use post-trial is demonstrated by the 2004-2007 statistics. The first recording period 
where CEDs were authorised nationally. CEDs were used 1374 times, arced 41 times and red-dotted 
613 times. The drive-stun was used on 69 occasions, and full-probe discharge occurred 521 times 
(Home Office, 2008).   
 
CED trials were extended to non-firearms officers 2007. There logically followed an incremental 
increase in recorded use. In the year 2010, there were 5,278 uses, almost a quarter of which were 
full-probe or drive-stun deployments. A further increase was reported in 2011 where the device was 
used 6,269 times, 25% of which were operational discharges. Moving closer to the present day, 2014 
saw CEDs “used” 10,062 times (an average of just over 27 times per day) and “discharged” 5 times 
per day (1,724). This marks a 3% decrease in use compared to 2013 (-318) but a 51% (+3,413) 
increase when compared to 2010 (Home Office, 2014).  
 
The most recent figures available at the time of writing, indicate a possible emerging consistency in 
the use of CEDs. Indicative of this hypothesis, is the statistical similarity between 2014 and the most 
recent published figures which show that CEDs were used 10,329 times in 2015. Reflecting a 
previously unprecedented consistency in recorded use when compared with the 10,062 uses in the 
year prior. Interestingly, non-discharges accounted for 8,408 (81%) of the 10,329 recorded uses in 
2016. This shows the value of the red-dot as a compliance tool (Home Office, 2016). 
 
By way of background, the above chapter has provided a relevant summary of the introduction and 
evolution of CEDs in Great Britain, and has also touched upon deployment and use statistics. This 
information provides a broad contextual understanding of the overarching topic area. The following 
chapter discusses why this research is necessary.  
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Chapter two  
Research context 
 
The above chapter has provided some relevant background information detailing the conception and 
evolution of the Taser phenomenon in the United Kingdom. The following chapter builds upon certain 
facets of this data, most notably, the relative paucity of peer reviewed research in the field, which 
justifies why this current research is needed. Chapter two continues by outlining the research aims 
and ultimate objective, before an in-depth evaluation of the key research questions.  
 
Why this research is needed 
Several academics have highlighted a general lack of empirical research on CED related topics (e.g. 
Dymond, 2014; Dymond & Rappert, 2014; Gau et al., 2010; Millar, 2010; Neyroud, 2007; Thomas et 
al., 2010). Dymond (2014) and Gau, Mosher and Pratt (2010) posit that the peer reviewed literature 
pertaining specifically to the use of CEDs in the UK is scarce, and Neyroud (2007) suggests that 
further research in this key emerging area must be attended to as a priority. Squires and Kennison 
suggest that “. . . the period between police arriving on the scene and the resort to potentially lethal 
firepower is the ‘window of opportunity’ for the utilisation of less-lethal options. Thereby 
discovering more about the circumstances and opportunities for alternative resolution strategies 
is a question of vital priority.” (2010, p. 163 emphasis added). And finally, very little academic 
attention has been paid to the CED training process, which is a topic that “. . . future research should 
examine . . . in considerable detail” (Thomas, Collins & Lovrich, 2010, p. 307). This observation was 
further solidified by Dymond who declared: “Thus key un-answered questions include the content 
of the UK national training package and how it has been received and interpreted and crucially, 
applied by trainers and police officers.” (2014, p. 4 emphasis added).   
 
Research aims and objectives  
The overarching aim of this research is to critically investigate the current standards of CED training 
and operational use from the point of view of 15 STOs working in a single police organisation. To 
achieve this goal, relevant literature is used to underpin the inquiry and identify topics of social 
concern. Survey data as well as reflective observations from the sample population are used to 
fortify the research outcomes and solidify recommendations for institutional reform. A qualitative 
approach explores first-hand perceptions of the pedagogical process with specific emphasis on 
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course structure, content, delivery, decision making strategies, ethical use and the position of CEDs 
within the hierarchy of force. By using specific examples of real-world use, this research also aims to 
establish not only, the sufficiency of initial training but also, the corresponding patterns and 
predictability in operationalisation and the extent to which the identified trends correlate with the 
existing scientific data on the use of force.   
 
Because of the relatively small-scale parameters of the research framework, the data and associated 
outcomes are not necessarily representative nationwide. Operational practice may differ from force 
to force and the opinions of the sample population are not necessarily generalisable. That being 
said, this research is unique in content and composition and provides a clear platform for further 
inquiry. Ultimately, it is both hoped and anticipated that the findings and recommendations 
embodied in this thesis will be used to facilitate immediate organisational improvement to current 
training and operational practice. On a wider scale, this research could be used as a platform for 
comparative purposes, contrasting uniformity in CED training and delivery on a regional, national or 
international scale.  
 
Research questions 
In order to achieve the research aims and ultimate objectives this study proposes four research 
questions which are discussed in detail below.  
 
Research question one: What is the content of the CED training package and how is the training 
received by prospective Specially Trained Officers?  
 
This is the primary research question. It was formulated in direct response to various academically 
highlighted knowledge gaps. Specifically, the content and sufficiency of the initial CED training 
course devised by the COP. This question also ties in directly with the primary research objective, 
which is the general advancement of the core literature base.  
 
Research question two: How are CEDs operationalised by Specially Trained Officers and is this 
practice compatible with existing scientific data on the use of force?    
The broader use of force literature in the UK suffers from the same volume deficiency as the 
narrower Taser phenomenon. This particular research question will provide a valuable contribution 
to the existing literature and the case study approach will add a deeper qualitative understanding to 
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what is a predominantly quantitatively researched topic area. Specifically, by analysing a number of 
examples of operational CED use and comparing the various force predictors with the existing base 
of evidence in order to identify patterns or methods of predictability. The results will tie in directly to 
both the research aims and the ultimate research objective which is the promotion of further 
comparative study. 
 
Research question three: Where do STO’s position CEDs within the use of force hierarchy and how 
effective is the National Decision Model (NDM) as a mechanism to support a force application 
decision?   
 
Linked intrinsically to the subjective interpretation of the training guidance this research question 
directly addresses the operational value of the NDM as a decision making tool. It critically explores 
the premise that the NDM has effectively (although not explicitly) rejected the continuum approach, 
as the preferred force election framework. This research question also assesses the true operational 
value of the NDM and explores the current level of clarity, and parity in the position of CEDs within 
the force hierarchy.   
 
Research question four: Is the training and operationalisation of CEDs being conducted ethically and 
with due regard to the protection of vulnerable citizens?   
 
This question emerged as a social dilemma during the literature review phase. It is intended to 
directly address the significant ethical concerns raised not only, by individual academics, (e.g. Gau, et 
al, 2010; Kleinig 2007; Oriola, Neverson & Adeyanju, 2012; Ryan, 2008) but also, by human rights 
protection groups such as Amnesty International UK (e.g. Amnesty International, 2004; Sprague, 
2007) who are vociferous in their opposition to increased CED availability in the UK. This research 
question allows the critical exploration of ethical safeguarding as mandated by governance. It 
further assesses whether these controls adequately protect society’s most vulnerable members 
from pernicious exposure to CEDs. Where it is identified that organisational improvement may need 
to be considered, this is duly stated.  
 
To summarise, research question one was selected in direct response to the demands of the 
academic community who have voiced explicit concern over the lack of knowledge in these 
particular areas (see Dymond, 2014; Dymond & Rappert, 2014; Gau et al., 2010; Millar, 2010; 
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Neyroud, 2007; Thomas et al., 2010). Question two pays critical attention to the use of CEDs by 
STO’s and also assesses the extent to which current operational practice compares with the 
evidence base relevant to the police use of force. Questions three and four emerged and evolved 
during the literature review and active research phases. As such, they were incorporated into the 
reflexive conceptual framework. Maxwell confirms this process as compatible with the case study 
design. 
 
Each component of the design may need to be reconsidered or modified in response to new 
developments or to changes in some other component. . . . The activities of collecting and 
analyzing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research 
questions and identifying and eliminating validity threats are usually all going on more or 
less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others. (1996, p. 2-3) 
 
This reflexivity in research design is integral to the overarching agenda, and critical given the 
researcher’s position as a practitioner-academic. The elected research questions explore operational 
concerns which are police specific, and sociological concerns which are predominantly citizen-
focused. This targeted approach affords an equal level of critical attention to police officers and 
wider society alike. By natural consequence this will ensure a well-balanced research agenda. 
 
Literature search strategy  
In order to explore relevant academic material, a systematic search for literature containing certain 
keywords and terminology was conducted9. From initial and continuation searches somewhere in 
the region of 500 results were received and triaged for relevance. For the most part, the literature 
included in this thesis is peer reviewed, published and reports on the results of research findings. 
Subjective opinion pieces, Masters Degree level dissertations and studies written in a language other 
than English were excluded. Whilst relevant UK scholarship does feature in this thesis, a cursory 
glance at the reference list will show that this subject area has been most extensively developed in 
North America.  
 
                                                          
9 Search terms included but were not restricted to: Police use of force, policing by consent, police coercion, 
police encounters, police use of less-lethal weapons, police use of Taser, police use of Conducted Energy 
Devices, police use of Conducted Energy Weapons, police use of Stun Guns, police use of firearms, police 
protective equipment, police use of technology, police training, police professional development, police 
deployment, police use of reflective practice, police use of the National Decision Model. 
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Continued awareness of newly published research to the point of submission, was maintained by 
systematic repetition of the search criteria and via automated e-mail notifications, which periodically 
recommended newly published material based on the initial search terms. The literature review 
strategy produced a rich and relevant corpus of contemporary academic scholarship which is 
discussed in this thesis and reflected by the reference list.  
 
The above chapter has outlined the strategy underpinning this current research by discussing its 
justification, aims, objectives questions and literature search strategy. The following chapter 
evaluates the theoretical concept of consent-oriented policing in a liberal democracy.  
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Chapter three 
The police use of force 
 
The following chapter introduces an overarching theoretical framework which permeates various 
sections of this thesis. The hallmark concept of policing by consent in a pluralistic democracy is key 
to this current research because there has been a notable derision in recent years and the addition 
of a CED to rank-and file officers could serve to dramatically exacerbate an already deteriorating 
construct.  This naturally raises a plethora of theoretical and sociological debate as to whether this is 
appropriate, warranted, desirable or even necessary in contemporary society. Issues such as police 
culture, excessive force, race relations and police accountability are all fundamental to this 
argument, which is why they are featured heavily in the chapter that follows.  
 
Policing by consent or coercion? 
The contemporary police officer is charged with the ever-expanding societal responsibility to 
address: “Something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-
something-now” (Bittner, 1974, p. 30). According to Klahm and Tillyer (2010) this broad mandate 
incorporates plethoric roles and functions, including but not restricted to crime fighting, maintaining 
peace and order, solving problems and delivering a public service, However, it is the dispense of 
force that remains the most politically contentious police function (Bittner, 1970; Muir, 1977; Reiss, 
1971; Sherman, 1980b; Walker & Fridell, 1993). The unique discretion of the police officer, acting on 
behalf of the state, to apply force to uphold the law is a phenomenon that has been studied by 
academics for over 65 years, yet even to this day it is not clearly understood (Klahm & Tillyer, 2010).  
 
The importance of advancing this understanding, particularly in the field of lethal or excessive force 
cannot be overstated. Punch argues that “. . . of the various forms of deviance associated with 
policing . . . it is excessive, unjustified and illicit violence that can be the most controversial and 
emotive, if not explosive” (2011, p. 104). To confirm this assertion, we only need reflect upon the 
fatal shooting of the young black male, Mark Duggan by a police firearms officer in 2011. This tragic 
event is widely believed to have been at least a contributory causal factor of the 2011 London Riots 
which shook the foundations of our society to the point where a breakdown of social order ensued. 
According to Davies, Fry, Wilson and Bishop (2013) the disorder which followed, resulted in an 
estimated 3,443 reported crimes, £250 million in property damage and 5 deaths.  
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Further widespread disorder (although not to the extent of the 2011 attacks) occurred following the 
in-custody death of a black Portuguese male Edson Frederico Da Costa who was arrested by police 
officers on 15th June 2017 after he was found to be in a vehicle linked to a street robbery. During the 
arrest chemical spray was deployed to-which Mr. Da Costa apparently suffered a severe adverse 
reaction which led to his death. This conclusion is disputed by the family of the deceased male who 
claim that in fact, he had received grievous internal injuries at the hands of the police during the 
course of the arrest. On 25th June 2017 a crowd gathered outside Forest Gate Police Station to 
protest against the use of excessive force and the lack of progress and transparency with the 
subsequent investigation. The initially peaceful protest later turned violent and resulted in 6 officers 
being assaulted (4 requiring hospital treatment) 4 arrests and a series of criminal offences including 
arson, assault, property damage and serious public disorder (Townsend & Quinn, 2017).  
 
Similar circumstances prevail when we consider the coercive arrest related death of 20 year old 
black male Rashan Charles on 22nd July 2017 (Townsend, 2017) and the death of newspaper seller 
Ian Tomlinson (who was subject to an unprovoked and excessive assault by a police officer) during 
the G20 protests in London 2009 (Taylor, 2013).   
 
The above deaths arguably point to a gradual erosion of the policing by consent doctrine but 
perhaps more importantly, they appear to indicate that the UK police service has not fully reformed 
in the wake of the Macpherson Inquiry which highlighted a culture of institutional racism in the 
British police force (Macpherson, 1999); and as such, may still be prone to isolated manifestations of 
excessive or unnecessary force perpetrated on vulnerable population groups (Erfani-Ghettani, 2018). 
It is perhaps the crux of this particular argument which bears especial relevance to the Taser 
phenomenon. Many commentators argue that the addition of CEDs will only to serve to further sway 
an already teetering cultural imbalance between the police and the policed, and as such, any 
operational benefit such devices bring, will ultimately fail to outweigh the risk they pose to wider 
society (Kleinig, 2007; Oriola, et al., 2012; Ryan, 2008; Shaw, 2015; Sprague, 2007).    
 
Developing this argument further, empirical research has shown that the celebration of violence 
remains, to some extent, embedded within the cultural dynamic of the police service (Loftus, 
2009a). There is evidence to suggest that police officers view their primary function as crime 
fighters, involved in the relentless pursuit of hardened criminals (Cain, 1973; Ericson & Hegarty, 
1997; Fielding, 1988; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Jackson, 2003; Loftus, 2009b; Paoline, Myers, & 
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Worden, 2000; Waddington, 1999a) and as such, relish the opportunity to engage in conflict. Loftus 
points to the police service as rife with “. . . powerful undercurrents of masculinity . . .  [which] . . . 
encourages an aura of toughness and celebration of violence.” (2009a, p. 96). When recounting 
stories of coercive encounters to their colleagues, research has shown that officers have the 
propensity to exaggerate certain details such as the level of violence offered by the subject and how 
their own actions in response could have fallen outside the conventions of morality, policy or even 
legislation. Officers may embellish certain situational characteristics such as the physical attributes 
or combative capability of the person they were confronted with and may trivialise and normalise 
the fact that the subject received serious injuries as a result of the encounter (Van Maanen, 1973; 
Waddington, 1999a).   
 
Some researchers suggest that the sharing of such stories not only, helps to create and maintain a 
healthy cultural balance and cohesion within a police team or unit (Fletcher, 1996; Loftus, 2009a; 
Schein, 1984; Van Maanen, 1973; Waddington, 1999a) but also, provides a vital avenue of escape 
from the stress, fatigue or mundanity of everyday policing (Holdaway, 1983). Whereas, other 
researchers attribute these behavioural traits to the fact that violent confrontation is an accepted 
and even desirable facet of everyday police work (Loftus 2009a; Reiner, 2000; Skolnick, 2008; 
Waddington, 1999a; Westley, 1953).  
 
Brandl, Stroshine, and Frank (2001) claim that such an organisational mind-set encourages the use of 
excessive force, particularly by young-in-service male officers who are keen to seek acceptance and 
build a reputation within their organisational environment. Loftus (2009b) linked this behaviour to a 
culture of silence whereby officers will not speak out against colleagues who had used excessive 
force for fear of social isolation and Anshel (2000) claims that this mentality promotes mutual 
distrust between the police and the public.   
 
In the light of the above observations, it is of interest to consider the effect the addition of a CED to 
the armory of rank-and-file officers could have on existing cultural attitudes within the police 
service. Also, the extent to which this significant organisational shift represents a divergence from 
consent oriented policing in a pluralistic society such as the United Kingdom. The UK has long been 
celebrated for its “unarmed” police service, which functions according to the willingness of society 
to be policed by a civilised agency adopting the least intrusive measures of law enforcement 
(Waddington, 1991).  
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This image of civility is characterised by the traditional English “Bobby”, who has long been 
celebrated as a hallmark of liberal society (Emsley, 2009). The altruism of “Bobby” is exemplified by 
the fictional TV character PC Dixon from a 1949 film entitled The Blue Lamp10. PC Dixon epitomises 
what have been referred to as the “Golden Years” of UK policing (McLaughlin, 2007; Reiner, 2000). 
Dixon walks his beat of Dock Green immaculately attired in a blue tunic, polished dress shoes and a 
traditional Custodian helmet. He is of course, unarmed. Weapons are not required for PC Dixon 
because he is a respected member of the community and is able to effectively exercise his function 
by conversation as opposed to coercion: ‘For almost one and a half centuries, then, the iconic “Great 
British Bobby”, patrolling alone and with his truncheon concealed beneath his tunic, symbolised the 
aversion to the use of overt force in the policing of British society.’ (Punch, 2011, p. 25) 
 
The image and glory of PC Dixon remains to this day, resonant and relevant to UK society but at the 
same time it is arguably becoming increasingly redundant (Squires & Kennison, 2010). Brady, (1990) 
and McLaughlin (2007) claim that the liberal principles exemplified by PC Dixon have always been, at 
least to some extent, fictitious. They refer to the concept as the “Dixon Myth” and point out that the 
police service has never lacked the capacity to employ various degrees of force (including lethal 
measures), should the need arise (Gould & Waldren, 1986; Waldren, 1992; 2007).  
 
Expanding on this point a little further, it is perhaps beyond contention that the UK police cannot 
currently be described as “unarmed.” Punch and Markham, (2006) refer to the UK police as “Semi-
armed” and Squires and Kennison agree: “In reality the notion of an unarmed police cannot now be 
seriously sustained. In our view they are neither one nor the other. They occupy a mid-way point 
between both positions . . .” (2010, p. 194). This premise is of increasing relevance today. In direct 
response to recent terror atrocities, the UK is in the midst of a significant “Event Driven” (Squires & 
Kennison, 2010, p. 56 see below)  uplift in the number and availability of firearms officers and Armed 
Response Vehicles (ARVs), particularly in the Capital and these officers (along with the associated 
hardware) are now more visible than ever before (Evans, 2016).  
 
Even the beloved “Bobby” has not escaped a degree of so-called “para-militarisation” (Jefferson, 
1987, 1990, 1993; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997; Waddington, 1999). In the contemporary policing 
                                                          
10 In 1955 the BBC first aired a show titled “Dixon of Dock Green” which was a spin-off of the Blue Lamp film 
and featured the exploits of PC Dixon. This show was incredibly successful in the UK and aired on Saturday 
night television for over 21 years. It is perhaps from these episodes that the true fondness for the “Great 
British Bobby” and by proxy the principle of policing by consent was nurtured and realised in this country.    
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environment, “Bobby” is rarely seen on foot and is seldom wearing a traditional Custodian helmet or 
tunic. He now drives a high powered marked response vehicle.  He is issued with black combat 
trousers, a fitted black t-shirt and steel-capped boots. He often wears a US style baseball cap along 
with high specification body armor underneath a tactical vest. He is adorned with technology such as 
a compact personal radio, a smart phone and a Body Worn Video Camera (BWVC). He is equipped 
with leg restraints, a “spit-hood11”, handcuffs, an extendable baton, chemical spray and now, a CED. 
An image which appears to portray the current policing style as one of increasing coercion as 
opposed to consent, and further confirms the “Dixon myth” (Squires & Kennison, 2010).  
 
Squires and Kennison (2010) claim that the principle of consent based policing (if it ever really 
existed) has been subject to gradual erosion over time and in response to a series of critical incidents 
which the police service have faced. They describe the increased resort to coercive measures (and 
concomitant erosion in consent based policing) as “Event Driven” and necessary in response to the 
increasing demands of contemporary law enforcement. This would perhaps go some way to 
explaining the increased availability of CEDs to uniformed officers, the roll out “Event Driven”, in 
direct response to a reduction in police numbers and an increase in assaults against officers (Police 
Federation, 2017).  
 
CEDs are electronic control tools designed to incapacitate people, either through pain compliance or 
by restricting a person’s normal bodily function. Research has shown that CEDs can bring significant 
operational benefit to the police service, such as a reduction in rates of injury to officers and 
subjects during a coercive encounter (Kaminski, 2009; Kaminski et al., 2015; Lin & Jones, 2010; 
MacDonald et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007; 2009) and a reduction in the number of instances 
whereby officers resort to lethal force (Kaminski et al., 2009; White & Ready, 2007). But, the 
question remains as to whether the operational benefits will ultimately justify the wider erosion of 
public trust and confidence which could befall the police service if these devices are not used 
ethically.  
 
When an individual police officer aims his or her weapon at a fellow citizen, and has to 
decide whether or not to pull the trigger, that highly contextual and emotionally charged 
moment carries with it a raft of wider social, cultural, political and professional factors. 
                                                          
11 A “spit-hood” is a dense piece of fortified material that is placed over the head of a subject who has, or is 
likely to, spit at officers. When deployed it completely covers the face and head of the subject.  
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These relate to training, selection of personnel, tactics and choice of weapons but, above all, 
to a philosophy of policing and its foundations in a culture and structure of accountability. 
This ensures the legitimacy and acceptance of the police and its legitimate use of force. 
(Punch, 2011 p. 5)  
 
It is vital that the ongoing implementation of CEDs into the British police service be handled 
sensitively and professionally by governing organisations. CEDs are controversial and their use has 
already attracted considerable criticism in many overseas policing jurisdictions analogous to our 
own, and some worrying trends have emerged. Not least, the overrepresentation of CED use on non-
white and vulnerable citizens. Of crucial concern is the apparently discriminate nature of the 
problem. CEDs appear to be consistently overused on the population groups considered a minority 
or regarded as an otherwise vulnerable citizen of the country to which the research relates. For 
example, CEDs are reportedly used in a disproportionate manner on the indigenous population of 
Australia (Ryan, 2008); the black and Hispanic population of the USA (Gau et al., 2010), the Maori 
and Pacific Island population of New Zealand (Cornege, 2011) and homeless or mentally vulnerable 
citizens of Canada (Braidwood Commission, 2010; Oriola et al., 2010).  
 
Despite a relative paucity of CEDs, this worrying trend also appears to have emerged in the United 
Kingdom (Shaw, 2015). A full critical discussion of the ethical concerns associated with CED use is 
provided in chapter five of this thesis, but it is also worthy of mention here because of the 
potentially serious consequences which could befall the UK if the incumbent risks are not effectively 
managed. If CED use is not handled professionally and with due diligence then it is possible that this 
significant change in organisational practice will do little more than promote a further shift away 
from consent doctrine policing. This will, in turn, promote further derision between the police and 
the policed and will ultimately (and perhaps inevitably) prove detrimental rather than beneficial to 
our society: “Police use of force is always an emotive issue and especially if it is associated with race, 
discrimination, lack of due care, the failure to seek alternatives or seemingly excessive violence.” 
(Punch, 2011, p. 73) 
 
With these concerns in mind, it is important to empirically explore the introduction and 
implementation of CEDs into the British police service. Also, to critically assess the standards of 
initial training (see chapter eight) and robustly investigate the current trends in CED 
operationalisation with an emphasis on decision making and ethical use (see chapter ten).  
33 | P a g e  
 
In order to expand upon the relevant theory underpinning this current research, the wider use of 
force literature is considered below, as context is key. To this end, the following section will explore 
the origins of use of force research before affording brief consideration to the concept of lethal 
measures. This is followed by a more detailed exploration of the police use of less-lethal force (with 
a focus on CED use) and the force predictors that have been shown to influence a coercive police-
citizen encounter. This overarching framework is used in the later part of this thesis to critically 
analyse a number of real-life CED-led encounters as described by the sample population (see chapter 
nine).  
 
Use of force  
Bittner (1970; 1974), is widely credited for laying the foundations for use of force studies as they 
exist today. In his early work Bitner categorised the very Office of Constable as “. . . nothing else than 
a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society” (1970, p. 39). Whilst this 
narrow confinement is unsuited to the current mandate of police officer omni-competence, it is 
indisputable that the police use of force is a key area of societal focus and concern. Such was 
highlighted by his early research which highlighted the difficulties faced by academics seeking to 
identify, correlate and quantify common predictors of police behavior (Bittner, 1970; 1974). 
 
Whilst not expressly acknowledging Bittner’s early contributions, Sherman (1980) authored a 
literature review which, for the first time, organised and codified the results of quantitative research 
(both published and unpublished) detailing various aspects of police behavior. A field at that time, 
clearly lacking in academic substance, and one which he described as merely “. . . a series of 
bivariate assertions about the impact of certain variables on police behavior about which a 
moderate amount of empirical evidence has accumulated” (1980, p. 70).  
 
Whilst the primary focus of this research was not police coercion, the use of excessive, justified and 
lethal force did feature in the study. More importantly, Sherman’s literature review formulated a 
rudimentary framework for the correlation and quantification of certain force correlates. Sherman 
proposed 5 “causes” which could be used for the bivariate or multivariate analysis of empirically 
acquired data. These correlates were categorised as “individual explanations” (such as officer age, 
sex or length of service), “situational explanations” (e.g. a proactive or reactive police response to 
call for service), “organisational explanations” (such as the way crime is prevented or reports 
investigated by the force), “community explanations” (such as the political landscape or the 
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economic area demographic) and finally, “legal explanations” such as the seriousness of the alleged 
offence or the availability of primary evidence at the crime scene (Sherman, 1980, p. 71-92).  
 
Whilst novel in concept, and sound in suggested approach, Sherman’s framework in its purest form 
was not sufficiently scrutinised by a battery of empirical enquiry, making its true effectiveness 
somewhat difficult to judge.  However, his research was key in that it kick-started an increased 
academic engagement in use of force as a standalone topic. 
 
Bayley & Garofalo (1989) is a good example. Building upon previous research by Reiss (1996) and 
Friedrich (1980), this inquiry focused on 467 coercive encounters. The primary research aim was the 
identification of highly effective officers, but use of force habit featured strongly. The research 
entailed the systematic observation of police interaction by trained observers.  
 
Bayley & Garofalo linked 3 of a possible 6 prediction variables as statistically significant force 
indicators. Perhaps unsurprising (but until this study unconfirmed by empirical enquiry); was the 
indication that encounters involving a weapon, verbal abuse conflict upon police arrival, were 
statistically more likely to end in coercion. The results were compelling. But, the study was small 
scale, involving a single police agency and a relatively small data set. This makes generalisability a 
problem. Also, the research failed to control for key officer demographics and the use of trained 
observers may have rendered the data liable to subjective misinterpretation.   
 
Worden (1995) analysed 1,528 encounters. Using multi-nominal logit as a means of multivariate 
analysis, Worden classified 6 (of a possible 30) factors as statistically significant predictors of 
reasonable or improper force. Four of which, shared some commonality with Friedrich (1980) and 
Bayley & Garofalo (1989). These factors included the seriousness of the index offence, the public 
nature of the police / suspect encounter, the presence of other members of the public and the 
intoxicated state of the suspect. Despite this apparent conformity of data it is worthy of note that 
not a single predictor is rated as statistically significant or indeed statistically insignificant across all 
three agendas.  
    
From this early research the development of a loose methodological framework for the accurate 
quantification of force can be seen. However, it was not until 1995 that a compendious definition 
was presented to the academic community. Garner et al. (1995) considered 1,585 surveys 
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completed by officers, and 185 interviews of suspects involved in a coercive encounter. The surveys 
examined relevant situational characteristics. Interviews were completed after the fact, in order to 
better understand the mechanics of the encounter. Garner et al., established that only 1 in 5 
recorded detentions necessitated coercion.  Accouterments were required in only 2% of 
interactions, and the most reliable predictor of police use of force was suspect use of force. Perhaps 
more important than the reported results was the research design. Garner et al. adopted a three 
measured approach to describe force used by police: physical force, maximum force and the 
continuum of force.  
 
The physical force category was used to record when any level of force, including strong verbal 
commands was used by the officer. Although, the value of this broad approach has since been called 
into question by Kaminski et al. (2015). The maximum force category relates to the highest level of 
force used, rather than relying on the analysis of a single sub-category e.g. less-lethal measures 
which could include a variety of methods. The severity of force used by the officer, and /or 
resistance displayed by the suspect during the encounter, was also measured using the continuum 
as a template. Multivariate analysis of a systematic arrest sample (1585 of 1777 adult arrests which 
occurred over a fourteen day period in June, 1994) was completed.  
 
The research used data from officers as well as suspects, developed and defined multiple force 
measures and employed effective multivariate statistical testing to identify consistent, inconsistent 
and consistent non-predictors of force. Not only was the research framework successfully replicated 
across six policing jurisdictions (Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002), it was also cited by academics as a 
definition “. . . that most, if not all studies after 1995 would use . . . in their assessment of this 
phenomenon.” (Klahm & Tillyer, 2010, p. 215).  
 
Lethal-force 
The Police use of lethal-force is not a primary focus of this current research. However, a general 
awareness of this particular research area is relevant because many of the hard “lessons learned” 
through the systematic dissection of lethal-force encounters, can be applied to the non-lethal arena, 
particularly in regards to the use of less-lethal measures such as a CED. With this in mind, the topic 
of firearms and deadly force is afforded succinct consideration.  
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Wilson declares that “. . . no aspect of policing elicits more passionate concern or more divided 
opinion than police use of lethal-force” (1975, p. 17). A bold declaration, clearly reflected by UK 
scholarship, which highlights state-level accountability to individual officer decisions.   
 
One of the most important decisions the state can make is to take the life of one of its own 
citizens. By implication the gravest judgment a police officer may have to make – on behalf 
of the state, but also of society – is to kill someone by shooting him or her dead.  (Punch, 
2011, p. 4)    
 
Statistical analysis of several hundred lethal-force encounters has exposed a number of commonality 
factors. These include suspect or officer demographics, location of the incident and the time of day 
(see Alpert & Dunham, 1995; Alpert & Fridell, 1992;   Blumberg, 1989; Fyfe, 1988a; Geller & Karales, 
1981a; 1981b; Geller & Scott, 1992). At the time of writing no consistent explanations for the link 
between these causal factors has been provided. A degree of academic consensus has arisen citing 
suspect intoxication (through drink or illegal street drugs), the suspect use of aggravated force, and 
the suspect attempting to escape from lawful custody as common precursors of police use of lethal-
force, but again there is little plausible explanation as to why.  
 
The desirable goal of a marked reduction in lethal-force encounters, is only exampled by North 
American research completed after the case of Tennessee v Garner (1985). In a landmark ruling, the 
Supreme Court declared that police use of lethal-force to prevent a suspect evading lawful custody 
was illegal unless exceptional circumstances exist (see Fyfe & Walker, 1990; Walker & Fridell, 1993). 
Whilst significant, these research findings are unlikely to be generalisable to the United Kingdom due 
to the significant variance in use of force policy and procedure between these two very different 
policing organisations.  
 
Moving to the United Kingdom, Best and Quigley (2003) were commissioned by the Police 
Complaints Authority12 (PCA) to analyse 20 police shootings which occurred between 1998 and 
2001.  
The research set out to identify commonality factors present in lethal -force incidents. More 
specifically, what situational or encounter characteristics are likely to precede a police shooting or 
                                                          
12 Formally the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) now the Independent Office for Police 
Conduct (IOPC).  
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have an influence on the timeframe of the first shot fired. A secondary research avenue was the 
investigation into the seemingly disproportionate number of black or ethnic minority victims of 
police shootings. From this study, some interesting arguments were presented. For example, the 
authors disclosed that without a clear working strategy in place or an effective command structure 
present at the scene, a police shooting was more likely to occur within a shorter period of time. 
Similar arguments were presented if officers were not provided with adequate ballistic protection or 
if the subject was intoxicated, suffering from a mental illness, in a public place or not properly 
contained.  
 
Interestingly, the researchers could offer little more than an untested hypothesis based on 
institutional prejudices which would now be regarded as “unconscious biases” (see chapter five) to 
explain the ethnicity imbalance. They went on to declare that “. . .  the disproportionate 
representation of non-white victims of police shootings in the PCA review (5 out of 24 or 20.8 per 
cent of the sample) would certainly suggest that this is a topic that requires considerable 
investigation.”  (Best and Quigley, 2003 p. 362 emphasis added). Despite this early warning, the 
avenues for further research in this vital area have not yet been followed and as a result, the 
problem of disproportionate ethnic minority representation has filtered from the firearms arena into 
the Taser phenomenon, a topic discussed in detail in chapter five. 
     
Squires and Kennison (2010) developed some of these key arguments further. Their case study 
analyses of a number of police involved shootings, focused heavily on the events leading to the 
death of Jean Charles De Menezes in Stockwell tube station in 2005. Using the controversial 
Operation Kratos policy which was developed by ACPO as a tactic to instantly incapacitate suspected 
suicide bombers, Mr. De Menezes was shot 8 times to the head at close range by two police firearms 
officers after he was mistakenly identified as a terrorist about to detonate a body worn explosive 
device. It later transpired that Mr. De Menezes was innocent. During the course of the investigations 
and inquests that followed this tragic event (IPCC, 2007a; 2007c) there was some debate as to 
whether the use of Operation Kratos, which was developed in secret by an unelected police body 
(ACPO now the NPCC), amounted to a “Shoot to Kill” policy and whether the “direction” to shoot 
given by the Designated Senior Officer (DSO) amounted to an “order” and as such removed 
individual accountability (and therefore discretion) from the firearms officer.  
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Squires and Kennison identified the importance of effective organisational oversight to both 
spontaneous and pre-planned firearms operations. They stressed the need for appropriate selection, 
training and equipping of armed officers, as well as an identifiable, well-informed chain of command 
making effective use of the available intelligence to better inform strategic, tactical and operational 
decision making. They highlight the importance of a pro-active as opposed to a re-active or “Event 
Driven” policing response to the management of armed operations and advocate the so-called “New 
Public Management” (Squires & Kennison, 2010, p. 50-51) approach, whereby the police service 
retains ultimate accountability for the end result of a critical incident which includes the, in-good-
faith, actions and even errors of individual agents.  
 
Punch (2011) dissected many of the same firearms incidents and made some valuable suggestions as 
to how the wider accountability rhetoric could be married to UK operational practice. Punch used 
the Dutch judicial system as a mechanism of comparison, pointing out that in Holland relevant 
branches of central government represented by a body of elected officials are given legislative 
oversight and ultimate operational accountability for the police use of firearms. This is in stark 
contrast to the UK approach that retains constabulary autonomy by passing responsibility of this 
critical area to a body of unelected senior police officers (i.e. the NPCC) with ultimate accountability 
still resting with the individual officer who is answerable to the courts.  
 
The Dutch approach certainly appears compatible with the New Public Management ethos and could 
be a viable avenue for the UK to follow, albeit a significant shift in national policy and current 
working practice would be clearly be required. Punch also advocated the principal of elongating 
firearms incidents by containment and negotiation as opposed to pushing an early resolution.  This 
so-called “playing it long” approach was said by Best and Quigley (2003) to be a reliable means of 
reducing the number of instances that police will resort to the discharge of firearms during 
spontaneous and pre planned operations and is a tactic that should be employed if the prevailing 
circumstances and risk permit.   
 
Crucially, all three commentators cite the use of less-lethal weapons such as CEDs, as a vital means 
of reducing rates of firearms discharge and as a by-product, lethal-force (see Best & Quigley, 2003 p. 
361; Punch, 2011, p. 85; Squires & Kennison, 2010, p. 180-181) however this position is, in itself 
fraught with difficulty because even less-lethal weapons have the capacity to kill or seriously injure 
people. For example, there have been 17 associated fatalities in this country since CEDs were 
39 | P a g e  
 
introduced in 2003 (SACMILL, 2017) and deaths caused by less-lethal weaponry have the potential to 
instigate negative social consequences akin to, and perhaps even indistinguishable from, a firearms 
related fatality.  
 
Less-lethal force 
The research focusing on the police use of less-lethal force is crucial to this current inquiry, 
particularly when the analysis relates to coercive encounters involving a CED. The use of a CED is 
purported to decrease rates of officer and suspect injury (Lin & Jones, 2010; MacDonald, Kaminski & 
Smith, 2009; 2009; Smith et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2012) and to reduce instances of police resorting 
to lethal-force (Kaminski et al., 2013; White & Ready, 2007; 2010). The empirical grounding of these 
claims are considered at various stages throughout this thesis.   
 
At the time of writing, the empirical research conducted by Jenkinson et al. (2006) remains the only 
peer reviewed article relating to the police use of less-lethal force in the United Kingdom. Due to its 
links to the debate around CEDs, this article is considered in-depth during chapter five. At present, 
the majority of research on police coercion originates from North America and focuses on non-lethal 
measures. Legal constraints such as those imposed by the Supreme Court in Graham v Conner (1989) 
demand that the level of force used must be objectively reasonable given the circumstances. 
Relevant parameters ensuring compliance with this doctrine are provided by law enforcement 
agencies through departmental policy often manifested by a force continuum (Terrill & Paoline, 
2013). UK policy and practice differs slightly from this approach, relying more heavily on adherence 
to legislation and use of the National Decision Model (NDM) (see chapter four).  
 
Lacking in the field of police use of non-lethal force, is a strict academic consensus as to the exact 
point when “force” has actually been “used”; particularly at the lower end of the force continuum. 
Terrill and Reisig (2003), posit that “force” has been “used” when a police officer threatens or elects 
to inflict any degree of physical harm to a suspect. A threshold which clearly places the officer as the 
primary instigator of a force encounter. In contrast to this narrow confinement are the parameters 
adopted by Williams and Westall who argue that force is used with “. . . any act or behavior that 
compelled a person into submission.” (2003, p. 471)  
 
This definition suggests that force usage is dependent upon nothing more than a positive act of 
submission from the subject. If interpreted in its strictest sense, this would imply that a suspect who 
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raises his hands in surrender at the mere sight of an approaching police vehicle has had “force” 
applied on him. Such inconsistency in approach would not only account for the disparate findings 
across various research agendas, but would also explain why many researchers provide no concrete 
definition of force at all. Instead they control only for the application of some form of physical or 
verbal coercion as the primary force measure. The subjective nature of this methodology may well 
serve the individual need of each research project, but does little to further a cohesive 
understanding of the phenomenon in its entirety.    
 
As discussed above, Sherman’s (1980) literature review was one of the first studies to amalgamate 
existing empirical evidence in order to increase scientific understanding of police behavior, including 
the use of force. Riksheim and Chermak (1993) took on this mantle by providing a thorough synopsis 
of the academic field since Sherman’s review, including specific focus (unlike Sherman) on the use of 
less-lethal force. Supported by these two studies, Klahm and Tillyer (2010) effectively rejected 
situational and organisational explanations as reliable force predictors. Instead, they preferred the 
now universally accepted categories of suspect, officer and encounter characteristics. The empirical 
evidence relating to each of these correlates as well as a number of associated sub-correlates will 
now be discussed.     
 
Suspect characteristics 
Suspect characteristics are often examined by academics researching police use of force. 
Demography is arguably the most commonly researched area, with particular attention paid to race 
/ ethnic background, gender and age. Other independent variables of interest include suspect 
behavior during police contact, social status and the prior consumption of intoxicants. A brief 
summary of the research relevant to each of these factors is provided below.  
 
Race / ethnic background  
A growing body of empirical research has explored the connection between race and coercion, yet 
findings remain inconclusive. Sherman (1980) reported mixed causality, and since this time several 
projects have achieved similar results (Kaminski, Digiovanni & Downs, 2004; Paoline & Terrill, 2004; 
2007; Terrill, Leinfelt & Kwak, 2008). Certain studies have reported that a suspect’s ethnicity had no 
influence on a police officer’s decision to apply force (e.g. Friedrich, 1980; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; 
McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline, 2005) but these findings can be contrasted with research by Gau et al. 
(2010); Shaw (2010); Terrill & Mastrofski (2002) Terrill, Alpert, Dunham & Smith (2003) and Garner 
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et al. (2002) who all claim that Black or ethnic minority citizens are more likely to experience force 
than Caucasians, particularly during low-level encounters.  
 
Gender  
Considerable attention has been paid to gender in the force literature. The evidence suggests that 
male subjects are statistically more likely to have force applied to them than female counterparts 
(Garner et al., 2002; 2006; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline, 2005; Miller 
2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill et al., 2003). Research by Croft (1985) 
and Klinger (1995) offers a plausible explanation for this. They present a solid case to argue that 
police generally perceive men to pose more of a threat to them than women. Only a handful of 
studies reported mixed or no relationship in this area (e.g. Morabito & Doerner, 1997; Engel, Sobol & 
Worden 2000).  
 
Demeanor 
Although vulnerable to subjective misinterpretation, the demeanor of a suspect as perceived by the 
attending officer is a relevant force predictor. Again the research findings in this area are not 
conclusive. Paoline &Terrill (2004); McCluskey et al. (2005); McCluskey &Terrill (2005) and Terrill & 
Mastofski (2002) all report that a suspect who uses foul or abusive language or displays otherwise 
disrespectful behavior is no more or less likely to have force applied to them than a passive suspect. 
On the other hand, multivariate analysis completed by Engel et al. (2000), Garner et al. (2002) and 
Kaminski et al. (2004) report a positive association.  
 
Intoxication  
Police use of lethal-force has been conclusively linked with an intoxicated recipient (Garner et al, 
2002; Geller & Scott 1992; Alpert & Fridell 1992; Fyfe, 1988a; Blumberg, 1989). The association 
between intoxication and non-lethal measures is less concrete. Boivin & Legacé (2016); Engel (2015); 
Engel et al. (2000); Kavanagh (1997); McCluskey et al. (2005); McCluskey & Terrill (2005); Morabito 
& Socia (2015); Terrill & Mastrofski, (2002) Terrill et al. (2003) and Terrill, Leinfelt & Kwak (2008) all 
argue that suspects who are drug or alcohol induced, are more likely to be subject of force than 
those of a sober disposition. However, Crawford & Burns (1998) concluded that drug use was not 
related to police use of force and Morabito & Doerner (1997) reported that intoxicants had no 
bearing on an officer’s decision to apply a less-lethal tactic.  
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Mental illness 
Engel (2015) declares that “One of the leading concerns among law enforcement agencies in this 
country is the appropriate handling of persons with mental disorders . . . [and]. . . the research 
community is poorly positioned to assist in the development of appropriate strategies to alleviate 
these well-known problems” (p. 247). The relevance of this social concern to UK law enforcement is 
certainly at a parity with North America, and the empirical evidence deficiency remains a sociological 
concern. Recent research by Morabito & Socia (2015) has taken initial steps to quantify the impact of 
mental illness on coercive a statistically significant predictor of injury to either subject or officer. 
 
In recent years the UK police service has dramatically altered its approach to first point of contact 
encounters with mentally impaired individuals. In a revolutionary development, initial calls for 
service are resourced by a uniformed police officer in company with a fully trained and accredited 
mental health triage nurse. Where possible, the nurse will conduct initial communication with the 
subject, access relevant medical history and then decide on an appropriate course of action.  
 
The intention of the street triage project was to reduce the number of persons detained in police 
cells under the Mental Health Act. Ensuring instead, that patients receive care at an appropriate 
facility such as a hospital or secure mental health institution. Recent research has suggests that this 
approach can reduce the annual number of custody detentions by up to 56% and result in significant 
financial savings for the police and health services (Cole, 2014; Keown et al., 2016). A reduction in 
rates of force application is also a feasible by-product; but as yet, there is little published research in 
this niche area. So, the true science remains to be seen.  
 
Officer characteristics 
The personal characteristics and professional background of the attending officer have been the 
subject of increased focus in recent years. Specific attention has been afforded to race, gender age 
and length of service. This study will address two of these characteristics. Race will be excluded as 
the research sample all self-identified as white British. Age will be excluded as the age gap between 
the participants is negligible.   
 
Gender  
Officer gender as it relates to the likelihood of force application during an encounter has been well 
researched. Academic consensus indicates that an officer’s decision to resort to force is not affected 
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by their gender (Paoline &Terrill, 2004; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & 
Terrill, 2007; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill et al., 2008). Interestingly, gender differentiation does 
occur when the severity of elected force is controlled for. A notable example is the study completed 
by Garner et al. (2002) which suggested that male officers were statistically more likely to resort to 
force and employ higher levels of force than their female counterparts.  
 
Ethnicity  
The majority of empirical studies indicate that no significant relationship exists between an officers’ 
racial or cultural background and his or her propensity to use force (Boivin & Legacé, 2016; Freidrich, 
1980; Lawton, 2007; McCluskey et al., 2005; McCluskey & Terril, 2005; Morabito & Doerner, 1997; 
Sherman, 1980; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). However, somewhat mixed results can be seen when 
other situational or organisational variables are introduced into the data set. For example, Sun and 
Payne (2004) reported that Black officers were more likely to resort to force when intervening in 
conflict than white officers (see also Garner et al., 1999; 2002; 2005 which reported mixed or 
inconclusive results in this area).  
 
Length of service  
The link between service length and force usage is unclear. For example, Paoline & Terrill (2007); and 
Terrill & Mastrofski (2002) report that more experienced officers were less likely to use force than 
those who were younger in service, but Boivin & Legacé, (2016); McCluskey et al. (2005); McCluskey 
& Terrill (2005) and Terrill et al. (2008) all came to a contrary conclusion, finding that more 
experienced officers were no more, or less likely to engage in force than less experienced colleagues. 
 
Encounter characteristics 
Research exploring the influence of certain impact factors external to the officer-suspect dynamic 
has increased in popularity in recent years. Common variables include the suspect use of a weapon, 
resistance, and the fact that the officer was effecting an arrest during the encounter. Research 
relevant to each of these characteristics is discussed below.  
 
Weapons 
It is perhaps unremarkable that the suspect possession, threat or use of a weapon during police 
contact, will dramatically increase the likelihood that the officer will elect to apply force in order to 
quell the situation (Boivin & Legacé, 2016; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline & Terrill, 2007; Terrill, 
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2007). What is surprising, is the inconsistency in results when other variables are introduced. For 
example, in a comparative study focusing on male–female, police behaviours, Paoline & Terrill 
(2004) used data gathered from a quasi-experimental study on neighborhood policing tactics, to 
report that the presence of a weapon had no bearing on a female officer’s decision to resort to 
force, but the same could not be said for male counterparts. Perhaps more surprising, is the research 
by McCluskey & Terrill (2005) which reported that this encounter characteristic had no bearing on a 
force decision, regardless of gender.   
 
Suspect resisting arrest or engaging in conflict 
In early research, predictors such as the behavior of the suspect during the encounter, were 
generally overlooked (Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 1980). The failure to control for the 
unpredictable dynamic of forceful encounters did little to facilitate scientific understanding. 
Contemporary research has addressed this shortfall. The results unanimously indicate positive 
associations. Boivin & Legacé (2016); Garner et al. (1996); Kavanagh (1997); McCluskey & Terrill 
(2005); McCluskey et al. (2005); Paoline & Terrill (2007); Terrill et al. (2003) and Terrill et al. (2008) 
all confirm that suspects resisting officers, or otherwise engaging in conflict, are more likely to 
experience force application.     
 
Chapter three has explored the principle of policing by consent, highlighting a cultural propensity 
towards the celebration and use of excessive force, that some academics claim is entrenched within 
the ranks of the police service. The possibility that the addition of a CED could exacerbate this 
situation has been raised, with a particular focus on race relations, police legitimacy and 
organisational accountability. The police use of lethal and less-lethal force measures has also been 
analysed. It is apparent from this data that a number of different factors can influence the 
application and severity of force used during a confrontational police – citizen encounter. What is 
unapparent, is a clear consensus as to the extent these influences play. Crucially, the reason why 
particular force factors are capable of affecting the encounter in the way that they do. Chapter nine 
of this thesis will help to answer some of these key questions by providing a deeper qualitative 
perspective to what is a predominately quantitatively researched topic area. The following chapter 
will address the guidance tools used by police officers to inform their operational decision making.   
 
 
 
45 | P a g e  
 
Chapter four 
Operational decision making aides 
 
The preceding chapter raised the argument that the hallmark principle of policing by consent has 
gradually eroded in recent years, and that the common addition of a CED to rank-and-file officers will 
only serve to further exacerbate this situation. The following chapter introduces and describes the 
various guidance tools, aides, technology, legislation and tactical considerations put in place by the 
COP to assist officers with operational decision making, particularly as it relates to the use of less-
lethal force. This information is crucial because in the later stages of this thesis, qualitative reflections 
from the sample population are used to critically assess the extent to which technology, legislation, 
policy and the NDM are truly utilised in the training and operational environment.  
 
Equipment  
CEDs represent not only, a significant addition to the armoury of a general duties officer, but also a 
further shift away from consent-oriented policing. Albeit this altruistic concept has already been 
challenged by many researchers (see above), the principles enshrined within this historic doctrine 
could go some way to explaining why the carriage of a CED is not yet routine and is more rigidly 
controlled in the UK than in comparable overseas organisations (NPCC, 2016; 2016a).  
 
Dymond declares that in order to truly understand the scientific impact of CEDs on UK law 
enforcement, the device must be considered in a broader sense. Not as a single entity, but rather a 
new piece in the use of force jigsaw: “. . . it is important to consider the Taser in the context of the 
socio-technical network that surrounds it . . . how this network is intertwined with other forms of 
policing weaponry, and their associated socio-technical networks and patternings.” (2014, p. 2)  
 
With this position in mind, it is necessary to explore the array of equipment carried by operational 
officers. Whilst, the use of less-lethal weaponry other than CEDs is not a key driver of this current 
research, such items cannot be entirely discounted because they have a role to play in the training 
and operational environment. Even if the decision making process ultimately negates their use. As 
such, a selection of this technology is briefly discussed below.  
 
 
46 | P a g e  
 
Extendable baton 
Historically, the only less-lethal weapon carried by a police officer in the UK was a small wooden 
truncheon. In the early 1990’s, 13 police forces took part in a series of trials assessing the operability 
of friction lock, side-handled batons commonly used by officers in the USA. Trials were overseen by 
the Home Office who reported that officers strongly preferred the extendable baton to the 
truncheon. Trial data disclosed that the modern baton was no more or less likely to cause serious 
injury than its predecessor, and that the public were generally open to the proposed change (Kock, 
Kemp & Rix, 1993).  
 
In the wake of the trials, an extendable baton is now issued to every warranted officer in the UK. 
Common brand names include “Asp™”, “Monodnock™” and “Camlock™.” Practicality issues directed 
a move away from the longer rigid side-handled baton, with police forces unanimously preferring 
the extendable friction-lock model which can be stored discreetly in a holster on the utility belt.  
 
Usually made from metal or a fortified plastic composite, extendable batons are intended to be 
drawn and subsequently extended by a sharp flick of the wrist. When the weapon is no longer 
needed, it is collapsed, either by a button on the base of the model, or by the operator striking the 
end, hard into a solid surface. The extendable baton is commonly viewed as an effective albeit 
rudimentary piece of equipment (Roberts, Noakes, Leadbetter & Pike, 1994).   
 
The extendable baton is marketed, and primarily intended to be, a less-lethal impact weapon. When 
used, it should cause the recipient no more than low-level motor dysfunction. In the UK, authorised 
use is reflected by way of a “Red. Amber, Green” system. Officers are shown an outline of a person 
and are instructed to strike at different areas of the body depending upon the seriousness of the 
threat posed (Travis, 1998).  
 
Officers are generally trained to strike soft tissue such as the side of the arms and legs (designated 
“Green”) which carry a low risk of permanent injury. “Yellow” areas are used if the threat is 
perceived to be higher and corresponding target areas are bones and joints which carry a higher risk 
of serious injury. “Red” areas (which include the head, neck and groin) may only be targeted in the 
most extreme circumstances because striking these areas has the potential to cause serious injury or 
death (Jenkinson et al., 2006). In some circumstances the baton may also be used to aide joint 
manipulation or pressure point application techniques or for general self-defence (Kock & Rix, 1996).  
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Chemical spray 
Chemical sprays are stored under pressure in a small can (akin to a deodorant or hairspray) and kept 
in a discreet holster on the utility belt. When needed, the can is removed and pointed at the subject. 
On most occasions a warning is given before a button on the top of the can is pressed and the spray 
is emitted. Chemical spray is designed to be administered into the eyes causing them to close. It also 
causes temporary pain and severe irritation to the eyes, mouth and nasal passages.13 The intended 
result of deployment is for the subject to stop resisting so that they can be safely apprehended 
(MacDonald, Kaminski & Smith, 2009; Morabito & Doerner, 1997).  
 
There are many different varieties of chemical spray14 all of which contain different active 
ingredients, affect the subject in different ways and are decontaminated by various methods 
(Rappert, 2007). Chemical spray was first tested in the UK in March 1996. The trial took place over a 
6 month period involving 16 police forces and 3,818 police officers and explored the value of this 
technology as a less-lethal alternative to the extendable baton, or empty handed tactics. During the 
trial period chemical spray was drawn and used 726 times and was drawn but not used 381 times. 
The desired result was generally achieved within 5 seconds and was effective 90% of the time. It was 
perceived by officers to be a safe and effective tool, often deterring a non-compliant subject without 
recourse to deployment (Kock & Rix, 1996). In the wake of a successful trial period, (and in parity 
with the extendable baton) a derivative of chemical spray is now mandatorily carried by every 
warranted officer (Rogers & Johnson, 1999; Morabito & Doerner, 1997). 
 
Common critique of chemical agents is overspray and secondary exposure (Kock & Rix 1996; Rappert 
2007). More importantly, the use of chemical spray has been linked to a number of deaths, both 
nationally (Granfield, Onnen & Petty, 1994) and internationally (American Civil Liberties Union 
[ACLU], 1995); however in a later, more comprehensive study, the IPCC investigated 333 in-custody 
deaths between 1998- 2009 but could not conclusively link the use of chemical spray as the sole 
cause of death (IPCC, 2010).   
 
 
                                                          
13 The organisation subject of this research has elected to issue all officers with a chemical spray known as 
Captor™. Which is a 50ml pressurised canister containing ethanol and water as well 0.3% Nonivamide which is 
an irritant akin to an extreme concentration of chili peppers. Captor is designed to cause localised pain and 
discomfort and forces the subject’s eyes to close temporarily.      
14 For example, CS™, CN™, OC™, PAVA™, Captor™ 
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Handcuffs 
Handcuffs are perhaps the most symbolic item of police equipment. Early models were made from 
iron and were chain linked with the shackles fabricated in a “D” shaped pattern. In 1992 most UK 
forces provided officers with a more contemporary form of rigid handcuffs. This advancement in 
technology afforded officers the ability to control a resistant suspect through the use of pain 
measures (such as the “push-pull” technique) or controlled take-downs with one or both wrists 
restrained (Rogers, 1998).  
 
Rigid handcuffs have been associated with serious injuries (Chariot, Ragot, Authier, Questrel & 
Diamant-Berger, 2001; Ball, Ferran & Barton, 2008) but are still commonly used. Certain UK forces 
have rejected rigid handcuffs, preferring instead the rotational chain-link design made by Chubb™ or 
Asp™. On the positive side, chain link models offer a lower injury potential, as they are not intended 
to be used during takedown techniques or for pain compliance. On the negative side the lack of 
rigidity takes away a valuable coercive compliance contingency.  
 
Body worn video cameras 
The introduction of Body Worn Video Cameras (BWVCs) to police officers is a significant 
technological advancement (Lum et al., 2015). BWVCs vary in design, durability reliability and 
technical specification (Sykes, 2014). The organisation subject of this research has issued a Reveal 
RS2-X2™ to every uniformed officer. The unit is black in colour and smaller than the average smart 
phone. It is carried overtly, clipped to the shoulder connector of the officer’s body armour. The unit 
is easily activated by a single button and when recording, it emits a red light, serving as notification. 
The device records both visually and audibly. Data is stored initially on the device itself, but can be 
downloaded to a secure storage system for evidential or developmental use. It is expected that the 
unit be carried at all times and deployed either at the officer’s discretion, or, as mandated by 
organisational policy. 
 
Given the relative infancy of BWVC technology, it is interesting to note a steady advancement in 
empirical scholarship. Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland (2015) for example, explored the effect of BWVC 
deployment on use of force and citizen complaint figures. The study took place over a 12 month 
period and involved frontline officers. Using the 12 hour shift as the primary unit of analysis, the 
study assigned officers either a “treatment shift” where they were required to wear a BWVC or a 
“control shift” where they were not. Data analysis disclosed that officers who use BWVC, are less 
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likely to use force, and less likely, to be subject of a complaint, than those who do not (Ariel et al., 
2015). Other operational benefits may include a decrease in citizen complaints, instances of 
excessive force and assaults against police, as well as an increase in positive court outcomes during 
criminal proceedings (see Ariel et al., 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; Ariel et al., 2017; Ellis et al., 2015; 
Grossmith et al., 2015; Jennings, Lynch & Fridell, 2015; Katz et al., 2015; Owens, et al., 2014).    
 
Legislation 
Officers are further guided in their force decision making by both British and European legislation. A 
selection of the most relevant statutory authorities will now be discussed.    
 
European Convention on Human Rights (1988) 
Article 2 - Right to life: Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
The UK does not ascribe to capital punishment. So the Convention provides a caveat to protect 
citizens who take life in limited circumstance, such as self-defence or legitimate law enforcement 
activity. Article 2 also places a positive obligation on member states to protect life where possible, 
and to investigate or intervene if life is lost, or taken unlawfully.       
 
Article 3 - Prohibition of torture: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
 
This provision is especially relevant to an STO. Unethical CED use could clearly constitute an Article 3 
breach. During a 5 second cycle, the recipient is caused significant pain and suffering. When the 
cycle is finished the barbs remain attached, and can be re-activated at the behest of the operator by 
a simple push of a button. Likewise, if the operator unnecessarily maintains pressure on the trigger, 
the cycle will continue indefinitely. The drive-stun technique could also be used for the application 
of warrantless pain. The power wielded by an STO, must be supervised at state and local level. CED 
deployments should be scrutinised and inappropriate use must be identified, challenged and 
remedied. Article 3 provides a control mechanism, to ensure requisite ethical compliance (European 
Convention on Human Rights [ECHR], 2010).    
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Criminal Law Act (1967)  
S.3 (1)  Use of force during arrest: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances 
in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected 
offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. 
 
This provision is relied upon heavily by police officers, albeit the provisions may also be used by 
civilians. The two key elements which ensure legally defensible actions is this use of reasonable force 
to prevent crime or effect an arrest. This legislation ensures that an STO deploying Taser on a person 
threatening to harm another with a knife is justified in doing so (British Self Defence Governing Body 
[BSDGB], 2016a).       
 
Common law 
“It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good 
law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary.” (Archibold 19-41). 
 
The common law comprises hundreds of years of judicial precedent, which have evolved to become 
binding legislation. Often in lieu of statutory governance. The common law system is incredibly 
complex, particularly as it relates to the use of force in self-defence. However, from this body of law 
the right to defend yourself, another, or, your property from attack, has evolved. This power is open 
to police officers and civilians, provided the force used was objectively reasonable given the 
circumstances (BSDGB, 2016b).   
 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (1988) 
S.76 CJIA (1988) - Reasonable force for purpose of self-defence. This section can be read as a juristic 
continuation of the existing self-defence provisions. This piece of legislation clarifies and develops 
certain aspects of the defence, specifically concerning the mens rea (guilty mind) of the defendant. 
S.76 CJIA makes clear that a person is entitled to rely on the law of self-defence if he honestly believed 
that use of force was necessary and the level of force reasonable in the circumstances. This defence 
remains even if this belief later turns out to be mistaken. This statue also provides a degree of flexibility 
in application if the force used was objectively viewed as excessive, after the fact. As long as the 
defendant can show an honestly held belief that the force he used was proportionate at the time of 
the offence then he is entitled to protection under the self-defence doctrine. Unlike PACE, the CJIA is 
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not exclusive to police officers, so the legal protections it affords can be relied upon by anyone. (The 
National Archives, 2011)  
 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) 
Section 117 PACE (1984) - The power of a constable to use reasonable force: Where any provision 
of this Act (a) Confers a power on a constable; and (b) Does not provide that the power may only be 
exercised with the consent of some person, other than a police officer, the officer may use reasonable 
force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power. 
 
S117 PACE (1984) is a concise, yet powerful piece of legislation that permits a police officer, to use 
reasonable force in the exercise of a lawful power, such as securing the arrest of a suspected 
offender (The National Archives, 2011b).  
 
Mental Health Act (1983) 
S136 Mental Health Act (1983) - Mentally disordered persons found in public places: If a constable 
finds in a place to which the public have access a person who appears to him to be suffering from 
mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care or control, the constable may, if he thinks it 
necessary to do so in the interests of that person or for the protection of other persons, remove that 
person to a place of safety.  
 
S.136 gives a police officer the power to remove to a place of safety, any person who is in a public 
place, appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and is in immediate need of care and control. 
The officer may if necessary use reasonable force to execute this power (The National Archives, 
2011c). 
 
Force continua 
Use of force continua are visual teaching aides which depict and exemplify the recommended police 
response the various levels of resistance displayed by a non-compliant subject. The most common 
models are linear in design, depicting force escalation or de-escalation as rungs on a ladder or a 
flight of steps. Other examples, include various tactical options displayed in a modified linear design, 
a matrix or a wheel configuration. Despite sharing similar characteristics, no single model or design is 
in common use (GAO, 2005; Terrill & Paoline, 2012; Thomas et al., 2010)  
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Continua will usually begin with an officer’s presence, or a strong verbal command. As resistance 
gradually increases, or decreases in gravity, so too will the officer’s expected level of response. For 
example, if an officer is faced with aggravated resistance, they may use chemical spray to control the 
subject. If a weapon is presented, the continua may suggest presentation or use of a Taser. If the 
officer is faced with a potentially lethal weapon then the continua may warrant the use of a firearm 
(Millar, 2010).  
 
Use of force continua are designed to provide an auditable framework for independent or 
departmental scrutiny of a forceful encounter, due to the rebuttable presumption that an officer 
who has followed the continuum has used proportional force (Terrill, 2005). Regardless of form, all 
continua are designed to provide training and guidance to officers on the appropriate level of force 
to employ, depending on the situation they are trying to resolve (Alpert & Dunham, 1997; Sykes & 
Brent, 1980; Terrill, 2001; 2003; 2005 Terrill et al., 2003).  
 
The position of CEDs on the force continua has been the subject of recent academic debate due to 
reports of alarming policy variance. Some jurisdictions (particularly those in North America) 
authorise CED use at a low-level on the continuum (i.e. on a passively resisting subject) and others 
place them at the penultimate stage, second only to lethal-force.  
 
Thomas et al., (2010) considered the placement of CEDs on the Use of force continuum; albeit as 
part of a wider research agenda. One hundred municipal police forces in the United States were 
surveyed. Respondents were asked to reflect their official CED policy using a simplistic 1 – 10 scale; 1 
being no resistance at all and 10 being the use of lethal-force. The survey results indicated that 61% 
of police departments place CEDs between 5 and 7 on a standard continuum, effectively permitting 
use on nothing below an actively resisting subject.  
 
Whilst these results are notable due to contrast with other empirical enquiries which point to a 
degree of institutional inconsistency in this area (e.g. Adams & Jennison, 2007; Alpert & Dunham, 
2010; Amnesty International, 2004; GAO, 2005) the research is not without methodological shortfall. 
For example, the surveys were not sent to smaller, regional or federal jurisdictions so 
representativeness is a problem. The scale itself contained little explanatory guidance and was 
weighted heavily towards the midscale response as this was the only option available other than an 
officer’s presence or use of lethal-force. It also relied on the subjective interpretation of the person 
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completing it.  Moreover, this particular research question took little account of the widespread 
variances in force continua configuration such as matrices, wheel-based designs or even models of 
reflective practice such as the NDM. The authors themselves also make the valid point that certain 
departments may have been politically overly-cautious in their responses and may have based their 
replies on estimated as opposed to official statistics (ibid, p. 305). 
 
Millar (2010) focused on the effect of an organisational policy change repositioning authorised CED 
use from a passive, to a resistive subject. In a simplistic pre-post design, quantitative data was 
collected from a total of 890 force incidents. Pretest data from the 12 months immediately before 
the policy change, and posttest data from the 12 months immediately after the policy change were 
compared.  
 
The findings were in some ways predictable, but in other ways more surprising. Indicative of the 
officers strict adherence to departmental policy, was a marked reduction in Taser use in the year 
after the policy change. Perhaps less predictable (and contrary to the popular opinion of the 
surveyed officers) was the finding of no significant difference in the frequency or severity of injury to 
suspects, and no difference in the frequency of injury to officers since the implementation. Womack, 
Morris and Bishop (2016) and Alpert and Dunham (2010) reported similar results.  
 
From this literature an arguable case in support of the consistent positioning of CED’s at an 
intermediate stage of the force continua (i.e. used on nothing lower than an “actively resisting” 
suspect) can be made. This stance is supported by academics such as Kleinig (2007); Oriola et al. 
(2012) and Sprague (2007) but rejected in the UK by Jenkinson et al. (2006) who campaign for an 
even more conservative approach. 
 
The National Decision Model  
The National Decision Model (NDM) is a pentagonal model of reflective practice but offers 6 key 
phases. It is unique to the police service and distinguishable from other models due to the centrality 
of the Code of Ethics which is incorporable to each and every cycle. The Code of Ethics was 
introduced by the NPCC to further professionalise the police service. It is based on the Core 
Principles of Public Life devised in 1995 by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. These 
principles (Accountability, Fairness, Honesty, Integrity, Leadership, Objectivity, Openness, Respect 
and Selflessness) have been amalgamated alongside the standards of professional behavior 
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(Honesty, Integrity, Authority, Equality, Diversity, Use of Force, Orders and Instructions, Duties and 
Responsibilities, Confidentiality and Fitness for work) into the Code of Ethics. A one-encompassing 
step, linked intrinsically to each phase of the NDM, and intended to sit at the core of every decision 
(COP, 2014). 
 
The NDM is designed to flow in a clockwise direction beginning with Step one, which is naturally 
positioned at the top center of the model. Step one is the Information and Intelligence phase, 
where the decision maker is expected to define the current situation, establish the existing state of 
knowledge and identify key deficiencies.  
 
Step two, is the Threat / Risk Assessment and Working Strategy phase. The user is expected to 
weigh the threat and risk against the potential reward, crucially assessing whether immediate action 
is needed and whether the current risk is tolerable.  
 
Figure 4.1. The National Decision Model 
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Step three, is the Powers and Policy phase, where the practitioner considers the legal framework 
within which he is working. Actions must be legal, proportionate, justifiable and necessary given the 
prevailing circumstances.  
 
Step four, is the Options and Contingencies phase. Preferred and alternative methods of resolving 
the situation are considered, depending upon certain impact factors such as available resources, 
immediacy of threat and the impact of the proposed action on the community.  
Step five, is the final stage of the NDM. The Action and Review phase where the police take action 
then reflect upon it after the fact, in order to establish if the correct decisions were made and 
correct actions taken.  
 
The NDM is cyclic in nature. It is not intended as a single use tool. Rather a dynamic entity which 
may be returned to and re-assessed at any time if for example, further information and intelligence 
is received which alters the level of risk. Argyris & Schön (1974) refer to this process as a “Double 
Loop” learning model which comprises either “Refection on action” or “Reflection in action”. 
Reflection “on action” logically takes place at step 5 of the NDM when the incident has concluded. If 
things could have been done differently these are discussed during either an immediate (“hot”) or 
more formal de-brief (COP, 2013a). This process allows practitioners the time, space and emotional 
freedom to critically reflect upon performance without the added pressure of being in the “there 
and then.” During for example a critical incident the NDM may be revisited on numerous occasions, 
a process colloquially referred to by police officers as “Spinning the Wheel” but explained more 
concisely by Argyris and Schön (1974) as “reflection in action” i.e. a process of regular and 
continuous critical review occurring during the natural course of a more protracted incident.  
 
General awareness of the NDM has been heavily promoted recently, through PowerPoint™ 
presentations, electronic learning packages and national fortification by some of the country’s most 
senior police officers (NPCC, 2015a). It is now expected that every police officer and staff member 
will embed the NDM and use it as their primary decision making aide. Depending on the situation, 
practitioners may be expected to record their decision in writing, using the NDM as a template. This 
provides an auditable framework to systematically articulate decision making. Officers are 
encouraged to commit the NDM to memory so that the model can be used when writing a 
statement, completing a use of force form or giving evidence at court.  
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A good working knowledge of the NDM is vital to the role of a prospective STO. Candidates are 
required to have a good working awareness of the model prior to attending CED training and this 
knowledge is formally tested as part of the written examination. Notwithstanding its importance, no 
empirical research has addressed the true operational benefit of the NDM, nor has a single project 
explored how it is used by practitioners. A knowledge gap that is addressed in chapter ten of this 
thesis.   
 
Deployment and command  
Whilst warranted police officers are afforded a certain level of operational autonomy and discretion, 
a number of institutional and policy driven factors are capable of informing their decision making, 
particularly when it comes to the coercive function. These factors can include but are not restricted 
to, the manner in which officers are deployed to calls for service and the existence or 
implementation of a formal chain of command when they arrive on scene.  
 
Although there is a degree of centralised guidance from governing organisations, it is ultimately left 
to individual Chief Constables to decide how to grade and manage calls for service within their own 
organisation. At the time of writing, telephone contact from the public to Westshire Constabulary is 
facilitated by the Police Contact Centre (PCC). If the call is made via the 99915 emergency number it 
will be triaged by an independent operator who will route the call to the appropriate emergency 
service (i.e. fire, ambulance police). If the police are requested, the call will be taken by a call handler 
based in the PCC at Westshire Headquarters. That person will generate a Computer Aided Dispatch 
(CAD) report. Although software, format and terminology may differ, the CAD system is fairly typical 
and broadly representative of the country.  
 
Each CAD contains a unique reference number, as well as basic details of the call for service. It will 
be given a response grading depending on the urgency of the situation and the readiness with which 
it can be resolved. The grading decision is made by the call taker and is based on policy guidelines 
and also, professional judgement. When graded, the CAD is passed electronically to police radio 
operators, (dispatchers) who are responsible for prioritising and resourcing the call. Table 4.2. 
(below) depicts the current resource and grading policy of Westshire Constabulary.  
 
                                                          
15 Equivalent to 911 in the USA or 000 in Australia.  
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Table 4.2. Deployment policy of Westshire Constabulary.     
Incident Grade Expected response 
time 
 Expected resource Expected method 
of resolution 
Grade 1 – Emergency 
response 
Within 15 minutes of 
first notification 
 Uniformed Police 
Officer (NRT) 
In person Police 
officer response 
Grade 2 – Prompt 
response 
Within 1 hour of first 
notification 
 Uniformed Police 
Officer (NRT) 
In person Police 
officer response 
Grade 3 – Planned 
response 
Within 72 hours of first 
notification 
 Police officer or  
police staff 
Pre-arranged 
telephone 
response 
Grade 4 – Resolved 
contact 
No response required. 
Call resolved at source 
 Police staff (call 
handler or radio 
operator) 
Spontaneous 
resolution at 
point of initial 
contact. 
 
A Grade 1 emergency will receive an immediate response. Westshire Constabulary endeavours to 
attend a Grade 1 within 15 minutes of it being received, failing that officers will arrive as soon as 
possible. A Grade 2 call (requiring a prompt but not immediate response) will be resourced within 1 
hour. The response to Grade 1 and 2 calls is the primary remit of NRT. Grade 3 or Grade 4 calls will 
be finalised by planned appointment or resolved at source. NRT will be notified of the need to 
respond to a call by radio operators or by accessing the CAD system personally. If a Grade 1 response 
is required NRT will usually attend in a marked police vehicle using blue lights and sirens however, 
this will be at the discretion of the police driver. Having arrived on scene the officer(s) will be 
expected to provide and appropriate initial response to the situation. Whilst officers are proceeding 
to, or present at, a scene they operate under a command structure which may, to some extent, 
inform their decision making during the incident. The chain of command becomes increasingly 
relevant if the call for service is designated a “Critical Incident”.   
 
A “Critical Incident” is defined as: “Any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is 
likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, the family and / or the 
community” (COP, 2013a p. 1). Such incidents could range from a serious criminal offence such as 
rape or murder, a suicidal missing person, a fatal Road Traffic Collision (RTC) a death or serious injury 
after police contact, a large scale public event, a serious case of hate crime / anti-social behavior or 
an outbreak of widespread public disorder.  
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In order to effectively manage critical incidents, the police service will often have a pre-set hierarchy 
in place based on the Gold, Silver and Bronze command structure. This model may apply to various 
critical incidents but is particularly prevalent in pre-planned large-scale public order events such as 
protests, carnivals or street festivals, premiership football matches, or planned firearms operations. 
The Gold Commander is usually an officer of the rank of Superintendent or above. This person has 
ultimate responsibility for the policing operation, is in overall strategic command and will set the 
overarching strategic parameters within which the deployed officers are expected to work. A Gold 
may well take advice from a Tactical Advisor when formulating this strategy.  The Silver Commander 
could be an Inspector or Chief Inspector who will work under the supervision of the Gold 
Commander and will be responsible for setting and implementing the tactical parameters required 
to fulfill the strategy set by Gold. The Bronze Commander could be an officer of PS rank (or PC rank 
in a Team Leader capacity) and this person will be responsible for executing the tactical plan on the 
ground. The Bronze role is also known as the Operational Commander (COP, 2013a).  
 
Prior to the policing operation, officers may be gathered together for a formal NDM structured 
briefing delivered by one of the incident commanders. Officers may be provided with information 
and intelligence relevant to the event as well as the associated risks. They will be informed of the 
strategic intention of the operation, advised of relevant legislation powers and policy and informed 
about any contingencies that have been put in place. The benefits of a formal command structure to 
help inform effective operational decision making have been well publicised in recent times. It has 
been suggested that when firearms officers are appropriately briefed and operating under a set 
command structure they are less likely to resort to lethal-force quickly and less likely to make an 
erroneous judgement decision (Best & Quigley, 2003; Punch, 2011; Squires & Kennison, 2010).    
 
The existence of a formal chain of command supported by a robust and auditable strategy which has 
been effectively communicated to operational officers is also a further manifestation of the 
developing New Public Management theory, whereby individual officers can be somewhat shielded 
from errors made in good faith during the course of a policing operation. In these circumstances, 
accountability will, in-theory, rest with the organisation as opposed to the individual. The necessity 
for this revised approach was dramatically brought to bear during the trial of a police firearms officer 
who was charged with murder after he mistakenly shot dead an unarmed man in Hastings in 1998 
and given worldwide prominence in the aftermath of the erroneous police shooting of an unarmed 
and innocent man in Stockwell Tube station in 2005 (Punch, 2011; Squires & Kennison, 2010).  
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The above chapter has explored the concept of police decision making which is both dynamic and 
multi-faceted in nature, particularly when it comes to the use of force. It clear that a number of 
different approaches may be used to execute this core function either in isolation or in combination 
with one another. The process that is ultimately selected appears to be largely dependent upon the 
subjective policy priorities of individual law enforcement agencies. From the various mechanisms 
and strategies in common existence no clear framework has emerged as comprehensively effective. 
This thesis will use first hand qualitative information to investigate the true operational effectiveness 
of the NDM and will also explore the premise that good use could be made of a national continuum 
for use alongside this model (see chapter nine). The following chapter critically examines the police 
use of Conducted Energy Devices with a focus on medical implications, ethical use and overall 
operational effectiveness.  
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Chapter five 
The police use of Conducted Energy Devices 
 
The preceding chapter has explored police decision making aides. The following chapter provides an 
in-depth discussion of the police use of CED’s, beginning in the United Kingdom where the corpus of 
empirical research is limited. Medical and ethical concerns are then considered, as is the juxtaposed 
sociological position of CED’s in society as effective police accoutrements on the one hand, or 
instruments of death on the other. The academic literature relevant to each specific area is 
paramount if we are to effectively assess the adequacy of CED training and operational use.  
 
CED use in the United Kingdom  
In the early stages of CED availability, a small number of articles discussing the device can be found 
(e.g. Herbert, 2003; Mason, 2004; Williams, 2005). However, this literature was published in 
professional journals and written for the benefit of practitioners not academics. Such articles 
contained little or no research of empirical substance and were subject to peer review (Dymond & 
Rappert, 2014).  
 
In the years that followed, academics began to pay passing scientific attention to the topic of CED’s 
(e.g. Burrows, 2007; Glass, 2007; Neyroud, 2007; Rappert, 2007; Waldren, 2007) and some 
specifically championed these devices as pivotal to their argument (e.g. Kleinig, 2007; Sprague, 
2007). From these articles the relative paucity of peer reviewed literature relating to Taser was 
made evident, and numerous authors expressed the urgent need for further UK specific research 
(e.g. Neyroud, 2007).  
 
More recently, Dymond & Rappert (2014) provided a valuable insight into the evolution of CEDs in 
the UK, highlighting missed opportunity for social research in the conceptual years, and disclosing 
several relevant knowledge gaps such as medical, scientific and technical device aspects.  
 
Dymond (2014) then made a further valuable academic provision, suggesting that a truly 
independent assessment of the sociological impact of CEDs could not be effectively made because 
researchers will invariably approach the phenomenon from a dichotomised “for” or “against” 
approach. A valid observation she eloquently describes as a significant ‘flaw’ in the overarching 
debate. 
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In addition, Dymond directly addressed the difficulties faced by academics seeking to fully 
understand this key emerging issue and in-so-doing, confirmed the urgent need for this current 
research:  
 
. . . if we conceive of Taser in a broad sense – as a socio-technical system, not simply as a 
discrete, physical object – then understanding not just the device but the guidelines and 
training around it is clearly crucial. Although UK national guidelines for the use of Taser are 
publicly available, there have been no peer reviewed studies assessing their content and, 
similarly, little attention has been paid to training given to police officers, which is more 
restricted. (2014, p. 3) 
 
Dymond (2014a) suggested that the quality of Taser related literature could be reliably enhanced by 
the application of social theory such as Actor Network. In a novel approach, she suggests that Taser 
should be considered as an entity in its own right; as should the operator, suspect and characteristics 
which influence a Taser related encounter. This reflexive approach adds value to the existing 
literature. It also offers an alternative sociological perspective, which will likely act in future 
furtherance of research agendas intrinsic to the area.  
 
In the only empirical study in the UK to date, Jenkinson et al. (2006) compared the injury risk when 
Taser is deployed in comparison to other less-lethal measures. Data from departmental use of force 
forms was gathered over a 12 month period. The information was compared with 2050 instances of 
Taser deployment over a 3 year period in the USA. The results showed that officers were more likely 
to be injured deploying a chemical spray (+ 12.6%) or a baton (+ 23.7%) than they would be if they 
used a Taser. Suspects were also less likely to be injured during a forceful encounter involving a 
Taser when compared with CS™ spray (- 20.5%) or a baton (- 46.1%).  
 
The conclusions support Taser use and the ongoing proliferation appears directly attributable. 
However, the inquiry is not without limitation. Firstly, the comparative data was extracted from 
incompatible subject populations. Secondly, the use of force forms may have been subject to 
responder recall bias. And finally, key data was extracted from the Taser International database, 
which Jenkinson et al. confirm “. . . was extremely vulnerable to responder bias. . .”  (2006, p. 237). 
Notwithstanding the significance of this research, the Taser phenomenon has progressed 
exponentially since 2006, yet the academic community has failed to maintain pace. One of the key 
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research recommendations, a suggested alteration of the position of CEDs on the use of force 
continuum (see Figure 6, p. 239) is now effectively obsolete given the introduction of the NDM, and 
we have lost the opportunity to assess, through empirical enquiry not only, the philosophical effect 
of this major transition but also, the sociological impact of providing CEDs to non-specialist officers.  
 
The lack of scientific research is an ongoing risk. The result is an organisational overreliance on 
limited, grey or biased material upon which policy and practice is shaped.  A danger Dymond & 
Rappert highlighted as a significant public safety concern: “Missing data - or ‘undone science’ - have 
consequences. One consequence is that it leads to claims about safety that, irrespective of their 
‘accuracy’ (if such determinations can even be reached) are outright discounted by some and 
vulnerable to challenge by many” (2014, p. 6).  
 
This risk is exemplified by recent comments from Commander Neil Basu (the National Less-Lethal 
Weapons Group lead) who defended the use of CEDs in the UK: “All options carry some form of risk. 
Taser is a less-lethal weapon. It poses significantly less risk than other tactical options used by the 
police such as metal batons, police dogs and CS spray” (Travis, 2014, para. 5). This declaration can 
only originate from research which is dated, open to challenge and published prior to significant 
events such as the implementation of the NDM, or the introduction of CEDs to non-specialist 
officers. If astute claims of safety are made by senior police commanders, then surely they should be 
evidence-based and reliant on sound contemporary research? This does not appear to be the case 
here.  
 
Medical implications 
The medical profession was one of the first to publish Taser-specific material (e.g. Bleetman & Steyn, 
2003; Bleetman, Steyn & Lee, 2004). Although these articles were written by medical practitioners, 
for the benefit of medical practitioners, many of the concerns they raise are now reflected by official 
training, policy and guidance manuals (see DOMILL, 2004; 2005; 2007; 2012; NPCC, 2016; SACMILL, 
2017).  
 
Table 5.1. below, provides an empirical snapshot of the relevant research. Whilst, a comprehensive 
review of every potential medical, scientific, psychological and pathophysiological risk associated 
with Taser use, is beyond the scope of this thesis, the studies most relevant to Taser training and 
operationalisation are addressed by the following section. 
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Bozeman et al. (2009) and White et al. (2014) share concern that the electric current produced by 
the Taser could adversely affect normal heart function, particularly if the electrical current were to 
pass directly over this sensitive area. The worst case scenario was hypothesised to be death by heart 
attack. A risk reportedly heightened, if the subject was under the influence of alcohol or drugs had a 
pre-existing heart condition, was a child, an adult of small stature, pregnant or had been fitted with 
a pacemaker (IPCC, 2010; Williams, 2008). For further discussion in this area see Ideker & Dosdall 
(2007) and McDaniel et al. (2005). 
 
DOMILL (2004) also addressed specific concern that the Taser may cause unintended cardiac events 
to subjects with pre-existing heart conditions, or those under the influence of intoxicants. DOMILL 
confirmed that the prior use of illegal street drugs could significantly increase the risk of an adverse 
cardiac event following Taser use and recommended officers remain constantly cognisant. DOMILL 
also considered other risks factors but maintained, “The risk of life threatening or serious injuries 
from the M26 Taser is very low.” (2004, p. 32) 
 
Following a technological upgrade from the Taser M26 to the X26, DOMILL (2005) again explored the 
risk of adverse cardiac reaction by exposing Taser to the beating hearts of live animals. It also 
addressed other medical concerns raised but not conclusively addressed during the 2004 phase of 
testing. DOMILL eventually reported it “. . . unlikely that the electrical discharge from the M26 and 
X26 Taser devices will influence cardiac rhythmicity by a direct action on the heart of healthy 
individuals.” And concluded, “The risk of a life threatening event arising from the direct interaction 
of the currents of the X26 Taser with the heart is less than the already low risk of such an event from 
the M26 Advanced Taser.” (2005, p. 27- 28)  
 
DOMILL (2012) assessed the effects of Taser on vulnerable persons and for the first time, included 
research on human volunteers. The risk of head injuries caused by Taser induced falls was 
highlighted, as was soft tissue injury caused by probe penetration and musculoskeletal injury caused 
as a natural consequence of NMI. The 2012 report even passed comment on 337 Taser associated 
deaths in the USA and 2 in the UK. Despite a number of recommendations, DOMILL concluded that 
operational risk of serious of serious injury caused by a CED was tolerable provided the stringent 
training guidelines were followed.  
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Table 5.1. The medical implications of Taser deployment 
Genre of Journal / Article  Author(s) / Date  Injury / Medical Concern 
Medical   Alpert & Dunham (2010); 
Bleetman & Steyn (2003); 
Bleetman et al. (2004); Gall & 
Payne-James (2016); Jenkinson 
et al. (2006); Terril & Paoline 
(2011). 
General medical concerns and 
comparative injury rates 
Medical Becour (2013); Jenkinson et al. 
(2006); Nislow (2005); 
Subject falling heavily to the 
ground post-deployment 
Medical 
 
 
Medical  
Bozeman et al. (2009); White 
et al. (2014); Ideker & Dosdall 
(2007); McDaniel et al. (2005). 
Williams (2008); IPCC (2010) 
Subject experiencing cardio-
vascular issues post- 
deployment 
The heightened risk of sudden 
in custody death / death after 
police contact 
Medical  
 
Psychological 
White et al. (2014) 
 
Kunz et al. (2012); Jauchem 
(2011) 
Impairment of cognitive 
functioning 
Subject experiencing 
pathophysiological 
complications post -
deployment 
Scientific  
 
Police / Governmental 
Clarke & Andrews (2014); 
Donnelly (2001) 
DOMILL (2004; 2005; 2007; 
2012); SACMILL (2017); 
McGuiness (2016) NPCC 
(2017) 
Ignition of proximate 
flammable liquid 
General medical concerns 
 
SACMILL (2017) assessed the medical implications of a further technological upgrade from the Taser 
X26 to the X2. After a battery of comprehensive medical tests SACMILL were “. . . broadly satisfied by 
the evidence it has examined, and is of the view that the medical implication of the Taser X2 system 
– when used by trained operators in accordance with UK policy and guidance – would be in line 
with those expected for a less- lethal system of this type” (2017, p. 1). In the light of such statements 
it is vital that the critical review of CED training is conducted because the training guidelines provide 
clear benchmarking for the ongoing safe operational use of CEDs: 
 
Most areas of high liability for police rely on a training component to ensure that officers are 
indoctrinated in the proper application of policy. Limited research has been done to assess 
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the effectiveness of training in achieving the desired outcomes in these areas. . . . By 
identifying variables that influence officer and suspect behavior in incidents common 
themes or characteristics could be identified. These themes could be incorporated in 
training programs to provide instruction that would allow officers to make better decisions 
related to use of force (Millar, 2010, p. 127-128).   
   
Continuing the medical debate, Clarke and Andrews (2014) conducted a number of field experiments 
which tested the use of Taser around flammable liquids. Working predominantly for the benefit of 
the Fire and Rescue Services, they demonstrated how easily the sparks from Taser probes will ignite 
petrol, gas and other flammable liquids, potentially causing serious injury to both the subject and 
operator. Notwithstanding the fact that Clarke & Andrews did not focus on the ignitability of 
different brands of Chemical Spray commonly used by police forces (for this concern see Donnelly, 
2001) their research was undoubtedly an informative and impactful addition to the topic area.    
 
White, Ready, Kane and Dario (2014) conducted a pilot study testing the after-effects of Taser use on 
the cognitive functioning of 21 police recruits. The overarching aim of the research was to establish 
the extent to which a 5 second Taser exposure could impair an individual’s ability to comprehend 
basic legal principles; specifically the recusal of Miranda rights (i.e. the right to remain silent or to 
have a Lawyer present during questioning).  
 
Participants were asked to undertake three memory, concentration and assimilation tests. The first 
test was conducted 3-4 hours before CED exposure, the second test was conducted immediately 
after Taser exposure, and the final test was conducted 24 hours later. The test results indicated that 
Taser recipients experienced significant reductions in both cognitive function and mental 
performance immediately after exposure, but these were short term and did not present 24 hours 
later. The interim results of this appeared to indicate that CED exposure could potentially cause a 
subject to experience a temporary lack of cognitive understanding which could lead to the 
inappropriate waiving of fundamental legal rights.  
 
Although the results of this pilot study bring to bear a number of important legal and moral concerns 
which are warranting of further empirical enquiry, the research project was relatively small in scale 
and lacked a comparison sample. Thus generalisability is an issue. In addition, the researchers did 
not specifically test participant’s understanding of basic legal concepts, which was the justification 
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for the study and the sample were presumably young, sober, reasonably intelligent, healthy adults 
of good character (or they would not have been successfully recruited into the police service) so 
were not representative of the population group the researchers were seeking to protect.   
 
Bui, Sourkes and Wennberg (2017) reported on the results of a case study whereby a police officer 
was inadvertently shot in the back of the head with a single CED dart by his colleague during the 
course of a foot pursuit. This incident caused the onset of a condition known as Generalised Tonic-
Clonic Seizure which resulted in the patient falling unconscious, foaming at the mouth, fitting, and 
later experiencing severe head pain as well as short term memory loss. The patient was young and in 
good health, he was not on medication and had no relevant prior medical history. This incident 
clearly shows the importance of safe weapon handling and selecting an appropriate point of aim 
when firing a CED. 
 
Furthering the topic of medical concern, an interesting academic debate has arisen about the correct 
recording of suspect injury following Taser discharge.  There are two schools of thought here. One 
side suggests that the puncture wound injuries caused by the Taser probes should be recorded as an 
injury (see Terrill & Paoline, 2012; Macdonald et al., 2009; Taylor & Woods, 2010). The other side 
counters that barb penetration is a natural consequence of Taser use so should not be recorded as a 
quantifiable injury (see Lin & Jones, 2010; MacDonald, Kaminski & Smith, 2009; Smith et al., 2007; 
2009; Taylor et al., 2012). Highlighting this academic disconnect, Terrill & Paoline called to the 
academic community for an explanation for the inconsistent findings and an agreed academic 
consensus on “. . . how to operationalize police-inflicted injuries as a result of CEW usage” (2011, p. 
24).  
 
In response, Kaminski et al. (2015) examined the effect of including and omitting puncture wound 
injuries in the quantification process. They were able to ascertain with apparent certainty that the 
inconsistencies highlighted by Terrill and Paoline (2011) were caused by their decision to record 
routine probe puncture as an injury. A method they roundly rejected: 
 
It is clear from our results that when routine CEW punctures are excluded from the injury 
measure, CEW’s are associated with reductions in injuries to suspects or are benign, neither 
increasing nor decreasing injury rates. It is also clear that including CEW punctures as injuries 
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consistently inflates injury rates, whether or not they were used in conjunction with other 
types of force. (2015, p. 615) 
 
This argument presents a compelling case to argue that the incidental injury caused by less-lethal 
technology should not be quantified. The efficiency of any less-lethal weapon is judged on many 
factors including the ability to control a subject causing minimal injury. If unavoidable (routine) 
injuries are counted, then there is a risk that the safety of CEDs could be called unfairly to question. 
There is the potential for injury figures to become over-inflated which could lead to unwarranted 
negative publicity or even prohibition of an otherwise effective device. It remains to be seen 
whether this approach will be roundly accepted by the academic community. 
 
Ethical and social concern 
The Taser phenomenon is overshadowed by an evolving body of literature highlighting a number of 
ethical and socio-political concerns which cannot be separated from the argument around continued 
use (Neyroud & Disley, 2008). Topics of significance include the (in) appropriate positioning of the 
device within the force hierarchy, an institutionalised culture of pernicious use (especially on ethnic 
minority citizens), a series of potentially avoidable CED associated deaths and a general 
inconsistency in training and operational use. A selection of the peer reviewed research most 
relevant to this key emerging area is critically discussed below.  
 
The Braidwood Commission (2010), for example, dissected the events preceding the CED associated 
death of Robert Dziekański in Vancouver International Airport on 14th October 2007. The 
commission unearthed significant unethical conduct by the attending officers, who purportedly 
exaggerated the true threat posed by Mr. Dziekański in a bid to post-justify the use of the excessive 
and multiple CED shocks, which undoubtedly contributed to his death.  
 
The Braidwood inquiry not only, made a number of firm recommendations regarding CED use, 
including a substantial elevation of the position of CED’s on the force continuum, and the 
discouragement of multiple cycles, (for the true scientific (in) effect of these recommendations see 
Williams, 2012) but also, prompted a further array of academic interest in the topic (e.g. Goldsmith, 
2010; Gordon, 2012; Hall, 2009).       
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Beginning poignantly with the vision of Mr. Dziekański laying lifeless on the floor after an episode of 
“egregious police brutality”, Oriola et al. (2012, p .65) argued that this tragic incident triggered one 
of the largest political controversies in Canada’s recent history. The authors then bring to bear wider 
ethical concern commonly associated with CED use, such as disparity in application on minority 
ethnic groups and the associated continuum position.    
 
In addressing the continuum paradigm, Oriola et al. appear to show a lack of understanding of the 
concept. In their publication, they unfairly criticise the Vancouver Transit Police’s 2007 decision to 
alter the position of CEDs on the force continuum, claiming the organisation simply replaced the 
term “non-compliant” with “actively resistant” when authorizing use (ibid, p . 68). In fact, the former 
did not, and was not intended to, replace the latter. These two levels are distinct, and represent very 
different examples of suspect behavior, for which continua provide suggested officer responses. 
Rather than covering up improper use by semantic alterations, the organisation appears to have 
made the decision to raise the level of authority for CED use from a “passive” to an “actively 
resistant subject.”16 In so doing, it appears to have responded to public concern and adjusted their 
internal policy accordingly. A change made prior to the Braidwood Commission recommendations, 
and deserving of praise rather than admonishment. After all, do these actions not show effective 
managerial foresight and an affirmative response in the wake of widespread public concern?       
 
Ryan (2008) positioned herself firmly against use of CED’s in Australia. She cited as justification, 
isolated instances of improper use, inadequate training and a general lack of confidence in the ability 
of officers to use the device responsibly. Whilst this article does highlight relevant ethical concerns 
(such as the risk of increased use on ethnic minorities such as the Aboriginal community); the piece 
lacks impartiality and reflexivity.  
 
Ryan focuses on the CED as a tool primarily intended, to prevent officers resorting to lethal-force. 
Caution is needed when viewing the situation within such binary confinements. CEDs do play a role 
in the reduction of lethal-force encounters (Kaminski et al., 2009; White & Ready, 2007) but they are 
also pivotal in reducing rates of officer and suspect injury during a forceful encounter. A fact which 
research prior to 2008 strongly supported, and research after this period, has proved beyond 
contention (Kaminski et al., 2015).  
                                                          
16 For the benefits of such a policy change see Millar (2010). 
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Ryan also casts aspersion on the ability and integrity of police officers. Implying that they cannot be 
trusted to use their coercive mandate appropriately, “. . . no officer wants to see good training hours 
go to waste . . .” (2008, p. 4-5). Such critique would be understandable if it was supported by a 
compelling evidence base. However, Ryan makes little mention of peer reviewed literature, instead 
relying heavily on grey material, including numerous citations by “unknown” authors. The end result 
is a subjective and partial position piece, struggling to achieve academic balance and reflexive 
longevity. 
 
Having done similar in the USA and Canada, (see Amnesty International, 2004), Amnesty 
International provided a summary of their political position on CED use in Britain. Writing on behalf 
of the organisation, Sprague (2007) suggested that due to the inherent risk of death, serious injury 
or improper use, CEDs should be categorised as “potentially-lethal” as opposed to “less-lethal” or 
“non-lethal” weapons. He also argued that CEDs should be positioned at the penultimate echelon of 
the force continuum, second only to the use of lethal-force.  
 
Sprague opposed CED use by any officer not trained to Specialist Firearms Officer17 (SFO) level, and 
called for a complete ban on using the device in “stun-gun mode18”, suggesting that a reliance on 
pain compliance amounts to tortuous treatment. This narrow interpretation shows a lack of 
operational knowledge. Not only did Sprague fail to distinguish between the “drive-stun” and the 
“angled drive-stun”, but he also, failed to address the operational value of this technique as a 
legitimate tactical option. In confined spaces such as a vehicle, or mobile home, it would be 
irresponsible for operatives to discount the drive-stun because this could be the only less-lethal 
contingency available. Conversely, the angled drive-stun technique can be used to achieve NMI, if 
one probe misses the target or becomes dislodged (NPCC, 2016). Another tactic which, if 
automatically discounted, could at best pose heightened risk to both officer and subject and at 
worst, evoke an avoidable police shooting.  
 
De Angelis and Wolf (2013) investigated the various sources of controversy surrounding CEDs and 
attempted to assess the potential sociological impact of their findings. In a study that is similar in 
both conception and methodology, to this current research, 27 police training officers were 
                                                          
17 The label of police SFO involves a considerably higher level of firearms training in the UK than that of an 
Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO). It is assumed here that Sprague was referring to the later skill level.   
18 It is presumed that Sprague is referring to the drive-stun or angled drive-stun technique here.  
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interviewed. Officers were asked for their opinion on the relative safety of CEDs, the origins of public 
controversy surrounding such devices and what could be done to alleviate the associated concerns.  
Training officers generally regarded CEDs as relatively safe and operationally essential items of 
equipment. They suggested that the controversy around CEDs is often heightened and 
sensationalised by the media, who do not fully understand the coercive function of police officers or 
the role of CEDs within the force hierarchy. In order to mitigate such concerns, participants 
suggested that police services could participate in programs of outreach to the media and the 
general public in order to better inform them about the technical and operational purpose of CED’s.  
 
Whilst this research did field some interesting qualitative observations and made a number of valid 
recommendations, the interviews were conducted by telephone which meant that the subtleties of 
face-to-face conversational contact and non-verbal communication were lost. Participants may have 
been wary about a telephone call and could have withheld data they may otherwise have disclosed if 
the interviews were conducted in person. Also, the participants were training officers as opposed to 
operational police officers. Officers who carry CEDs and interact with the public on a daily basis may 
have been in a better position to offer an opinion on societal impact, than full-time instructors.       
 
Kleinig (2007) disclosed that CEDs were being overused by many police departments due to a 
relatively low position on the continuum. Kleinig claimed that the device was being used as a matter 
of convenience and often in unjustifiable lieu of other less extreme measures “. . . as a way to cut 
short verbal communication or even one that could reasonably require more direct physical 
intervention say, carrying or applying an escort hold or joint manipulation on a passively resistant 
demonstrator” (p. 287). That CEDs may be used to control subjects resisting at the lower end of the 
force hierarchy, is a concern highlighted by empirical inquiry (e.g. Alpert & Dunham, 2010; Crow & 
Adrion, 2011; Thomas et al, 2010) and remains ethically valid. 
 
Gau et al. (2010) published further evidence of unethical CED use. The study disclosed racial 
disparity by Highway Patrol officers disclosing that Hispanics were two times more likely to be 
Tasered on first application of force than Caucasians. An intriguing statistic when comparison is 
drawn with the results of a similar study recently completed in the UK, which concluded that black 
people were three times more likely to be subjected to CED use than persons of white origin (Shaw, 
2015). Such statistics naturally bring the question of racial prejudice in officer decision making to the 
fore. A concern recently and explicitly acknowledged by the then Home Secretary (now Prime 
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Minister), Theresa May, in a recent public address (Home Office, 2015). And, a topic certainly worthy 
of further inquiry.  
  
Whilst the conclusions drawn by Gau et al. (2010) are supported by compelling evidence, 
generalisability is an issue. The primary remit of the Highway Patrol is road related matters. Officers 
in this department will not habitually patrol high crime areas, investigate volume crime or intervene 
in trigger offences such as alcohol related disorder, domestic disputes or calls involving weapons or 
illegal street drugs. Operational factors which could substantially increase the likelihood of CED use 
(Garner et al., 1995; Garner, Maxwell & Heraux, 2002; Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2005). In addition, the study did not include an officer’s length of service as a variable during 
statistical analysis. A characteristic which influence an officer’s decision to use force (Terrill & 
Mastrofski, 2002; Paoline & Terrill, 2007).  
 
When discussing CED misuse by officers, neither Sprague (2007); Gau et al. (2010) or Shaw (2015) 
took into account the fact that these devices have in-built memories which record the number and 
length of discharge as well as the time and date each one occurred (Kleinig, 2007). Each cartridge 
also contains aphids with unique identifying numbers which fall to the floor when it has been fired.  
Some international police forces, for example, New South Wales in Australia are even using CEDs 
with in-built camera technology which begin recording when the device is armed (Ryan, 2008). 
Combine this with the growing popularity of BWV, the increased coverage of CCTV and widespread 
availability of a smart phones with recording capability, and one could reasonably assume that the 
opportunity for unethical CED use would become increasingly self-limiting.  
 
So why does this not appear to be the case? Why are ethnic minority citizens disproportionately 
subject to force in general and CED’s in particular? Several compelling theories have been offered. 
For example, Engel et al. (2002) point to outright racial prejudice. Black & Reiss (1967); Bratton & 
Knobler (1998); and MacDonald (2010) claim that the disparity is attributable to the greater 
involvement of ethnic minority citizens in the commission of volume crime, and their greater 
propensity to resist arrest.     
 
In recent years, the concept of unconscious or implicit bias has received increased attention. Also 
emerging, is the so called counter bias theory which stands juxtaposed to the implicit bias 
perspective. Implicit bias theory, suggests that officers for the most part are not personally or 
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institutionally prejudiced. Rather they unconsciously perceive certain characteristics or physical 
traits (e.g. race) as more of a threat, based on pre-existing stereotypes, historically associated with 
that particular group and their own personal background and upbringing (Fiske, 2010). Clearly this 
unconscious unawareness could have a marked effect on the type and severity of force used during 
a coercive encounter.  
 
Correll, Park, Judd and Wittenbrink (2002) conducted computer simulation exercises subjecting 
officers to simplistic “Shoot” or “Don’t Shoot” scenarios. The results comprehensively indicated the 
presence of implicit bias. Officers shot an armed black assailant faster than an armed white assailant 
and the most common threat perception failures were officers not shooting an armed white male 
but shooting an unarmed black male. Results echoed by several additional studies (e.g. Correll et al, 
2007a; Correll et al, 2007b;  Fachner & Carter, 2015; Payne, 2001; Plant & Peruche,2005); but which 
can be compared with James, Klinger & Villa (2014) who could not link subconscious racial bias to 
lethal-force decisions.     
 
Fridell & Lim (2016) have attributed recent instances of widespread public disorder, following the 
shooting of black subjects by white police officers in the US, to an emerging psychological theory 
known as counter bias. The counter bias paradigm opposes earlier implicit bias findings. 
Contemporary research appears to indicate that current serving officers are becoming increasingly 
reluctant and statistically less likely to shoot black subjects, even if they pose a lethal threat. A trend 
not followed if the lethal threat emanates from a Caucasian aggressor. A phenomenon attributed 
predominantly to the far reaching societal consequences which historically follow the erroneous 
shooting of an unarmed black male (James, Vila & Dartha. 2013; James, Klinga & Vila, 2014; James, 
Vila & James, 2015).  
 
Despite the presence of seemingly opposing, yet equally compelling psychological theorem, Devine 
(1989) introduced the concept of controlled response. A mechanism for officers to override their 
unconscious biases through a period of awareness training (for successful examples of this see, 
Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils & Czopp, 2002 and Monteith, Arthur & Flynn, 2010).   
 
Further research in this politically charged area is certainly warranted (Fridell & Lim, 2016). It is also, 
without doubt, key to this current research. Not least due to the fact that an officer, ignorant to 
unconscious bias, has the potential to deploy a CED in error on a citizen of ethnic minority. 
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Conversely, due to counter bias, an officer may hesitate to use a CED when to do so would have 
been entirely warranted. There are far reaching societal consequences relevant to each principle, 
not only, for the prevention of widespread public disorder but also, for the protection of officers and 
the public. This current research will critically evaluate the training curriculum for sufficient 
recognition of this sensitive issue. 
 
CEDs as life takers 
Since their introduction to US law enforcement in the 1980’s, CEDs have suffered from a negative 
societal stigmatism. Moving from one sociological extreme to the other CEDS can be found at the far 
end of each ideological spectrum depending on the political stance of the commentator. CEDs may 
be viewed as weapons which torture and kill on the one hand or tools which assist police officers in 
the safe execution of their duties on the other. This section will briefly address the evidence relevant 
to both sides of this argument, beginning with the research on CED associated deaths. 
 
Greenwood suggests that if a police operation results in death then it should be viewed as a 
categorical failure, regardless of the prevailing circumstances: “There must be no heroics, no James 
Bond style individuality. There must be no military style thinking of assaults with metaphorical fixed 
bayonets and an acceptance of a ‘reasonable’ casualty rate . . . in a police operation the only 
acceptable casualty rate is zero” (1979, p. 59). If this premise is to followed it appears that the 
continued police use of CEDs should be robustly questioned. Since 2003 there have been 17 CED 
associated fatalities in this country (SACMILL, 2017). That the prior use of a CED holds a causal 
connection to each death is not disputed. A CED was used and after this exposure, death occurred. 
What is yet to be confirmed is any direct evidence linking CED use (proper or otherwise) as the sole 
causal factor. This explains why no criminal charges in relation to these reported fatalities have been 
instigated. That being said,  in a relatively recent development, the High Court has ordered a further 
investigation into the CED associated death of Jordan Begley (BBC News, 2016) and the initial 
inquest into the tragic death of former professional footballer Dalian Atkinson is still in progress 
(Dodd, 2016).   
 
In direct response to this string of fatalities, various human rights protection groups19 have written 
to the head of the Home Affairs Select Committee, Keith Vaz MP, demanding a public inquiry be 
                                                          
19 Such the Omega Research Foundation, Amnesty International and the Children’s Rights Alliance 
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conducted in order to assess the training, use and reporting policies currently governing CED usage 
in the UK:  
 
Following a series of tragic incidents, serious questions must now be asked. We need a 
thorough investigation to determine whether these weapons are being used properly and 
responsibly, particularly given the increasing number of these weapons on our streets . . . . 
Tasers can be a valuable tool, but they are extremely dangerous and can kill, especially when 
misused. This is why it’s important that there is absolute clarity in when and how these 
weapons are used and the toughest and highest professional standards in place to train, 
monitor and evaluate its use. (Sprague, as cited by Amnesty International, 2016, para. 5) 
 
A valid observation which further solidifies the urgent need not only, for a public inquiry but also, 
this current research:  
 
It is important to ensure that the training and policy around Taser - and, indeed, all police 
use of force - is striking an appropriate balance between enabling officers to use their 
discretion, and giving them sufficient guidance on when its use is appropriate . . . . It is also 
important to ensure that, once Taser has been used, robust accountability mechanisms are 
in place, both inside and outside the force in question.  There’s a real need for an informed, 
transparent discussion on these important topics – and, as such, a Home Affairs Select 
Committee Inquiry would be most welcome. (Dymond, as cited by Amnesty International, 
2016, para. 8)  
  
Moving from the United Kingdom to North America, Kornblum and Reddy (1991) conducted a 
detailed examination of 16 CED related deaths after police contact. In the majority of cases (68.8%) 
the primary cause of death was an overdose of illegal street drugs. A suspect characteristic recorded 
as an impact factor in 13 of the reported incidents. One cause of death was indeterminate and one 
further death was linked to heart disease, a condition exacerbated by exposure to a CED. Of the 16 
mortalities investigated, the study concluded that not one of them could be conclusively linked to 
CED use.  
 
The same 16 deaths were further scrutinised in the United Kingdom by Bleetman and Steyn (2003) 
who also reported a series of heightened risks which predisposed the individuals to an elevated 
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chance of death after coercive police contact. These included a history of street drug abuse and 
presenting with excited delirium prior to arrest. This report also concluded that the deaths could not 
be solely and conclusively linked with prior use of a CED, albeit this research was commissioned by, 
and conducted on behalf of, Taser International so an element of research bias cannot be 
discounted (Azadani, Tseng, Ermakov, Marcus & Lee, 2011).    
 
Strote and Hutson (2006) reviewed 37 autopsy reports. Again, a strong connection with the 
consumption of illegal street drugs (75.7%), excited delirium (78.4%) and pre-existing cardio-vascular 
disorder (78.4%) was discovered. Interestingly, the study also stated that use of CED was a potential 
cause of death in 6 of the reported cases (16.2%) and at least a contributory factor in a further 4 
(10.8%).  
 
Williams (2008) examined 213 CED associated deaths and reported 2 cases where the prior use of 
the device was either the primary or at least a significant causal factor. They also highlighted the 
increased risk of a fatal outcome if CEDs were combined with additional risk factors such as illegal 
drug use, pre-existing heart conditions and excited delirium.  
 
CEDs as an effective tactical option  
From the above research data it is apparent that exposure to a CED can cause or at least contribute 
to death. However, this is a rarity and certain additional factors will predispose an individual to a 
heightened risk. With this in mind it is necessary to look objectively at the bigger picture, to balance 
the risk of CEDs against their operational benefit.   
 
CEDs are intended to quickly and effectively incapacitate a non-compliant subject on first 
deployment. Early research indicated that this was possible between 50–85% of the time (Donnelly, 
2001 cited by Kaminski et al., 2013).  Research by White & Ready (2007) accredited advancement in 
technology to an increased success rate of 80-94%. Whilst these results should be viewed sceptically 
given that the research was commissioned and funded by Taser International (who hold a vested 
interest in publishing favourable statistics) several independent studies also report high percentage 
efficacy.  
 
For example, Meyer defined effectiveness as “. . . if the application of force ended the altercation.” 
(1992, p. 16), and attributed an 86% success rate to CEDs. Mesloh, Henych, Hougland and Thompson 
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(2005) studied 400 use of force reports and suggested that CEDs were immediately effective 67.7% 
of the time. Mesloh, Henych and Wolfe (2009) reported a 59.8% rate of success. Meyer (2009) 
disclosed similar results. According to Kaminski et al. (2015) technological failure of the device itself 
seldom occurs.  
 
When failures were reported these were generally attributed to operator error. Common mistakes 
included one or more barbs missing the target or becoming detached, barb under-penetration due 
to thick clothing or the suspect being in a state of excited delirium, or under the influence of 
intoxicants (Jenkinson et al, 2006). According to Kaminski et al. (2015) technical failure of the device 
itself seldom occurs. 
 
From the above data, there is increasing evidence to suggest that CEDs are effective law 
enforcement tools which have the capacity to quickly control combative subjects. They also appear 
to have the capacity to reduce rates of injury to both officers and subjects during a forceful police-
citizen encounter (Kaminski, 2009; Kaminski et al., 2015; Lin & Jones, 2010; MacDonald et al., 2009; 
Smith et al., 2007; 2009). In the light of this research, CEDs appear to be operationally efficient 
devices, with the potential to proliferate exponentially if policing organisations come to the 
conclusion that the benefits they bring to law enforcement outweigh the risk they pose to wider 
society.  
 
The preceding chapter has critically examined the police use of CEDs such as Tasers with a focus on 
UK academia and associated medical and ethical concerns. Both sides of the juxtaposed argument 
that CEDs are both effective tools but at the same time, instruments that kill, have also been 
explored. The following chapter outlines the research methodology.  
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Chapter six 
Research methodology 
 
The above chapter has critically examined the police use of CEDs. The following chapter explores the 
chosen research methodology (the thematic analysis of qualitatively obtained data, framed using a 
single case study design), and proceeds a description of the research setting and sample population. 
The process for the formulation and dissemination of the primary and secondary research 
instruments is then described, as are the techniques used for initial and secondary raw data analysis. 
Chapter six concludes with a discussion of the ethical considerations intrinsic to this research and 
includes a synopsis of the measures taken to mitigate any identified risk.  
 
Methodology 
After careful consideration an inductive approach using a qualitatively driven, single case study 
design was selected as the most appropriate methodology for this current research. In order to 
investigate the content of CED training and to explore how the exacting standards are applied in a 
real-life context, a flexible research framework was required. Survey data was used to identify 
potential candidates and themes warranting further exploration, and semi-structured interviews 
were necessary in order to secure an enhanced understanding of the pedagogical processes by using 
the first-hand, real-world perspective of individual research participants. This concept was 
summarised by Webber as a “Verstehen” approach which describes the study of human behaviour 
as a “. . . science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at 
a causal explanation of its course and effects” (1947, p. 88).  
 
Although a significant quantity of primary information was gathered during this process, the survey 
and interview data is localised to 15 police officers employed by a single organisation, and it was 
gathered by an insider researcher who outranked the participants. Therefore the research outcomes 
embodied within this thesis are not necessarily representative nationwide (Denscombe, 2014), and 
the data may have been subject to responder bias which could affect its overall representativeness 
and validity (Labaree, 2002; Taylor, 2011; Unluer, 2012).   
 
Notwithstanding the above concerns, it was still possible to conduct reliable and empirically useful 
evidence-based research as an insider researcher because a stringent ethical framework was 
formulated and adhered to (McLain & Kim, 2018). For the purposes of this current research, control 
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measures included the use of gatekeepers to disseminate information and conducting active-phase 
research out of uniform, in the public domain and with unknown research participants, which 
significantly reduced the risk of responder bias (for a more detailed discussion of this area see 
below).  
 
Case study research was specifically chosen because this approach provides a rigorous examination 
of a complex circumstance, explainable by analysis of individual, group and event dynamics. Yin 
describes the case study design as “. . . an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (1984, p. 23). Stake 
(1995) and Yin (2003) suggest that a case study design should be utilised if certain criteria is met. 
Firstly, the research aims to answer “How” and “Why”, type questions. Secondly, the researcher is 
unable to manipulate the behaviour of the sample population. Thirdly, the research proposes the 
analysis of contextual conditions linked to the case. And finally, the study is inextricably linked to the 
situational context within which it exists. These factors demonstrate the appropriateness of the case 
study approach because the research questions key to this current research are all open ended. The 
ethical control measures in place (see below) ensures data integrity and the CED phenomenon 
cannot be properly investigated without consideration of the situational context of the officer within 
the constraints of the learning and operational environment.  
 
Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) stress that case studies present in various guises and can be single or 
multiple in design. Yin categorises case studies as either explanatory, exploratory or descriptive, 
whereas Stake prefers the terms intrinsic, instrumental or collective. For the purpose of this current 
research a single descriptive case study was best suited to the design  because this research seeks “. 
. . to describe an intervention or phenomenon and the real-life context in which it occurred” (Yin, 
2003, as cited by Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 548). 
 
The case study approach is based on a constructivist philosophical underpinning (Yin, 2003; Stake 
1995) which is suited to this current study, not only because this approach supports a close 
relationship between researcher and participant (Crabtree & Miller, 1999) but also, because it 
embraces subjectivity, allowing interviewees the flexibility to impart data they personally deem 
relevant. This facilitates a better understanding of the overarching phenomenon (Lather, 1992; 
Robotttom & Hart, 1993).   
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Despite a largely qualitative structure this current research also makes use of research instruments 
traditionally associated with the quantitative paradigm (i.e. self-completion surveys). This does not 
change the nature of the research to a quantitative or mixed methods design. Indeed the use of 
multiple data sources is celebrated as a hallmark of the case study approach, enhancing the 
credibility of the data achieved. 
 
Unique in comparison to other qualitative approaches, within case study research, 
investigators can collect and integrate quantitative survey data, which facilitates reaching a 
holistic understanding of the phenomenon being studied…..Each data source is one piece of 
the “puzzle,” with each piece contributing to the researchers understanding of the whole 
phenomenon. This convergence adds strength to the findings as the various strands of data 
are braided together to promote a greater understanding of the case (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 
554).   
 
Setting 
Westshire Constabulary is a small regional police service located in the South Eastern region of 
England. It currently employs 2,748 warranted police officers (J. Rodgers, personal communication, 
June 30, 2016). Because this organisation is not commonly the subject of evidence-based research it 
was able to offer a degree of uniqueness to the field. However, due to its relatively small size and 
location in an affluent area with comparatively low rates of ethnic diversity, the research outcomes 
are not necessarily generalisable countrywide; albeit they are at least comparable.   
 
A further ethical concern related to the position of the researcher as an employee. Whilst the 
“Insider” status can offer a degree of pragmatic benefit to the project, for example close assistance 
with administrative requirements of the research, such as obtaining permissions, accessing the 
infrastructure and identifying the sample population (see Brown, 1996a); according to certain 
academics, the Insider position may also inadvertently bias the research data. For example, Bartunek 
and Louis (1996) argue that an Insider researcher may lack true independency due to a level of pre-
existing organisational knowledge, and that participants may withhold, exaggerate or embellish key 
information because they are talking to a trusted colleague. Other researchers take this point further 
and claim that Insider research is effectively pointless (Weatheritt, 1986). For a fuller discussion of 
how the position of the researcher within Westshire Constabulary (as both an employee and 
manager) could have impacted the research data, see the Ethical Compliance section below.   
80 | P a g e  
 
Research participants were selected from a department within Westshire Constabulary known as the 
Neighbourhood Response Team (NRT). This department was chosen because STOs operate from NRT 
after they have completed CED training. Officers from the NRT work on a rotating shift pattern and 
provide a 24/7 emergency response capability. Westshire Constabulary currently parades 5 NRT 
teams or “Sections” (A-E). NRT officers operate in uniform, and usually patrol and respond to calls 
for service in marked police vehicles. During their time on NRT, officers have the opportunity to 
acquire a range of enhanced professional skills by attending relevant training courses. CED training is 
one such example.  
 
Less-lethal weapons training is managed by the Operations Department and is delivered by the 
Tactical Training and Public Order Unit (TTPOU). The TTPOU is made up of 9 full-time instructors: 1 
Inspector, 1 Sergeant, 6 Constables and 1 civilian staff member. CED training is conducted in the 
grounds of a decommissioned nuclear bunker which was acquired by Westshire Constabulary as a 
training venue. The site is equipped with several classrooms, a weapons range and a rudimentary 
mock village. Entry to the grounds is generally restricted to police personnel, but on occasion, 
civilians are permitted on-site to observe certain aspects of training, or even contribute to the 
learning process, by acting as stooges.  
 
Sample  
The sample population was made up of 15 uniformed police officers. To select the research 
population purposive sampling was used. The only officers in a position to provide the requisite data 
were current accredited STO’s. This automatically excluded any other officers. Of the 2,748 
warranted officers employed by Westshire Constabulary only 230 (8%) had completed CED training. 
(M. Gander, personal communication, June 16, 2016). Of this already small population, 30 members 
had since moved to other departments so were no longer accredited. This left an approximate 
potential sample population of 200 officers which equated to less than 6% of the workforce. A list of 
these officers was obtained from the Human Resources Department. The officers were all sent an 
initial survey by e-mail and web-link. The survey contained information about the proposed research 
and included expression of interest forms.  
 
The intention was to conduct a minimum of 12 interviews which is a sufficient number (given the 
topic area) to achieve the point of data saturation (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006). From the e-mail 
responses, a total of 17 expressions of interest were received. One potential participant left the 
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organisation before the interview could be conducted, and a further interview had to be terminated 
prior to completion because the researcher and the participant, were recalled to duty. As a result, 15 
interviews were conducted.   
 
Table 6.1. shows a demographic breakdown of the sample population. All participants were current 
STO’s, of PC or A/PS rank working on NRT. In total, 12 males and 3 females were interviewed. The 
officers had between 8 and 15 years’ police service. The minimum time spent as an STO was 6 
months and the maximum was 4 years. From the sample population a reasonable spread of home 
stations as well as rural and urban policing environments was achieved.  All officers’ self-identified as 
White British in ethnic origin. 
 
Table 6.1. Demographic breakdown of the sample population. 
Participant Rank Gender Age Length of 
Service 
Time as an 
STO 
P1 A/PS M          34 10 years 2 years 
P2 PC M 38 8 years 1 year 
P3 PC M 34 8 years 1 year 
P4 PC M 32 10 years  3 years 
P5 PC M 30 11 years 4 years 
P6 PC M 33 11 years 4 years 
P7 PC M 29 12 years 4 years 
P8 PC F 30 10 years 2 years 
P9 PC M 37 15 years 3 years 
P10  PC F 35 10 years 2 years 
P11 PC M 36 15 years 4 years 
P12 PC M 40 8 years 2 years 
P13 A/PS M 38 8 years 3 years 
P14 PC F 40 12 years 1 year 
P15 PC M 34 11 years 1 year 
      
      
 
Self-completion surveys 
At the time of this research, officers from Westshire Constabulary had been inundated with a 
number of survey requests. These included the annual Police Federation Survey, the annual 
Employee Satisfaction survey and various other requests, both internal and external. With this in 
mind, the surveys used as part of this current research were kept deliberately short and concise, 
comprising only 10 questions each. This helped to maximize rates of completion and minimise 
responder fatigue (Hibbard & Bennett, 1990). 
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Both surveys were constructed by the researcher, using a web-based survey provider. They were 
sent by e-mail request which contained the web-link. This ensured that officers could open, 
complete and return the survey quickly and easily. The primary focus of the first survey: “Tactical 
Options” (see Appendix A) was the use of personal protective equipment, with particular emphasis 
on the availability of CEDs and potentially firearms to non-specialist officers. It was created in order 
to assess the overall level of organisational interest in the use of less-lethal force. This survey was 
sent in February 2015, to 140 uniformed response officers working on NRT. It was live for 30 days 
with a follow up request sent after 15 days. The survey closed in March 2015 and generated 67 
responses which was slightly lower than hoped. 
 
The second self-completion survey: “Red-Dotted!” (Appendix B) was disseminated in June 2016. It 
was targeted solely at current STO’s, and focused on areas specific to the research agenda. The line 
of questioning included the content and sufficiency of initial training, the operational value of the 
CEDs, and the suitability of post-incident procedures. The data from this survey were used to inform 
the line of questioning for the semi-structured interview schedule. Specifically the content and 
sufficiency of initial training and the operational effectiveness of the device. The survey request also 
contained information about the proposed research and explained how officers could express an 
interest in participating. It is from these expressions of interest, that the sample population for the 
battery of semi-structured interviews was ultimately selected. This survey was sent to approximately 
200 officers. It was live for a 30 day period, with a follow up request sent at the halfway mark. In 
total 91 responses were received equating to a take up rate of 46% which was again, slightly lower 
than hoped and anticipated.   
 
In order to present the survey data legibly within this thesis, the numeric outcomes were 
transformed by the researcher into both a coloured graph and tabular depiction. Detailed analysis of 
the survey data is presented in chapter seven and the surveys in-full are also appended to this thesis 
(see Appendix A and B).  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
The use of in-depth interviews is compatible with both a qualitative approach and the case study 
design. In order to achieve high quality data, a degree of planning and preparation is required 
(Patton, 1990). Prior to commencing the interview process, an interview template was created 
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(Appendix C). Considerable time and care was taken in the formulation of this document and it was 
followed closely during the course of the interviews.  
 
Stake (1995) and Yin (2003) stress that well-structured, carefully selected questions are fundamental 
to a good quality case study. With this in mind, several introductory questions were used to put the 
participants at ease with the interview process. A number of initial exploratory questions were then 
posed. These were deliberately open-ended in order to facilitate a naturally participant-led 
conversation. Initial questions were then followed by a number of probing questions, which add a 
layer of depth and clarity to the data (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The interviews were conducted in a consistent manner. Firstly, the participants were informed of the 
general nature and purpose of the study. They were then asked to confirm that they had read and 
understood the participant information sheet (Appendix D) and signed the consent forms (Appendix 
E). In order to commence the interview proper, participants were asked to provide a brief summary 
of their career to date. They were then asked to explain why they had applied to become an STO and 
what the initial application process consisted of.  
 
In keeping with the primary research aim (a better understanding of the training curriculum) 
participants were prompted to reflect upon each individual day of instruction in sequential order. 
They were asked open ended questions about the content of the training, what input they received, 
what they were asked to do and how they felt during the process.  
Further probing questions were then asked about individual elements of the course, such as the 
value of the theory inputs, the individual elements of the classification exercise and the content of 
the scenario based role plays. Participants were further encouraged to provide personal reflections 
of their individual experiences throughout the process.     
A research question key to this current project, relates to the position of Taser within the use of 
force hierarchy. Specifically, how this concept subject with the recent introduction of the NDM. With 
this question in mind, participants were quizzed on their subjective interpretation of these notions 
as a fundamental part of the interview process. A number of conceptually interesting answers were 
provided. These are explored in the results chapters.  
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A further research question relates to the operationalisation of Taser. An area of particular academic 
interest. In order to fully explore this key emerging area, participants were asked to recount (within 
the stringent ethical guidelines discussed below), their experiences of operational Taser 
deployments. They were also asked a number of probing questions, exploring how their role has 
changed (in the operational sense) since becoming STO’s.   
At the conclusion of the interview participants were asked if they had any further comments they 
wished to add about any aspect of CED training or operationalisation. Specifically, any improvements 
which could be made. They were then thanked for their time and the interview was concluded. 
During the interview process, contemporaneous notes were taken by the researcher. These were 
subsequently used for the early identification of important patterns and emerging coding schemes.  
The first interview was conducted in July 2016 and the final interview was completed in December 
2016. The interviews generally took place at the participant’s home station. The researcher and the 
participant were the only persons present. Each interview was audibly recorded using a digital voice 
recorder which ensured an accurate and ethical record of the interview. The shortest interview 
lasted 23 minutes and the longest interview lasted 62 minutes. The more durative interviews tended 
to involve longer serving STO’s, discussing several instances of operational Taser deployment.  
Each interview was professionally transcribed. Edwards (1998) confirms that this process ensures a 
verbatim record of the verbal account, and better facilitates both data coding, and thematic analysis. 
To ensure the security and integrity of data, discs and hard copy transcripts are secured in a locked 
safe. Electronic copies are secure and password protected. Hard copies were printed and also saved 
to CD disc. Electronic copies are stored on a USB device and a computer Hard Drive. When the data 
collection phase was fully completed the corpus was analysed.    
Analysis 
The data corpus comprised 2 self-completion surveys and 15 interview transcripts. For analytical 
purposes, the survey results were exported from the web-based platform. The data was then 
manually converted into percentage value answers to the survey questions. Coloured charts and 
numeric tables were also created in order to provide a better visual and comparative representation 
of the outcomes. The data from the first survey was primarily intended to assess the feasibility of the 
proposed research. This was achieved by exploring the general level of interest in CEDs from the 
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point of view of research participants. Also, to provide a more targeted direction for the second 
survey which was aimed specifically at current serving STO’s.  
 
Akin to the first survey, data from the second survey was exported and manually converted into 
numeric value percentages. Graphs and tables also provided an enhanced visual representation of 
the results. This process provided a valuable initial insight into CED use within Westshire 
Constabulary and helped to underpin the content of the primary research instrument, with a 
number of additional questions emerging as relevant and warranting of further qualitative 
exploration during the semi-structured interview phase.  
 
The process of initial data familiarisation was conducted by reading and re-reading the interview 
transcripts. From this process a number of potential candidate themes were identified. Initial coding 
was first conducted manually. Written notes identifying a number of recurring themes were made 
on hard copy interview transcripts (Bernard, 2000). Different colour highlighter pens were then used 
to identify existing and emerging patterns within the data set, and a numeric grading system ranked 
the evidence in terms of relevance and usefulness to the project (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bryman, 
2012).  The purpose of this initial process was to secure an overarching understanding of officers’ 
perceptions relevant to the process, and to identify a number of potential patterns for subsequent 
exploration (Thompson & Barrett, 1997).    
 
After the process of initial coding was completed, a secondary process of focused data coding 
commenced. Charmez (2010) declares that focused coding allows for a more detailed thematic 
categorisation of the sample and assists with the identification of patterns within each relevant 
context. From the process of secondary coding, a set of candidate themes for critical discussion were 
identified then quantified for regularity in appearance across the entire case. Whilst this process did 
not, and was not intended to, provide an indicator of overall generalisability to the topic area, it did 
allow for a reliable indication of recurring themes present with the current data set (Strauss, 1987).  
The relevant text segments ascribed to each theme were identified and systematically attached to 
thematic headings and (where appropriate) sub-headings. Each theme was arranged hierarchically in 
terms of sociological importance to the topic area as underpinned by the research aims and 
objectives (Dye, Schatz, Roesnberg & Coleman, 2000).  These included, but were not restricted to, 
the content of training, the presence of ubiquitous pressure, a disconnect between officers 
interpretation of CEDs within the force hierarchy, an operational disparity in appropriate use of the 
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NDM, and a lack of protection measures afforded to minority ethnic citizens who are 
disproportionately represented by CED use statistics (Oriola et al., 2012; Ryan, 2008; Shaw, 2015). 
The themes selected for discussion and critical analysis were all highlighted and exemplified by real-
world reflections from the sample and they are critically examined as research outcomes in chapters 
seven through to ten.  
Ethical compliance  
Positivity in ethical safeguarding is an essential aspect of reliable scientific research (Miller, T., Birch, 
M., Mauthner, M., & Jessop, J, 2012). Prior to commencing the active phase of this current research, 
a Favourable Ethical Opinion was required from the University of Portsmouth. A detailed application 
form was completed, which clearly documented potential ethical risk, and included proposed 
measures for mitigation. This form was completed in May 2016 and a favourable ethical opinion was 
granted in April 2016 (see Appendix F). Confirmation that this current research was conducted 
within the specified guidelines is provided by a signed Ethics Declaration form (see Appendix G).    
 
Official permission was also required by Westshire Constabulary before any form of research could 
commence. Again, this required the completion of a detailed application form. The application for 
this current research was submitted in March 2016. It was considered by an internal research panel, 
which sits on a quarterly basis and is chaired by the Force Research Co-ordinator. In June 2016 
official written permission to conduct this research was granted (see Appendix H). During the 
application processes, a number of ethical safeguarding measures were highlighted and risk-
managed. Space limitations preclude the discussion of each and every ethical dilemma, but the most 
pertinent considerations are documented below.   
 
Insider researcher 
Perhaps the most significant ethical concern of this current research was the position of the 
researcher as an employee of Westshire Constabulary. A fact which could compromise data integrity 
and must be fully acknowledged (Weatheritt, 1986). As such a brief summary of my professional 
background is provided below.   
 
I joined Westshire Constabulary in 2006. I received initial training at a remote training centre after 
which, I was posted to NRT to complete the remainder of my probationary period. In 2008, I applied 
to join the Tactical Firearms Unit. After a 3 day selection process, I attended an 11 week initial 
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firearms course. After completing this gruelling process, I operated as an Authorised Firearms 
Officer. I received enhanced training in lethal and less-lethal weapons (including CEDs), 
marksmanship, foot strikes, vehicle strikes, rapid building entry and counter terrorism tactics. I was 
privileged to have received promotion within this unit, and was further trained as a specialist 
firearms Sergeant and an Operational Firearms (Bronze) Commander.   
 
In 2012, I moved to Australia and re-trained as a police officer in the Queensland Police Service. I 
spent 2 years serving on general duties before returning to the UK to seek further promotion. 
Operationally, I have been extensively trained in and have deployed most use of force options 
available to a police officer, ranging from strong verbal commands, moving up the continuum to the 
deployment of chemical spray, use of a baton, CED and escalating as high as the use of a firearm. 
The “Insider” status is an ethical risk which can affect data integrity in several ways. Brown (1996a) 
suggests, that insider researchers may enjoy ready access to people and resources, unavailable to an 
outsider. Bartunek and Louis (1996) declare that an insider’s professional background, is 
incompatible with a truly independent study. In their argument, they suggest an insider’s view of the 
organisational environment is already tainted by pre-existing knowledge, which consequentially 
affects the integrity of data. Weatheritt has described the results obtained by an Insider researcher 
as little more than a “forgone conclusion.” (1986, p. 19).  
 
Whilst robust measures were put in place in order to prevent the researcher’s insider status from 
adversely affecting the data (such as the use of a gatekeeper to disseminate surveys and 
participation requests, conducting interviews out of uniform and with participants unknown to the 
researcher) it is possible that the information imparted from the sample population was to some 
extent compromised. That being said, the research data is both auditable, evidence-based and 
presented with reflexive balance. The research outcomes are, by-no-means, a forgone conclusion 
and in fact, a number of surprising and illuminating themes are analysed in the following chapters.   
 
Influence of the researcher over the sample population 
A further significant ethical concern related to Rank. As an Inspector, the researcher outranked each 
member of the research sample. By consequence, there existed a substantial risk of the interviewees 
feeling compelled to participate in the research because they had been asked to do so by a supervising 
officer (Brown & Walters, 1993). 
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In order to mitigate this concern, participants were recruited through the use of 2 anonymous 
questionnaires, sent on the researchers’ behalf by a Gatekeeper. The second questionnaire allowed 
participants to complete an Expression of Interest form, if they were prepared to participate in an 
interview. Completed forms were returned to the Gatekeeper who in turn, forwarded them to the 
researcher. Interview participants were previously unknown to the researcher and there was no direct 
supervisory relationship. The interviews were conducted out of uniform and not on duty time. These 
measures served to minimise the risk of rank adversely bearing on the interview process.   
 
Complaints / investigations 
A significant section of this current research is devoted to Taser operationalisation. A Taser 
deployment will, in many cases, result in the recipient making a complaint about excessive use of 
force. The circumstances will also invariably result in a criminal investigation of some description. If 
the incident resulted in death, serious injury or significant community tension then any subsequent 
investigation is managed by the IPCC.  
 
Obviously, it was not appropriate to discuss an ongoing investigation. Such information would be 
classed as evidential and could be required for disclosure purposes which would compromise the 
anonymity guaranteed by the consent forms. In order to mitigate this ethical challenge, participants 
were not permitted to discuss any Taser deployment still subject to an investigation of any kind. This 
proviso was recorded on the consent form and signed by each participant.  
 
Health and safety  
CED use is, by its very nature, an emotionally charged and stressful event for those involved. Incidents 
where a CED is discharged can often involve a life threatening situation for the officer, the subject or 
members of the public. The risk that recounting such an incident could place a degree of stress upon 
participants even to the degree where post-traumatic stress arises or presents, was recognised. In 
order to mitigate the risk of exacerbating any underlying mental health concern, participants were 
required to sign and acknowledge that they were not undergoing treatment for, or feeling the effects 
of post-traumatic stress disorder, or any other form of mental or emotional illness, prior to the 
interview.  
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Disclosure of personal information 
Officers participating in this current research were guaranteed anonymity. The survey data did not 
request or give the option to provide data which could serve to identify participants. During the 
interviews, only the first name of the officer was used. Each participant was allocated a number (1 - 
15) in accordance with the order in which the interviews were conducted. When reporting the 
research results, this number was used to ascribe data to each particular participant. At no point in 
this thesis have names or unique warrant numbers been disclosed. Likewise the true identification of 
Westshire Constabulary is not published. When discussing operational examples of CED use 
participants were asked not to disclose personal details about the subject or the location of the 
incident. They were asked to recount the circumstances in general terms only. This further ensured 
confidentiality.  
 
Financial assistance  
The provision of financial support has been identified as a potential ethical risk (Robson, 2011). In a 
bid to alleviate the high cost of University tuition fees, various funding applications were submitted 
to Westshire Constabulary. These were all refused. In late 2016, an application to the COP Bursary 
Scheme was completed and approved. The grant was used retrospectively, to substantially reduce 
the cost of tuition fees, which were entirely self-funded prior to the award.  
 
The fact that the COP has national oversight of the research area is an ethical concern that must be 
acknowledged. That this body has assisted financially with this research, could be perceived by some 
as a burden. Particularly when it comes to publishing an honest critique of the findings (Noakes & 
Wincup, 2004; Sheptycki, 1994). However, the active research phase was completed, and a full draft 
of this thesis was written prior to confirmation of the bursary award. No changes were made to this 
thesis in direct response to the funding allocation.  
 
The above chapter has outlined the research methodology. It began with a brief description of the 
various strategies commonly used to conduct research and continued by outlining the research 
setting, sample and methods used to analyse the raw data. A detailed discussion of the primary and 
secondary research instruments was also provided. Chapter six concluded with a précis of relevant 
ethical concerns. The following chapter is the first of three to discuss the research outcomes.  
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Chapter seven   
Survey Research and the initial application process  
 
The preceding chapter has discussed the research methodology, the following chapter explores the 
data obtained from two self-completion surveys which were disseminated in the embryonic stages 
of this research. The survey outcomes point to an increased operational need for CEDs, a robust 
training process and a general feeling of reliability when it comes to field-use of these devices.     
 
Survey research  
The first survey, titled “Tactical Options” was completed by 67 respondents. The opening questions 
established demographic details. Seventy three per cent of the sample were male and 48% were of 
PC rank. Fifty three per cent were aged between 21 and 49 years of age and 58% had completed 
between 5 – 10 years police service.  
 
The survey then explored the number of STOs within Westshire Constabulary. In the earlier years of 
the Taser phenomenon, various newspaper articles suggested that up to 13% of officers in the 
United Kingdom had access to Taser (e.g. Arnett, 2013; Leville, 2013). This current survey places the 
figure a little higher at 16%. In a more recent national survey, the Police Federation (2016), reported 
that somewhere in the region of 25% of current serving officers now carry a CED. This appears to 
show a steady rise in the number of STOs over recent years which is in line with Home Office 
recommendations.  
Figure 7.1. Number of STOs in Westshire Constabulary  
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The value of CEDs as a legitimate and desirable law enforcement tool was evident from the survey 
responses. Seventy five per cent of surveyed officers were of the opinion that such devices should be 
standard issue to uniformed officers.  
 
Figure 7.2. Should all police officers carry Taser?  
 
 
This position is currently echoed by the Police Federation of England and Wales and was voiced by 
the Deputy Chairman Calum Macleod, who made the following observation on behalf of his 
members: 
 
Taser is an option that can be used to protect the public and police officers 
themselves, and that is why we have been calling for every officer who wants to carry 
Taser - and is willing to be trained, tested and held accountable for its use - to be allowed 
to do so.  This is not only to provide greater public reassurance but to offer greater 
protection for our members who risk their lives on duty, to defend the public, day in, day 
out (The Police Federation, 2015, para. 4). 
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Despite this assertion, universal CED carriage is not currently supported by the NPCC (NPCC, 2015). 
The emerging drive from serving officers towards standardisation in this area is of particular interest 
when comparison is drawn with the same question about routine carriage of a police firearm. This is 
a concept that was rejected by more than 60% of the survey respondents. 
 
Figure 7.3. Should all police officers carry a firearm? 
 
 
This general consensus of opinion demonstrates that police officers are not seeking the full array of 
coercive accoutrements; a concept Jenkinson et al. refer to as the “new toy” element that exists 
within the policing environment (2006, p. 238). Rather they are looking to acquire specific tools they 
consider essential to the safe operationalisation of their coercive mandate.  
 
Developing the above argument a little further, this survey then explored the possibility of providing 
weapons training to front-line officers for emergent use. Over half (55%) of those surveyed were of 
the opinion that they should be trained to use a firearm, but they did not want to carry one 
routinely. Thirty five per cent of the sample population rejected even this premise and 10% were 
unsure. 
 
  67 Responses 
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Figure 7.4. Firearms training as an operational contingency
 
 
Of relevance to the wider police organisation is the concern that experienced officers would look to 
leave the service if carriage of a firearm became mandatory. Although not generalizable 
countrywide, the responses to this current survey indicate that this would be a possibility for a 
relatively small, but not insignificant number of officers. 
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Figure 7.5. Retention 
 
 
From the survey data, a clear desire to be routinely armed with a CED is evident. A logical 
explanation for this outcome is officer safety: “. . . officers never know when they may face sudden 
danger. Consequently they feel more secure with a weapon on their belt . . .” (Squires & Kennison, 
2010, p. 71). A further theoretical explanation could be that this situation is a further manifestation 
of the gradual erosion of the policing by consent paradigm (Gould & Miller, 1977; Waldren, 1996; 
2007), at least from the point of view of current serving officers. Regardless of motive, it is perhaps 
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some comfort to societal pluralists to note that the majority of the sample population remain 
unwilling to carry a firearm permanently. In order to further explore why CEDs are perceived to be 
such a desirable piece of operational equipment, a second survey targeted specifically at STOs was 
created.    
 
The second self-completion survey titled “Red-Dotted!” was sent to approximately 200 STOs 
employed by Westshire Constabulary. It was completed by 91 officers of PC or APS rank and began 
by exploring the sample demographic. Eighty per cent of the respondents were male and 85% were 
experienced police officers with over 6 years’ service. Sixty eight percent of those surveyed had 
carried Taser for 12 months or longer.  
 
Figure 7.6. Length of time as an STO
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From the introductory questions, a good indication of the true strength of the training curriculum 
provided by Westshire Constabulary was disclosed. Eighty six per cent of the sample population 
stated that the course was either more challenging than they had expected or the most challenging 
course they had ever undertaken in the police service.  
 
Figure 7.7. Participants experience of Taser training  
 
 
A point fortified by the course failure rate within Westshire Constabulary which currently stands at 
around 10%.  
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Figure 7.8. Initial training failure rate 
 
 
Although these particular results are not necessarily generalisable countrywide they do give a good 
indication of the robustness of the training agenda within a single police service and provide a 
benchmark for further comparative research on a national or even international scale.  
 
Moving from the training into the live environment, this survey then explored the operational value 
of CEDs from the point of view of current serving STO’s. There is compelling empirical evidence to 
suggest that police officers seldom resort to force (e.g. Alpert & Dunham 1999; Bayley & Garofalo, 
1989; Croft, 1985; Fyfe, 1989; Kavanagh, 1997; McLaughlin, 1992; Russell, 1978; Worden, 1995). A 
concept broadly supported by this research which shows that of the 91 officers surveyed, only 22 
(24%) had actually fired a CED operationally.  
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Figure 7.9. Taser firings 
 
 
 
It is also frequently reported, that CEDs are effective weapons which have the capacity to resolve a 
volatile situation, often without recourse to discharge (Home Office, 2016). A premise qualified by 
survey data, which reported an 81% rate of success when the arc or red-dot function was used as a 
standalone tactic, to resolve a potentially forceful police – citizen encounter. 
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Figure 7.10. Operational Taser use  
 
 
 
Finally, this survey addressed post-incident procedures. This particular question was hampered 
slightly, because 47% of the sample population had never fired a CED operationally. Notwithstanding 
this fact, 49% of those surveyed considered the post-incident procedures they had been taught or 
had experienced either very effective, or effective but in need of improvement. Only 3% of the 
sample were of the opinion that the current provision was inadequate.      
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Figure 7.11. Post-incident procedures  
 
 
In summary, the survey data reveals that only a small proportion (anywhere between 16-25%) of 
non-specialist officers are currently permitted to carry a CED whilst on duty. For the most part, those 
who do not have access to such a device, would like the option. Interestingly, though perhaps not 
surprisingly, the same could not be said of a firearm. When current serving STO’s were questioned 
about their experience of CED training, most reported the process to be challenging (which is 
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reflected by a 10% failure rate). When it comes to operational use, the device is regarded as an 
effective weapon especially when presented as a visual deterrent. Instances of firing are low and 
STO’s are generally satisfied with current post-incident procedures.   
 
The application and pre-joining process  
Prospective STO’s are required to submit a written application form which must be positively 
endorsed by a first and second-line manager before they can undergo CED training.  The written 
application comprises a number of competency based questions, to which the candidate must 
provide written answer. To pass the paper sift and proceed to an initial course, officers must 
demonstrate a solid background in operational policing, decision making under pressure, 
appropriate use of force and sound application of the NDM.  
 
Places on an initial course will be limited and competitive. A prospective candidate may not pass the 
paper sift at the first time of asking. .   
 
“I didn’t get it the first time round, because I think there were quite a few people in the hat 
for it, and there were only two vacancies, but I got it the second time round.” (P3) 
 
Those who are successful in the initial stages are required to gain medical clearance from the 
Occupational Health Department and pass an eyesight test (set at the national level for firearms 
training) before being allowed on the course. 
  
Westshire Constabulary usually provides 2 or 3 initial courses per financial year. There are between 
6 and 9 participants per course. The training period is currently 3 days (18 hours) in total. Although 
some longer serving STO’s undertook a 4 day process. Overall, CED training is perceived by the 
majority of students to be robust, particularly in comparison to other courses they have undertaken.     
 
“Some of our courses are turn up and pass. But this is certainly not one of those ones where 
you turn up and pass. They make you work for it, and they expect you to be switched on from 
day one.” (P12) 
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When asked why officers volunteered for CED training, the general consensus was these devices 
represent a valuable addition to their armory providing additional officer safety and a useful skill-set 
to the team environment.  
 
“Something I think is actually quite useful . . . as a tool for us to have. I can think of quite a 
few incidents where . . .  I would have drawn it and used it, that have been dealt with, with 
batons and spray . . . and the risk levels to us have been quite horrendous. In those incidents 
we could have just used [a CED] and had almost zero risk at all to both subject and us. So I 
thought it was quite a valuable thing to have.”  (P2) 
 
“I suppose the best way to describe it is it’s just another tool, another tool to the belt as such, 
you know, personal safety as well I think . . . quite often we can be sent out on our own 
nowadays. . .  I want to have as much . . . protective equipment on me . . . as I can. I always 
like to take on a new challenge, seemed like a kind of natural, natural step really.” (P3) 
 
The most noteworthy aspect of the pre-joining process is the aura which surrounds CED training. 
During the interview phase, several research participants reported a distinct feeling of trepidation in 
the lead up to the course and had evidently placed themselves under considerable self-induced 
pressure to pass it.  
 
“I was really nervous, yeah. I found it quite stressful, quite nervous. I have never done 
anything like that before . . . you put a lot of pressure on yourself. You don’t want to fail. You 
don’t want to mess up . . . once you have gone for it you want to achieve it. So, yeah, you put 
quite a lot of stress on yourself and, it's quite hard really.”  (P8) 
 
“I think everybody puts themselves under that pressure don’t they? Because they want to do 
well, they know it's a pass or fail course within [Westshire Constabulary] or any police force, 
and you don’t want to come away saying no, you failed.” (P7) 
 
Prospective STO’s are under no illusion that this course is different from many others they have 
attended. The training program has a formidable reputation. Even before the course begins, officers 
know they will be placed under considerable pressure, they are sure they will be challenged and 
ultimately, they are aware that they might not be successful.  
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“. . . prior to going and actually starting the course, I was very apprehensive. There’s a 
reputation that it’s a bit of an Old Boys Club, if your face fits, you’ll be alright. . . . There were 
grumblings that [the instructors] want you to fail, you know it was a lot harder to pass than 
it was . . .  to fail, and for me that . . . gave me concerns because … you’ve already got the 
pressure on your shoulders anyway because you’ve been sent by … your team, to go and . . . 
pass a course and get a bit of kit that will benefit everybody. So there’s already pressure 
there, without the reputation.” (P1) 
 
This tangible feeling of pressure is a theme which runs throughout initial training and manifests in 
different ways depending on the psychology of the individual. For some participants, the pressure 
builds to the point where it becomes a negative and ultimately overwhelming influence. This leads 
to patent nervousness, resulting in poor weapon handling, erroneous judgement and ultimately 
course failure. For others this pressure acts as a positive driver, informing good decision making and 
allowing a sought-after assertiveness, which undoubtedly makes the course as a whole a more 
comfortable process. It is conceivable, if not likely, that the generally nervous individuals find the 
training process a more difficult and less passable endeavor than those of a more naturally self-
confident disposition.   
 
If governing organisations were keen (perhaps from a budgetary perspective) to reduce initial rates 
of failure, or if widespread CED armament was proposed (including training probationary officers or 
even Special Constables) then presumably they would look for measures to achieve high percentage 
pass rates, without lowering the expected training standards. In order to make this possible initial 
de-pressurisation measures would be beneficial in the pre-course stages. Instructors could work to 
alleviate the feeling of negative pressure by providing an input which “demystifies” the both the 
device and the training process. Prospective STOs could also benefit from a degree of prior 
familiarity with the device itself in order to conduct handling and dexterity exercises. Chapter five 
(below) discusses such measures in more detail and shows that if the intrinsic pressure is not 
checked at an early stage of training then it can result in negative consequences for the participant.     
   
The above chapter has reported on the results of 2 self-completion surveys disseminated in the early 
stages of this current research. It has also addressed the initial application and pre-joining processes, 
and has introduced the idea of positive and negative pressure responses. These concepts are 
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referred to, and developed upon, throughout the following chapter which addresses, in detail the 
content and delivery of initial CED training.  
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Chapter eight 
Training and content 
 
The following chapter provides a detailed breakdown of the initial CED training course. For ease and 
structural continuity, the content of each individual day is addressed in sequential order. It focusses 
on safety and handling requirements, as well as the core assessed components such as the 
classification exercise, written examination and scenario based role plays. Reflective observations 
from the sample population litter this passage, and where appropriate, the relevant literature is 
cross-referenced for analytical purposes. The intrinsic pressure entailed by the training standards is a 
theme which runs throughout this chapter and is manifested by extremes of positive or negative 
performance. Chapter eight concludes with a battery of overreaching reflections from the sample 
population which includes some valid avenues for potential improvement.  
 
Initial training - Day one 
For what is generally perceived to be a dynamic and intensive program, the initial training course 
does contain a significant proportion of classroom based activity. This takes place at various stages 
during the three day course, beginning with an information session on the morning of day one, 
where candidates are exposed to a series of PowerPoint™ presentations.  
 
In formulating the quantity and placement of classroom based content within the training 
curriculum, the COP appears to have achieved a rare balance of relevance and proportionality.  
 
“I will say that you know we weren’t sat in a classroom for more than an hour and a half at a 
time, so the balance of you know classroom input to practical input, as far as a police course 
goes, was pretty good to be honest with you.” (P3) 
 
Extended classroom based presentations are historically amongst the most difficult training 
packages to deliver to seasoned police officers. The phrase “Death by PowerPoint” is commonplace 
within the ranks, and electronic inputs are often viewed with comedic dread by prospective 
recipients. But this does not appear to be the case with the Taser inputs. It was certainly not alluded 
to by any of the research participants. One officer even awarded the Taser related PowerPoints the 
highest police honor of being almost bearable!    
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“I actually find the PowerPoints and, the classroom based stuff for Taser, probably more 
bearable than most of the other training stuff that we do. I think they have got that pretty 
right to be honest.” (P9) 
 
The first theory input covers the technical specifications of the Taser X26. Officers are given 
information on the location and nomenclature of vital device aspects including the cartridge housing 
bays, the safety catch, the sighting system(s), the Extended Digital Power Magazine (XDPM) and the 
trigger. They are then shown how the device should be used under ideal operating circumstances. 
This includes information on full-probe versus drive-stun or angled drive-stun deployment, 
recommended operating distances and the science behind Neuro-Muscular Incapacitation.  
 
Officers are then further briefed on the potential medical consequences of Taser deployment. This 
naturally indicates when Taser use should be avoided, save in exceptional circumstances. It is 
encouraging to see that these crucial guidelines appear to have been formulated in direct response 
to official guidance, (i.e. DOMILL, 2004; 2005; 2007; 2012; SACMILL, 2017) and the evidence-base.  
 
For example, Becour et al. (2009) and Nislow (2005), expressed grave concern about secondary head 
injuries caused by a Taser recipient falling heavily to the ground and Clarke & Andrews (2014) warn 
against Taser use on a subject doused in flammable liquid due to the possibility of unintended 
ignition. These serious medical concerns are addressed in theory during classroom-based input and 
tested practically through assessed role play exercises.    
 
Despite this positive development, there still appears to be at least some room for editing the 
content of the classroom based presentations, as the relevance of certain aspects has been called in 
question. 
 
“I don’t really see the necessity to show us YouTube clips of dogs being Tasered, you know? I 
think a simple, ‘This is what could happen’, is sufficient . . . I found that to be unnecessary.” 
(P1)   
 
On reflection, this appears to be a valid critique. The curriculum could arguably use the time set 
aside for valuable theoretical input to better use perhaps by addressing one of the many compelling 
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scientific studies which further explore the risks of Taser exposure to vulnerable members of society. 
Rather than focusing on the affect the device may or may not have on animals.  
 
For example, Kornblum & Reddy (1991) and Williams (2008) address the increased risk of a Tasered 
subject experiencing death by positional asphyxia; whereas Bleetman & Steyn (2003); IPCC (2010; 
2013) and Lee et al. (2009) discuss the increased likelihood of a death in police custody, after Taser is 
used. McGuiness (2016), provides a list of factors which must be considered by an STO before Taser 
is used. This includes consideration that the subject may be experiencing an episode of Excited 
Delirium or Acute Behavioural Disorder and further indicates that children, people of small stature 
and those with pre-existing health conditions are especially vulnerable. As such, Taser should only be 
used as a last resort. DOMILL (2012) cautions against use of Taser on children and pregnant women 
which is not specifically included in the APP. Also, international guidance advises strongly against the 
use of multiple Taser cycles (Braidwood Commission, 2010; QCMC, 2013). These are all very 
relevant, heightened risk factors, based on sound evidence, but are for the most part, overlooked 
during initial training.  
 
It is both surprising and concerning, that certain serious risks appear to be comprehensively 
mitigated by the training curriculum, whereas others are not. An inquiry into the COP’s risk 
prioritisation strategy, would provide some much needed clarity here; particularly in the light of the 
recent decision by the home office to replace the Taser X26, with the more powerful and 
technologically superior Taser X2. A development which naturally incurs additional public safety 
concerns (SACMILL, 2017). 
 
In the wake of an extended period of theoretical input, the first day of training continues with a 
more practical, weapons familiarisation session. Prospective STOs are presented with an inert 
training device and are encouraged to familiarise themselves with the weapon. Particularly general 
handling, attachment and removal of cartridges and the location of component parts.  
 
“. . . so it's a safe removal and insertion of the cartridges . . . red laser dot, red laser dot with 
the flash light, just the flash light, and then, turn them all off together and just being able to 
shoot through the cross hairs . . . should any of the aids, malfunction.” (P7) 
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After a reasonable period of familiarisation, officers are further instructed on more specific, and 
nationally accredited, safety and handling techniques. This includes taking up a solid shooting 
platform, drawing the device from the holster, arming and pointing it in the nominated safe 
direction. Officers are shown how to safely load and unload the device by attaching and detaching 
the front cartridge. They are also further indoctrinated in the so- called “operational reload” 
technique whereby, the device is drawn, armed, fired then de-armed before the spent cartridge is 
removed, and the spare cartridge (housed in the XDPM at the bottom of the unit) is quickly 
attached. This allows the option of an additional shot.  
 
Even at this early stage, the instructors begin to apply a degree of pressure on the candidates who 
are front-loaded with numerous tactile techniques which they are expected to assimilate quickly, 
and execute safely.  
 
“Very slow . . . clear instructions, how to hold it, specifically, how to then insert it safely, 
where your fingers should be, i.e. not in the trigger, safety on, not off, and then you . . . very 
rapidly move on from that. . . . [The instructors] only . . .  tell you once or twice, and then you 
go into really doing it straight away, so you build up a muscle memory almost immediately.” 
(P7) 
 
The introduction, familiarisation and handling session with the training unit represents the first 
“hands-on” experience officers will have had with the device. This may also be the first time the 
officer will have handled a weapon of any description. Officers are closely monitored by the 
instructors, and are given continuous advice and developmental feedback. The overarching aim is 
safety. If potentially unsafe Taser use is noted this is quickly corrected. Unsafe use includes placing a 
finger on the trigger at any time before the operator is ready to fire (which could invoke a 
“negligent” or “unintended” discharge), pointing the device in an unsafe direction, particularly at a 
person who is not a target (colloquially referred to as “muzzle sweeping” or “blue-on-blue”) and 
failing to de-arm (switch off) the device when loading or operationally re-loading, which can cause 
the operator to shock himself!    
 
“Safety, that’s all they harped on about was safety, safety, safety! If you’re not safe in using 
that thing, then you’re not having it basically.” (P3) 
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The rigid process of closely supervised inculcation is a unique undertaking for officers, most of whom 
will not have experienced such intense scrutiny in previous training. Whilst some participants are 
able cope, the pressure of the situation can sit uncomfortably with others, who remain consciously 
aware that they are being individually monitored.    
 
“You’ve almost got like one to one sort of coverage with the instructors, so they are there, 
monitoring your every move.” (P3)  
 
After dry handling practice, officers are then taken to the weapons range, where they are first 
introduced to a live Taser. From here on in, work towards the classification exercise begins. Officers 
are given a safety briefing by the Range Commanding Officer (usually the senior instructor present) 
which highlights the conduct expected of them during live-fire exercises. They are then introduced 
to the static targets which officers are expected to shoot at.  
 
The static targets are made of cardboard and are full colour, life-sized representations of a person, 
usually holding an offensive weapon such as a knife, iron bar or baseball bat. On the command of 
the instructors, officers stand at various distances from the target, draw the device, arm, aim and 
fire.  
 
It is encouraging to note that officers are instructed to fire Taser within the safe parameters guided 
by scientific evidence. For example, Bozeman et al. (2009); White et al. (2013) and Ideker & Dosdall 
(2007), all document the increased risk of heart attack, or other serious cardio vascular-
complications, if the electric current from the Taser probes were to pass directly over the heart.  
DOMILL (2004; 2005; 2007; 2012) and SACMILL (2017) all highlight the risk of serious injury to the 
neck, head, groin and eyes if the probes were to penetrate these particularly sensitive areas. This 
explains why the accepted point of impact for the Taser probes during training and classification, 
breaks the belt-line of the assailant i.e. the top probe should hit the large muscle mass above the 
waist and the bottom probe should ideally hit the upper leg / thigh  area. It is essential that the 
probes do not pass over or near the heart, head or groin.   
 
The live-fire practice can be a daunting and sometimes overwhelming experience for participants. 
Particularly if the candidate has little or no previous experience with firearms. The feeling of 
pressure is a theme which runs throughout Taser training and is heightened during live-fire 
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exercises. During this particular session, officers are treated robustly by the instructors, who 
assertively expose and rigidly correct safety and handling errors.  
 
The officers who use this intense pressure as a positive driver tend to understand and make light of 
the process. Even thrive under it.  
  
“I mean the training is strict. But it has to be you know. They know what they want you to do 
and if you mess it up, you are going to get shouted at or you are going to get the Mickey 
taken out of you . . . they are there to do a job, they are there to train you in a certain way.” 
(P9) 
 
However, the officers who are negatively affected by the intrinsic pressure, will find themselves 
overwhelmed, and will start to make serious mistakes:  
 
“On at least two occasions, I forgot to switch the Taser off, before doing the reload, and got 
a shot to my hand, so the feedback . . . was pretty sharp and pretty blunt, but it kind of 
needed to be.”  (P3) 
 
At the conclusion of day one, it is perhaps unsurprising, that officers will experience a diverse mix of 
emotions, depending on the extent to which they have been positively or negatively affected by the 
rigors of the curriculum. What is perhaps surprising, is the apparent lack of middle-ground. Officers 
are either well-within their comfort zone, and feel confident going forward.  
 
“I felt good on day one, yeah, day one was all right.” (P4)  
 
“Yeah I am a fairly confident person . . . so I was fine. . .  I knew that I would pick it up, as I 
say . . . it wasn’t all smooth sailing, I made a few fuck ups but yeah everything . . . went 
alright. I knew that I would get it in the end.” (P11) 
 
Or, they are far less confident having been consumed by the significant emotional pressure they 
have experienced. Even at this early stage, the less confident participants find themselves 
contemplating the prospect of either failing the course or voluntarily withdrawing.  
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“Pretty awful, day one. . . I felt relieved that the day was over. If I was honest, there was a 
small part of me that thought, I’m not going to come back tomorrow.” (P3)    
 
“I left on the first day, and thought . . . I am not sure this is for me.” (P8)  
 
Thought provoking and polarised reflections which clearly attest to the general difficulty and overall 
intensity of the training curriculum.   
 
Initial training - Day two 
Day two starts in much the same manner as day one finished. Officers are taken to the weapons 
range and look to perfect safety and handling techniques. The feeling of pressure continues, as does 
the omnipresence of the instructors who are now seeking demonstrable confidence with the 
weapon, as well as smooth, sharp and safe drills. These are essential because the classification 
exercise follows. 
 
“. . . any errors in handling the weapon or anything are picked up very quickly.” (P12) 
 
Although commonly referred to as the classification “shoot” the assessment proper involves more 
than just accuracy. Officers can fail the classification due to a safety issue even if shot placement is 
perfect. They may also fail the classification before even a single shot is fired, by for example, placing 
a finger on the trigger before the operator is ready to fire.     
 
“If you’re not being safe, that’s it you’re gone!” (P12) 
 
The various elements of the classification exercise are nationally proscribed. In theory, every police 
force should be conducting the assessment in the same way. The order of the various courses of fire 
does not appear to be so-prescribed, however the suggested process runs in a sequentially logical 
order, so one would presume that this would generally not be deviated from. Whilst the 
classification is designed to be challenging, it is also designed to be familiar to prospective STO’s, 
often mirroring handling exercises and courses of fire they have recently demonstrated.  
   
 “You do a dry handling practice, of everything you need to do, and then they tell you: “Right! 
We are going to do exactly the same thing again. But now is your classification.” (P7) 
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The classification comprises 4 courses of fire, each of which must be executed within a set time limit. 
The officer is expected to demonstrate each command safely and accurately. If they run out of time, 
a miss is recorded. The pass mark is 100% so a miss or safety issue will be recorded as a classification 
fail.  
 
Officers are given 4 live cartridges, and 1 training cartridge. Initially, the Taser will be holstered on 
the utility belt. A live cartridge will be attached to the front of the device and the training cartridge 
attached to the XDPM. Officers begin the classification by standing in front of their nominated target 
at a distance of five meters. The instructor will verbalise each expected course of fire and check to 
ensure understanding.  
 
The first course of fire is a basic draw and shoot using the red-dot. Candidates are given 5 seconds to 
draw and fire. The Taser will run through a full cycle. Officers are expected to shout “TASER, TASER 
TASER!” each time the device is fired. At the conclusion of the cycle, officers will de-arm and unload 
the device before re-loading with a training cartridge. A further live cartridge is then added to the 
XDPM and the device is then holstered.   
 
The second course of fire involves a simulated “miss” followed by an operational reload. Again from 
the 5 meter line, officers are given 10 seconds to safely draw, shoot reload and reengage. They are 
instructed to draw and fire before shouting “MISS!” They will then conduct a safe operational 
reload, taking one step back before re-engaging the target with a live cartridge. Accuracy is judged 
by a good spread of probes breaking the belt line. 
 
This particular course of fire involves multiple drill techniques which must be completed safely 
within a time constraint. It is generally perceived to be the most challenging element of the 
classification.  
 
“You fire the Taser, perform an operational reload, step back to the further line, and then do 
another shot, and I think that all had to be within like ten seconds . . . . so that was quite 
tricky . . .  I was probably at twenty seconds to start and when you’re under pressure, trying 
to change the cartridge, it was quite tricky to be honest.” (P3)  
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The third course of fire simulates a technical failure with the red-dot sight. This system can be 
switched off using the illumination selector button on top of the Taser. From the 7 meter line 
officers are given three seconds to engage the target using the castle sight. They must then de-arm 
the device before the end of the 5 second cycle and reload with a live cartridge.   
 
The final course of fire assesses competence in the angled drive-stun technique. Prospective STO’s 
stand on the 5 meter line, draw and shoot. They then dynamically approach the target and drive the 
front cartridge into an appropriate contact point on the assailant’s body, demonstrating a good 
probe spread. The drive-stun is a 5 second cycle which may be shortened at the instructor’s behest. 
After this course of fire the classification is complete. Participants will be informed immediately if 
they have passed or failed.  
 
The classification exercise is the first assessment proper. It is a formal process and a nerve-racking 
experience that participants are universally relieved to have passed.  
 
“That was nerve-racking, the classification . . . I was really nervous because . . . I wanted it so 
desperately . . .” (P14)   
 
The classification also represents the first realistic juncture where an officer can fail the course. If 
this occurs, it will not usually be a surprise for either the officer or the instructors. A failed candidate 
will usually be one who has struggled in the early stages of the course and experienced a negative 
pressure culmination at the first formal assessment. When this occurs the officer will not usually be 
allowed to remain on the course.  
 
“I was actually out with another chap off my section, he failed the classification shoot . . . he 
got sent away . . . back to section.” (P6) 
 
The late morning and early afternoon of day two consists of the written examination, followed by 
classroom based inputs and a practical exercise. The written examination includes multiple choice 
and “fill in the blank” type questions. Key knowledge areas include naming the component parts of 
the Taser and the various elements of the NDM. Also given coverage are various technical aspects of 
the device and the situations where it should or should not be used.  
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The written examination is another nationally proscribed assessment, but it is not closely controlled 
like the classification. Candidates hint towards verbal collusion within the group and visual aids being 
left pinned to the classroom walls, which contain the answers to many of the questions. Of the 15 
officers interviewed, not one failed or witnessed failure, of the examination. This naturally begs the 
question of component relevance.  
 
“The only thing I would say about the exam is no one failed that and I don’t think anyone has 
ever failed it because I wouldn’t really call it an exam if I’m honest, I’d call it a police exam.” 
(P3)   
 
After the written examination, officers receive a classroom based input on post deployment 
procedures. The lesson focuses predominantly on evidential requirements such as scene 
preservation and securing key exhibits.  
 
The last exercise of the day, is colloquially referred to as the “21 foot drill.” A stooge stands 21 feet 
away from a prospective STO, usually in possession of a weapon such as a knife or iron bar. The 
officer must attempt to draw and fire the Taser before the stooge can engage him with the weapon. 
This exercise gives candidates an indication of how quickly they need to act under pressure. It also 
provides a visual representation of the limitations of the Taser and operator. And, it highlights the 
need for contingency planning, such as maintaining a reactionary gap, using hard cover and electing 
a tactical carry position, at an early stage of the encounter.  
 
“But that was good. That highlighted . . . the impact you know. It’s only a 20 foot 
deployment, and how quick someone can close you down.” (P1)   
 
At the end of day 2 the remaining officers feel more confident. Even those who struggled in the early 
stages. Presumably due to the fact that by this stage, officers will have successfully completed 2 of 
the 3 assessed course components. That being said there is still a general air of underlying concern 
even from the more confident officers.  
 
“Yeah pretty good, I thought I was in with a chance of passing it, but again it comes down to 
whether or not you can perform under pressure on the day.” (P3) 
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Initial training - Day three 
Day three is dedicated to a series of assessed scenario based role-play exercises. Arguably, this is the 
most important and challenging performance aspect of the training curriculum. Participants are 
required to complete at least three assessed scenarios during the course. Before the exercise begins, 
officers are given details of a call for service, akin to that which they would receive on operational 
duty. They are then dispatched to resolve the situation. The scenarios are designed to be as realistic 
as possible. Officers will be in full uniform, including body amour, and in possession of handcuffs, 
baton, inert chemical spray and a Taser. They may even begin the scenario by driving to the scene in 
a marked police vehicle.  
 
Officers are deployed to various locations around the training site including a mock high street, bed-
sit, shop, building society or petrol station. And, they are exposed to various hypothetical policing 
situations such as a domestic dispute, a man with a knife or a person behaving “oddly.” The 
scenarios are acted out by instructors, or other members of staff acting as stooges.  
 
As with other components of the training curriculum, there is a marked disparity in approach to the 
scenarios, depending on the mindset of the officer. The more confident candidates tend to relax into 
the process, treating the exercises as if they were on operational duty.   
 
“I just found, when I started in the scenarios, you’re back in, I mean you’re in uniform, you’re 
in a police car, you’ve got a radio on, and I felt really relaxed all of a sudden, it was like thank 
God the training is over and I’m now at work again. I can do all this sort of stuff.” (P5)  
 
“You get on the radio, and you go out and actually get to shoot properly, and use the Taser, 
in more of a realistic environment . . .” (P14)  
 
Whereas the less self-assured candidates approach these exercises with a more distinct trepidation.  
 
“I hate scenarios at the best of times, I don’t think anyone likes them, but it's just trying to 
get yourself into that police mode, get your police head on.” (P10) 
 
Given the nature of the training, it is perhaps unsurprising that the presumption of incident 
resolution often lies with the Taser but this is not always the case. In certain scenarios officers may 
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be expected to resolve the situation using an alternative measure of force, or no force at all, instead 
relying on tactical communication.   
 
The COP suggests a number of scenarios designed to test an officer’s knowledge, confidence and 
ability with Taser. Again the content of the scenarios are largely reflected by evidence-based safety 
concerns. Common scenarios include a call for service involving male acting strangely in a petrol 
station forecourt or doused in flammable liquid. 
 
This particular scenario is designed to test whether prospective STO’s have assimilated the risk of 
the Taser sparks setting fire to flammable liquid. A concern first highlighted by Donnely (2001); then 
further explored by Clarke & Andrews (2014); DOMILL (2004; 2005; 2007; 2012) and SACMILL (2017). 
The position of participants was abundantly clear. Taser use under these circumstances is not 
appropriate.  
 
“Another one was the subject in a petrol station basically, threatening someone or having a 
fight I think it was, and again a big no-no!” (P3) 
 
“And the third one was a chappie at a petrol station.  Something to do with getting petrol, 
and he was getting very irate, so you had to think to yourself, having seen the video on Taser 
and petrol . . . obviously going to spark, you don’t want to spark anything up.  For me it was 
just a case of using tac-coms [tactical communication] the whole way, and in the end they 
turned round and said, ‘We couldn’t . . . kick off with you, you were being too polite!’ . . .   So 
I felt good on that one.” (P4)   
 
Another common scenario is the report of a male standing over a high ledge threatening to jump off, 
or displaying aggressive behaviour whilst standing at the top of a flight of stairs. Becour et al. (2009) 
and Nislow (2005) highlight the risk of secondary head injury caused by a subject falling heavily to 
the ground after being Tasered. A risk which is exacerbated if the subject is standing in an elevated 
position. The more capable candidates recognised this heightened risk and adjusted their force 
mind-set accordingly: 
 
“So one of them was a . . . violent subject, on like a grass verge, with a big drop . . .  it’s 
basically high enough for someone to seriously injure themselves, so someone’s kicking off, 
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they’ve got a weapon or whatever, they’re threatening you, but the kind of general 
consensus is you can’t really be using Taser there because you Taser them, they’re going to 
fall back off the side and seriously hurt themselves.” (P3) 
 
“The third scenario was a male with a baseball bat I think it was, who was standing on the 
edge of a wall. . . . I kept engaging him, talking to him, and there was nobody else around so 
no need to engage him with Taser at that moment. Waited for him for move away from the 
wall, when he carried on refusing to comply, then he was Tasered.” (P12) 
 
But worryingly, some officers when faced with the same scenario, clearly succumb to the negative 
pressure. They fail to process the inherent risk, and instead elect to use Taser in a situation which, if 
translated to the operational environment, could have resulted in fatal consequences. 
 
“I remember one of my scenarios, was a guy, with a, a weapon and they were standing on 
the edge of a wall. I didn’t even notice they were on a wall . . . I Tasered him and he fell off, 
and instantly went unresponsive . . . that was like oh crap, because I knew what I had done, 
you know, you are taught, you know, you don’t Taser someone on the stairs, unless it's so 
bad that, that’s your only option.” (P9) 
 
This polarised method of same-situation resolution, is further demonstrated when the commonly 
used scenario of a male in possession of a knife or baseball bat is considered. The more assertive 
officers quickly realise that this is a case where Taser use is justified. They approach, draw and red- 
dot the subject. It is expected that if the subject does not immediately comply, then Taser will be 
fired. 
 
“Yeah that one was like he was coming at you, with, clearly with a knife and you had to Taser 
him, and just go through the whole scenario . . . to the point of handcuffing.” (P8) 
 
Whereas the less confident officers will succumb to the pressure and make erroneous judgement 
decisions. They may also struggle with accurate shot placement and general situation resolution.  
 
“ . . . I made ground on him and that’s when I shot it . . . it bounced off his head, and on his 
shoulder . . . I knew I had fluffed it because I had dinked him in his helmet . . .” (P10) 
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In this scenario CED use was clearly justified, but the probe struck the head of the intended subject. 
The medical consequences of this error are at best, very serious and at worst, potentially life-
threatening. A Taser dart to the head has been proven to cause a medical condition known as 
Generalised Tonic-Clonic seizure (even in healthy adults) and as such, should be avoided at all costs 
(Bui, Sourkes & Wennberg, 2017).    
 
Whilst this breach of safe weapon handling is a grave one, it is important to remember that the 
officer was working within the confines of the training environment. As such, operational errors are 
to some extent expected and accepted. What is important is the intrinsic process of constructive 
feedback and critical reflection after a “fluffed” scenario. Both the instructors and the candidates 
must work together to ensure that serious errors are not repeated in the operational environment. 
To this end, the sequence of scenario based role play exercises are vital to the development of 
prospective STO’s and are arguably the most valuable component of the initial training course.  
 
The conclusion of the scenarios marks the conclusion of the course. Officers receive verbal and 
written feedback from the instructors and are informed whether or not they have passed. Positive 
notification comes as a welcome relief. Particularly to those officers who were less confident during 
the process.  
 
“Yeah, relieved I suppose, glad that I could come back to my team and not be the first one to 
fail it. So yeah, I felt relieved.” (P3)   
 
Post-course reflections  
When asked to reflect on their overarching experience of Taser training, officers unanimously 
confirmed that the initial course was a robust and mentally taxing pedagogical process.    
 
“It felt like a very intensive course so I was quite mentally drained.” (P5) 
 
“. . . to be honest, the whole way through, I didn’t think I was going to pass it.” 
 
“I didn’t turn up to the course thinking it was going to be easy, but it was a lot harder than I 
expected.” (P3)  
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They considered the coverage comprehensive and were confident to take their newly acquired skill-
set forward into the operational environment. This is a testament to the training programme which 
has undoubtedly achieved its intended objective, which is to indoctrinate course participants in the 
safe and effective use of Taser. 
 
“Very good, yeah.  You came out confident that you knew what you were doing with the 
Taser . . .  it was a good course, one of the best I’ve been on.” (P12) 
 
“I think they have got it spot on, absolutely spot on, they cover everything, I think it's a really 
good course, and it works really, really well and like I said before, I couldn’t think of anything 
that I would want them to change, because it worked, and I think it has a lot to do with the 
trainers because they were very good and they know their stuff.” (P14) 
 
“Yeah I think pretty good to be fair.  Yeah I don’t really think they could, I don’t think they 
could improve it too much.” (P3)   
 
Course participants also made a number of interesting observations about the course. Their attitude 
towards scenario based role play was of particular interest. Especially when compared with other 
course components. For the most part officers are happy to talk with others about the various 
training requirements. There is even a degree of collusion with certain elements such as the written 
examination. However, officers are guarded when discussing the training scenarios, and are 
generally reluctant to disclose specific content to outsiders, or even co-participants.  
 
“. . . from speaking to other STOs, you know, they don’t discuss the ins and outs of the 
course. You’re not told not to, you know, the instructors don’t tell you at the end of it, ‘Right, 
you must, you know, must keep secret everything that you’ve learnt’, but there’s obviously 
some unwritten rule somewhere that you can’t discuss the scenarios.” (P1) 
 
A possible reason for this development appears to be the intrinsic process, which is seen as a rite of 
passage for course participants. Prospective STO’s feel that unqualified officers should approach the 
scenarios with unformed knowledge, and should act and react to the incumbent uncertainty, just as 
they would be required to in a live situation. Mistakes may well occur, but stringent assessment and 
constructive feedback, will help to ensure effective performance in the operational arena. If officers 
were to approach the scenarios with secure knowledge, having already decided on a particular 
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tactical option or course of action, then their response to an unfolding scenario will be disingenuous, 
and of little developmental value.  
 
When asked about improvements to the course, certain officers suggested that the initial negative 
pressure could be eased significantly by prior familiarity with the Taser itself. This could be achieved 
by access (whether supervised or unsupervised) to an inert training unit for a period of time before 
the course.  
 
“I just think it's sometimes like putting a red Taser or something in the safe, so that once you 
know you’re on the course, one of the STO’s could show you how to use it.” (P8) 
 
“ . . . if there was some way we could, have, somewhere that we could practice, even with, 
inert cartridges, just to go through the procedures of it, in local stations, that would be 
helpful.” (P6) 
 
A logical suggestion would be to make the red (inert) training devices available at larger police 
stations. This would allow officers selected for Taser training, to practice safety and handling 
techniques under the guidance and supervision of a current STO. This simple solution could help 
reduce course failure rates which is especially important if routine availability is actualised.    
 
An additional avenue for improvement was the incorporation of BWV into the training environment. 
It was suggested that this would provide better opportunities for prospective STO’s to reflect on 
their performance during role plays.  
 
“I . . . am gutted I didn’t record my scenarios . . . Body Worn Video is brilliant. I think it's a 
really good training aid. . . .  I don’t think it would be a bad thing to film your scenario, 
because you can look at other peoples and you can look back at yourself and you can see . . . 
how you are behaving, and sometimes you can't even remember what you have said because 
you are just going along with it. So, I don’t think that’s a bad thing . . .” (P14) 
 
This appears to be another simple, cost effective solution that could pay significant dividends.  
It is readily achievable, given that many police forces have now issued BWV to every uniformed 
officer and it is a stance that is strongly supported by SACMILL, who made the following observation 
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when concluding their statement on the medical concerns of the Taser X2, which will eventually 
replace the X26.  
 
SACMILL has previously made known its strong support for the use of body-worn video 
cameras by CED officers and would like to take the opportunity to re-state its position here. 
Body worn video imagery promises to provide medically relevant information from incidents 
in which an adverse outcome is associated with CED use (2017, p. 17).  
 
Finally, officers were asked whether the experience of a 5 second Taser cycle should be offered 
during initial training. The overwhelming consensus was against this. Principally, because the sample 
population were all experienced police officers, who had already felt the effects of other force 
options such as chemical spray and saw no benefit in adding a further painful experience to this 
repertoire. Prospective STO’s are fully aware that Taser is unpleasant, they know it hurts, and they 
know what is supposed to happen when a person is shot with it. They do not feel the need to 
experience this personally, and are of the opinion that it should not be mandatory.  
 
“Why put yourself through that? It hurts. I accidentally did it, it hurts. It’s a shock and I don’t 
see why we should. Especially neuro-muscular incapacitation. I don’t see why anybody should 
need to . . .  feel that, unless they have committed an offence in law and it has to be used to 
incapacitate someone legally.” (P7)  
 
“I don’t want to be Tasered, I don’t think I need to. I know it's going to hurt . . .  I have 
watched it being done, I know what effect it can have. I don’t need to feel that.” (P14) 
 
A stance the author would echo having experienced a five second Taser cycle and would qualify 
further. We do not know the long term psychological effects of Taser exposure (SACMILL, 2017; 
White et al., 2014). So officer’s longer term mental well-being should not be put at risk needlessly. 
Also, if officers were subjected to Taser by the police service, then this could in theory, constitute a 
breach of Article 3 ECHR (1998) and the state could be legally regarded as complicit in the 
application of unjustified and inhumane treatment or punishment, in other words, torture. 
 
The above chapter has examined the CED training curriculum, describing the various core 
components and detailing the effect of the entailed pressure on course participants. Potential 
improvements such as the introduction inert devices into home stations and BWV into the training 
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environment were also considered. The following chapter will explore how CEDs are being used in 
the operational environment.  
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Chapter nine 
CED operationalisation 
 
The following chapter explores the impact CEDs have had on front-line policing within Westshire 
Constabulary and how these devices are being used by non-specialist officers. The first section 
provides an overview of how officers perceive their role to have changed since becoming an STO. 
The second section comprises the breakdown analysis of eight ethically obtained examples of 
operational CED use and also briefly describes the post-incident procedures. Chapter nine concludes 
with a standalone section on CEDs and the use of force. The research data is pitted against relevant 
literature (predominantly the causal force factors); and reflective observations are to add qualitative 
weight to the findings. The intention of this chapter is to use the research data in combination with 
the literature in order to identify potential patterns in CED use.  
 
Operational context 
After the initial training process was fully explored, the sample population where asked whether 
their operational life had changed since becoming an STO. For the most part, STOs indicated that 
their core duties have remained much the same. They report that an STO may be preferred in the 
initial response to higher-risk calls for service such as those involving weapons, conflict or the arrest 
of violent individuals. They may also be occasionally abstracted from response tasking and used to 
assist in the execution of high-risk arrest warrants. But ultimately, there is no significant change in 
everyday function or responsibility.       
 
“Business as usual. Yeah. Yeah. . . .  Sometimes they ask for an STO to go to jobs, but 
normally . . . you just go because you are going anyway!” (P8) 
 
Secondly, STO’s were quizzed about the reaction they had received from the general public since 
becoming a Taser officer. There was clear consensus. In everyday public interaction, the majority of 
STO’s reported no significant reaction. Positive, adverse or neutral. Most members of the public 
either did not notice, or merely expressed a passing interest, in the presence of Taser  
 
“Yeah, no one bats an eyelid. I mean we’re here today at “Revival” [a large music festival], no 
one has batted an eyelid. I’m walking around, there’s 40 thousand people here, maybe, and 
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no one’s come up and said, ‘How dare you wear Taser?’, or ‘How dare you have a Taser?’” 
(P4) 
 
That being said, some STOs also indicated that citizens who frequently come to the attention of 
uniformed police officers do exhibit significant behavioural changes when interacting with an STO 
when compared to an officer not in possession of a CED. This is manifested by consent, where it 
might otherwise have been unforthcoming and attests to the visual deterrent of a CED.  
 
“The well-known ones, if they see a police officer with Taser and they need to be arrested, 
they don’t kick off. But the first thing they will clock is . . . if you have Taser or not. And if you 
don’t have Taser they will then run away, or think game-on!” (P4) 
 
Thirdly, officers were asked whether they consider CEDs a necessary addition to the armoury of a 
contemporary police officer. This particular question evoked some alarming reflective observations 
relating to officer safety. Most notably, the increased preparedness of criminals to resist arrest and 
assault officers using weapons.   
 
“I have had situations before where . . . they have pulled a machete out of their trousers, and 
all of a sudden, standing there with your spray in your hand and you know a 10 inch long 
metal stick, suddenly feels quite inadequate.”  
 
“. . . even just from my experience people . . . are willing to get aggressive with the police. 
Willing to have a fight, take their chances and all the rest of it. That’s increasing, in a big, big 
way. As are, people who are carrying weapons, whether that be needles, razor blades, 
knives, bottles, bars, baseball bats, you name it, they are being carried, and they are being 
carried a lot more than we know about.” (P9) 
 
These worrisome reflections, indicate the deterrent effect of CEDs. They also appear to confirm the 
capacity of such devices to help reduce rates of injury and defuse a potentially volatile situation by 
mere presence or presentation. The latest Police Federation statistics indicate that a Police officer is 
assaulted every 22 minutes in the UK (2017) and there is a growing base of evidence to suggest that 
these figures could be reduced by CEDs (e.g. Kaminski, 2009; Kaminski et al., 2015; Lin & Jones, 
2010; MacDonald et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2007; 2009). In the light of this information (and 
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notwithstanding the valid moral objections posed by organisations such as Amnesty International) 
the case for further if not widespread availability is appears compelling.    
 
The fifth topical question queried participant’s understanding of the injury recording requirements 
after a drive-stun or full-probe discharge. It must be said that the current training guidance is 
unclear. Officers are unsure of official guidance but tend to record routine puncture wounds as a 
separate and quantifiable injury. 
 
“I mean I would record it. The forms that we do, obviously make note of it. It is incidental of 
the injury isn’t it? It's not an injury as such, but like, it's as a result of them being Tasered . . . 
There seems to be some sort of like, disconnect with Taser, in that every time we use it we 
are injuring someone, but that’s the intent . . . it's as a result of being Tasered. It is what it 
is.” (P11) 
 
Clearly this has wider implications for the use of force recording. CEDs could be viewed as higher 
liability weapons than in fact they are and empirical research could be rendered unreliable due to 
methodological inconsistencies. Public opinion could also be unfairly skewed against the device 
(Terrill & Paoline, 2015). Official clarity and a common approach is urgently required. To avoid any 
ambiguity, the common sense suggestion made by Kaminski et al. (2015) could be implemented (See 
chapter five). This approach would ensure that only non-routine CED related injuries are 
documented and would in-turn, result in a more consistent approach to injury recording.   
 
And finally, officers were asked whether CEDs should be made available to every uniformed officer. 
Once again there was consensus towards the positive, but with a caveat. STO’s felt that officers who 
want to carry a CED should be allowed to but it should not be mandatory. They also stressed that 
carriage should be subject to successful completion of an intensive training course akin to that which 
they completed. They stress that the high training standards should not be lowered due to a general 
demand.  
 
Question: “And do you think everyone should have Taser?” 
 
Answer: “I do, yeah, my opinion is every response officer.” (P12) 
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Question: “And do you think everyone should go through the same training as you? 
 
Answer: Definitely. Yeah. Yeah. I don’t think you can lower the standards. I think the 
standard they’ve set it at is where we should be at.  And that’s where it needs to stay really.” 
(P12)   
 
Certain research participants also intimated that a number of police colleagues were simply not 
responsible enough to carry such a high liability device.  
 
“There is certain people I wouldn’t trust with it.” (P6) 
 
“Let's face it, we all know people who are nightmares. Who are too heavy handed. Who 
haven’t quite got the right mind-set and the right attitude. Who, you know that if they had it 
would, would perhaps be a bit more of a risk, or a bit more gung-ho about it . . .” (P9) 
 
“I don’t think every single police officer should carry it because . . . in any organisation, 
unfortunately there are a few people that sort of slip through the net and . . . I don’t think 
could be trusted with it.” (P3) 
 
These concerns reflect a body of empirical research which suggests that the use of excessive force 
can be a desirable and celebrated facet of routine police work (e.g. Cain, 1973; Ericson & Hegarty, 
1997; Fielding, 1988; Holdaway & Parker, 1998; Jackson, 2003; Loftus, 2009b; Paoline, Myers, & 
Worden, 2000; Waddington, 1999a). Officers with such a negative cultural mind-set could well be in 
the minority but they still pose a substantial risk to the British Police service. A risk which would be 
significantly enhanced if these officers were allowed access to a CED. Policing by consent relies on a 
contract of trust between society and the police service and this trust could be subject to significant 
erosion if CEDs are misused. This pertinent concern is one that individual police forces will need to 
address through appropriate internal channels if routine availability of CEDs is to be actualised.  
  
Operational CED use  
In total, 14 examples of operational CED use were disclosed by the sample population. Table 9.1. 
below provides a summary. Eight of the most relevant examples are sign-posted by relevant theme 
and analysed in this current section. All 14 instances of CED use are then pitted against the relevant 
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force predictors in the final section of this chapter. The selection includes a combination of arguably 
textbook CED use, somewhat disparate CED use and also instances where use of the device has 
proved either dangerous or ineffective. It should not go unqualified, that the following examples are 
real-life situations in which officers have faced extreme danger from violent suspects, often in 
possession of potentially lethal weapons.   
   
Table 9.1. Summary of 14 CED uses as disclosed by the sample population 
Incident number/type Taser 
use 
Officer 
gender 
Subject 
gender 
Weapon 
used 
Assault / 
resist 
Intoxication Mental 
Health 
1. Criminal 
damage 
Fired M M No Yes Yes No 
2. Domestic 
violence 
Drive- 
stun 
M M No Yes Yes No 
3. Mental health Fired M M Yes Yes No Yes 
4. Robbery Red-dot M F Yes No No No 
5. Domestic 
violence 
Fired M M No Yes Yes No 
6. Domestic 
violence 
Fired M M Yes Yes No No 
7. Public order Fired M M Yes Yes No No 
8. Domestic 
violence 
Fired M M Yes Yes Yes No 
9. Mental health Red-dot M M Yes Yes Yes Yes 
10. Mental health Red-dot M M Yes Yes Yes Yes 
11. Serious 
assault 
Red-dot M M Yes No Yes Yes 
12. Serious 
assault 
Red-dot M M Yes Yes Yes No 
13. Public order Drive- 
stun 
M M No No Yes No 
14. Public order Red-dot M M Yes Yes Yes No 
 
Textbook use 
Officers were called to a mental health hospital. A male had forced entry and was trying to set fire to 
the building. On police arrival, staff members reported that the male was in the corridor area, 
causing significant damage to the building. He was in possession of an iron bar and he had removed 
his outer clothing. P12 attended the location in company with several other non STO’s. P12 drew 
and armed his CED and repeatedly challenged the male, ordering him to drop the weapon. The male 
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did not comply and instead he raised the metal bar above his head and charged at the officers. P12 
fired the CED. Both barbs made contact with the male’s body, breaking the belt line. The male fell to 
the floor. He was exposed to a five second shock cycle. P12 then directed two officers in support, to 
move in and handcuff the male.  
 
P12 was asked to describe and reflect upon his experience of this encounter. His response was very 
similar to those given by prospective STO’s discussing scenario exercises during initial training.  
 
“I don’t even remember drawing my Taser. It was more of an instinctive thing . . . right he’s 
got a weapon, so I’m not going to put myself in harm’s way, or my colleagues, if we’ve got 
something else that we can use. He starts running towards us with the bar above his head, 
gets Tasered . . .  he fell to the ground . . .  at which point . . .  everyone knew what to do.” 
(P12)  
 
P12’s response to this dynamic situation was both instinctive and effective. Whilst there is little 
evidence to support realistic use of the NDM, the response is entirely justified based on core 
principles of self-defence, and securing the arrest of an armed offender.  
 
The fact that both the subject and the officer were male and a weapon was used during the 
encounter, meant that the police response (i.e. the use of a less-lethal measure) was in-keeping with 
both training and scientific expectation (e.g. Boivin & Legacé, 2016; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline 
& Terrill, 2007; Terrill, 2007). In this incident, the use of a CED was instrumental in the safe 
resolution, of an otherwise very dangerous encounter.  
 
Dynamic risk assessment 
P6 was patrolling alone when he was called to attend numerous reports of a male walking in a busy 
high street openly carrying a large kitchen knife. P6 arrives on scene and is immediately confronted 
by the male. He immediately draws his CED and red-dots the male. In response the male lifts the 
knife up to his throat. 
 
“. . .  as soon as I red-dotted him, he pulled the knife up to his throat, which made me think I 
don’t want to pull the trigger too fast because if he falls on that, then that’s, game over. So I 
just managed to talk him into getting . . . to the floor and, surrendering . . .” (P6) 
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During this dynamic incident, P6 clearly adheres to the standards imposed during initial Taser 
training. He conducts a risk assessment and elects not to fire his Taser due to the high risk of 
secondary injury caused by the subject falling heavily onto a knife (Becour et al. (2009); Nislow 
(2005). He adjusts his use of force mind-set and elects to use tactical communication, rather than 
any other level of force. This has the desired effect and the male is safely arrested. This is another 
example of a clinical Taser encounter which is conducted in-keeping with initial training standards 
and the evidence base.   
 
Assaults on police 
This example of Taser use was ultimately a successful deployment, but the circumstances are far 
more harrowing than in the previously documented cases. Officers were called to a house to 
investigate an allegation of domestic abuse. P12 was the first officer on scene and was in company 
with a colleague. P12 knocked the door and was met with an extremely aggressive male. P12 
attempted to arrest the male. The male responded by repeatedly punching P12 to the face knocking 
him to the floor. His partner used multiple force options in self-defence, (including chemical spray 
and baton strikes) but these measures proved ineffective. As the male turned to assault his 
colleague, P12 took the opportunity to draw and fire Taser from a prone position on the floor.  
 
“He got very aggressive . . .  he’s turned around, swung, caught me straight on the left eye, 
which has swollen straight out, started straight away. Then he’s repeatedly rained eight or 
nine blows against my head, which has knocked me to the ground and I’ve been on my knees.  
My colleagues have emptied a can and a half of spray into his face, with no effect on him at 
all.  One of my colleagues is then going in with a baton strike to his ribs, which has had the 
effect of him turning away from me . . .  on the body-worn camera, you see him drawing back 
his fist to punch her in the face, but that gave me enough time to roll on to my side, draw the 
Taser and shoot him whilst laying on the ground.  Which got a full connection in the back, it 
wasn’t a big spread, but it hit him, he went . . . down with the first one, he then took another 
two cycles, because he was fighting. He was trying to fight to rip the barbs out, two cycles 
before he complied, put his arms behind his back and stopped trying to resist.” (P12) 
 
Rather than a clinical Taser deployment, this incident was resolved in desperation after all other use 
of force options had failed. From an analytical perspective the deployment was unique in that the 
outcome was scientifically unexpected. For example, no weapon was involved, a fact which is a 
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statistically significant  precursor  to CED use (Boivin & Legacé, 2016; McCluskey et al., 2005; Paoline 
& Terrill, 2007; Terrill, 2007); albeit the subject was both male, drunk and combative which increases 
the likelihood of use (Garner et al., 2002; 2006; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill & 
Paoline, 2005; Millar 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; Terrill Paoline & 
Manning, 2003).  
 
It is perhaps of interest to note that the initial training does not teach or recommend that officers 
shoot from the ground. Also, the current COP guidelines caution strongly against the use of multiple 
CED cycles (Braidwood Commission, 2010; QCMC, 2013) as well as the use of the device after the 
deployment of chemical spray (Clarke & Andrews, 2014; Donnelly, 2001). This situation 
demonstrates the unpredictable nature of a coercive encounter and shows that CEDs can still be 
effective even if used outside of the training parameters. In addition, an incident such as this could 
be a real-life example of when the New Public Management approach could potentially be 
implemented in the event of a CED related death. In this incident the STO admittedly used a CED 
outside of the training guidance, but because he was effectively fighting for his life it would be 
arguably remiss for that officer to retain individual accountability for the outcome of the encounter. 
It would perhaps be more appropriate for the organisation to absorb this burden thereby allowing a 
path of accountability and legal resolution to any interested parties, but at the same time shielding 
the individual agent from the consequences of a tragic outcome occurring after an in-good-faith 
operational decision:  
 
A situation that is fluid and essentially unmanageable and which requires officers to do what 
they themselves have described as ‘impossible’ is as unacceptable to individuals as it is to 
police culture as a whole. The ‘action oriented’ culture of policing impels officers to 
improvise, do their best and do what they can, assured that they will be protected from the 
consequences of a well-intentioned mistake . . . the very least an agency can promise . . . 
(Squires & Kennison, 2010, p. 50) 
  
The operational reload 
The following example took place the day after P3 completed Taser training. P3 was asked by a 
colleague to assist in the arrest of a male for a criminal damage offence. He attended the scene to 
find his colleague struggling to control a male, who was resisting arrest. Officers used knee strikes, 
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chemical spray and an extendable baton. These could not secure the arrest. The male is taken to the 
floor by officers, at which point he kicks P3 to the face and tries to escape. P3 draws his Taser and 
attempts a full-probe deployment. This is unsuccessful as the probes do not embed the skin. He 
performs an operational reload and fires again. Full NMI is achieved, and the suspect is arrested. P3 
was asked to reflect on the immediate aftermath. He cites a state of relief at resolving the situation 
without incurring further personal injury.  
 
“Okay so immediately after obviously your adrenaline is pumping and you know, you think . . 
. that’s a bit lucky, you know, I could have got a bit of a serious kicking there” (P3) 
 
This situation is similar to example three (above) in that it is not a clinical Taser deployment. 
However, P3 does show competent use of the device. P3 fires and quickly recognises a miss. He goes 
on to perform an operational reload which resulted in full NMI. This demonstrates the effectiveness 
of rigid inculcation during the weapon handling sessions, and the benefit of including the operational 
reload as part of the classification assessment. A pedagogical process which clearly helps STO’s 
prepare for the dynamism and unpredictability of the operational environment.  
 
Effective use of the National Decision Model 
On Christmas day 2016, P12 is called to a domestic assault. An intoxicated male has assaulted his 
wife. She has locked herself in her flat and the male is trying to gain entry. The male has multiple 
previous convictions for assaulting police officers. P12 arrives on scene and immediately sees the 
male standing at the top of a flight of stairs.  
 
“I initially went to Taser, then saw the stairs and thought . . .  I can’t Taser him there.” (P12) 
 
P12 knows he has to arrest the male to prevent him from forcing entry to the flat and further 
assaulting his wife. He walks up the stairs and tries to engage with him but the male’s wife opens the 
front door. The male tries to enter. P12 and another officer move in to restrain him but both are 
assaulted.  
 
 “Me and my colleague go in after him, ending up having a right old fight with him, taking 
punches and elbows and all the rest of it.”(P12) 
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P12 reassesses use of Taser. Due to proximity, he uses a drive-stun to gain acquiescence. Both officers 
are exhausted but still need to secure the arrest.  
 
“He’s gone to the ground, at that point both me and my colleague were absolutely 
exhausted, so he’s then taken a third . . . shot from the gun to his back, to keep him on the 
ground, which had the effect, effectively stunning him for four, five seconds, at which point 
we managed to get the cuffs on and then after that he’s just gone ballistic again, and we’ve 
had to restrain him for the next twenty minutes.” (P12) 
 
In this situation CED use was predictable because the encounter involved officers being assaulted by 
an intoxicated and violent male subject (Garner et al., 2002; 2006; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; 
McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline, 2005; Millar 2010; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Terrill & Reisig, 2003; 
Terrill Paoline & Manning, 2003). 
 
What is perhaps more interesting, is the fact that this deployment appears to show rudimentary use 
of the NDM. Albeit this is not expressly stated. With the information and intelligence initially 
provided, P12 conducted a risk assessment and elected to use Taser as part of his initial working 
strategy. He was aware of his powers of arrest and he took action by drawing the Taser. Upon seeing 
the stairs he revisited the information phase, and in line with training, elected not to use Taser. As a 
contingency he engaged in tactical communication and made ground on the male.  
 
When the risk again escalated, but the male was no longer standing on the stairs, P12 revisited the 
risk assessment and formulated a new strategy. This time involving the use of the drive-stun 
technique. He took action and secured the arrest. P12 even embarked upon a process of reflection 
after the fact, stating that he cannot see how the situation could have been safely resolved without 
the use of a Taser. The conclusion of this encounter also shows effective use of the drive-stun, and 
appears to counter the position of Sprague (2007) who feels that this technique should be banned.  
 
“We had no other option, there was no room to baton, if we’d sprayed at the top of the stairs 
… it was such a small space, we all would have been affected.  I . . . honestly don’t know how 
we would have been able to control him if . . . I hadn’t had Taser.” (P12) 
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CED fallibility 
The following two examples caution against overreliance on CEDs as they are not infallible. Police 
were called to a report of a male in possession of a knife outside the railway station of a busy urban 
town. P5 attends as a lone STO. P5 locates the male who is openly carrying a large kitchen knife. P5 
draws his Taser and challenges the male. The male runs away from the officer towards the train 
station. He is still carrying the knife. P5 chases the male and fires the Taser into his back.  Both 
probes make contact but get stuck in loose clothing. The discharge was ineffective and P5 had to use 
other force options.  
 
“So I had to hit him with the baton, until he dropped his knife, which was fine, because he 
wasn’t actively seeking to kick my arse . . .” (P5) 
  
On reflection, P5 considered himself lucky that the male did not attack him with the knife as Taser 
would not have saved him. This is particularly concerning given that he was single-manned at the 
time which clearly left him in a vulnerable predicament.  
 
“. . . had he turned round after being Tasered and challenged me . . . the Taser would have 
been next to useless. I probably would have thrown it on the floor.” (P5) 
 
An encounter such as this could have benefitted from the principles of Critical Incident Management 
being instigated at an early stage. Notwithstanding the obligation of police officers to intervene 
positively to protect life, often in dynamic circumstances, there is little evidence of organisational 
support or a pre-existing command structure here. P5 was effectively acting as a lone agent and was 
not operating within any strategic, tactical or operational parameters. As a result he was placed at 
significant risk. This incident could have benefitted from the early involvement of a set command 
structure even if these roles were assumed by the officer’s Sergeant and Inspector in the initial 
stages. Such a structure would almost certainly have recognised the increased risk to the public, the 
police officer and to the subject himself and could have worked to put contingency measures in 
place to mitigate this risk. Having reviewed this encounter it seems that nothing more than good 
fortune combined with a lack of willingness on the part of the subject to use the knife against the 
attending officer is the only thing that prevented the encounter resulting in serious consequences.  
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A common failure precursor  
Police were called to the home address of a young male, reportedly in possession of a knife and iron 
bar. He had stated an intention to stab any police officers who approached him. Police tried to call 
him out of the address, but he refused. P5 entered the address with Taser drawn and began a room 
by room search for the male. The suspect approached an officer in the rear garden. He was still 
armed so P5 followed him out and, in a bid to protect his colleague, fired his CED. Only one barb 
struck the male, so NMI was not achieved. A baton and chemical spray were then used to facilitate 
the arrest. This encounter clearly demonstrates the fallibility of CEDs, they are not always effective 
and good contingency planning is essential. When CEDs fail officers are put in danger and this can 
lead to a lack of confidence in the device.  
 
“So my two actual discharges have both missed and been ineffective . . . so my confidence is 
less high in Taser than it was. . . .  I’ve never been hugely under the illusion that it’s a 
particularly effective tool . . . with Taser, you can hit them, and it can do sod all, or you can 
miss because it’s windy or something like that.” (P5) 
 
The above two examples indicate that when CEDs fail operationally, a number of situational 
commonalities are likely exist. Problems arose when officers were faced with a subject wearing 
loose clothing, or moving dynamically. Also, when operators missed the intended target with one or 
more probe. These are common failure precursors, often attributable to the operator as opposed to 
the technology. Each precursor is addressed by prior research (e.g. Jenkinson et al., 2006; Kaminski 
et al., 2015) and mitigated at various stages of Taser training (see chapter five above). For example, 
accurate shot placement on a moving target is taught and practiced, as are operational 
contingencies, such as the operational reload or angled drive-stun technique, to follow up a single 
probe miss. These tactics were not attempted during the above examples, so the failures could 
reasonably be regarded as an individual training need, rather than a valid critique of the device 
which generally reports high percentage reliability (e.g., Kaminski et al., 2013; White & Ready, 2007; 
Mesloh et al., 2005; Mesloh et al., 2009).  
 
Notwithstanding this assertion, it is perhaps advisable that more instruction and greater emphasis 
be afforded to limitations and common failure precursors during initial training. Such pedagogy 
would ensure that officers remain operationally uncomplacent, and could also lead to a reduction in 
rates of injury during a coercive encounter (Millar, 2010).     
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Unsafe use 
The final example of operational Taser use highlights a problem when too many STO’s attend the 
same call for service and when untrained officers become involved in the encounter. The situation 
began when officers were affecting the arrest of a violent male. The subject had been secured in the 
rear of a police vehicle when his friend emerged from a nearby house in possession of a large knife. 
He made threats towards officers and attempted to free his friend from police custody. There were 
three STO’s present at this situation along with a number of other officers who had not completed 
Taser training. The subject was engaged by three Taser officers, including P6.  
 
P6 had armed his Taser and red-dotted the subject however a non-Taser officer walked in front of 
the red-dot and directly in the arc of fire. This officer then used chemical spray on the subject at the 
same time that a Taser was deployed by another STO. As a result, both the STO and the subject were 
doused with chemical spray.  
 
“. . . unfortunately, one of my colleagues ran in front of me, so, I had a great Body Worn 
[Video] shot of my Taser dot, on the chap and then on the back of . . . this other PC. He got 
Tasered by the other STO, at the same time as, one of the other officers Captored him 
[deployed chemical spray], and, he hit the deck, and that’s why the STO ended up with the 
spray because the PC was aiming at the chap’s face, so it was just a bit of a mess really.” (P6) 
 
This example highlights some significant areas of operational concern whereby both the subject and 
the attending officers were placed in serious danger. Firstly, no single STO acted as the primary 
officer engaging with the subject. As a result three STO’s engaged him. Had Taser been deployed 
under these circumstances, then the subject would have experienced multiple Taser shocks which 
would have placed him at heightened risk of death or serious injury (Braidwood Commission, 2010; 
Oriola et al., 2012; QCMC, 2013) 
 
Secondly, the untrained officer clearly placed himself in danger of a “Blue-on-Blue” encounter by 
walking straight into the firing line of an STO. Had the STO made the decision to fire before 
processing this risk then the officer would have been struck by a Taser dart at close proximity. This 
has been known to invoke potentially life threatening medical consequences such as generalised 
Tonic-Clonic seizure (Bui, Sourkes & Wennberg, 2017). 
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And finally, the untrained officer elects to use chemical spray at the same time that a Taser was 
fired. As a result, he doused both the subject and his STO colleague with a flammable liquid which 
could have been ignited by sparks emitted from the Taser. Again this could have caused potentially 
fatal injuries to both the subject and the deploying officer (Clarke & Andrews, 2014; Donnelly, 2001). 
 
This scenario was correctly described by P6 as a “mess” and several significant learning points 
naturally emerged which could be addressed or further highlighted during initial or refresher 
training. These include the need to quickly identify a single primary STO to control a Taser 
encounter. The need to inform untrained officers to tactically position themselves behind STO’s and 
not to use chemical spray unless all other force options have been exhausted.  
 
Post-incident procedures  
As the above examples show, CED use can, and often does, involve officers being seriously assaulted 
or threatened with deadly weapons. There can also be significant injury caused to the subject. Yet 
there is no national mandate whereby officers are referred to support agencies, or subject of regular 
follow-up support facilitated by their home force. Punch suggests that “In relation to coping with the 
after-effects, however, there is a fair amount of evidence that care for officers following a shooting 
often used to be primitive if not non-existent” (2011, p. 100). Albeit this discussion was raised in 
relation to the police use of lethal-force, the extant procedural deficiencies appear to remain to this 
current day and also appear to have cascaded down to the less-lethal weapons arena.   
 
This unfortunate situation manifests in both the organisation and individual officers normalising 
potentially psychologically damaging incidents. There is an expectation that an employee who has 
fired a CED will return immediately to full operational duty, often without undergoing any process of 
mental healing. A concern exemplified by P3 in his reflection on a firing, during which he was kicked 
in the face by the suspect.    
 
“I think it just kind of, just got passed off as a normal-ish kind of incident . . . but to be honest 
it was very minor, so I wouldn’t have expected a follow up.” (P3) 
 
The potentially devastating long term ramifications for individual officers cannot be overstated. 
Neither can the negative reputational consequence which could befall the police service as 
employers if they fail to make improvements in this area. Particularly, in the light of a projected 
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increase in CED availability. Improvement could begin with the simplest of measures. Such as a 
mandatory referral process after a full-probe discharge, combined with regular follow up meetings 
with a supervisor. Evidently, no such support is mandated or in place.  
 
“But for me the biggest issue is . . . what I would call the post-post-incident procedure. There 
isn’t one.”  (P3)   
 
CEDs as a standalone force option 
There is a growing evidence base which suggests that police officers are willing for the most part to 
police by consent and as such seldom resort to force (Alpert & Dunham, 1999; Bayley & Garofalo, 
1989; Boivin & Legacé, 2016; Croft, 1985; Fyfe, 1989; Garner et al. 2002; 2006); Kavanagh, 1997; 
McLaughlin, 1992; Worden, 1995). This evidence is supported when the CED use disclosed by the 
research sample in considered. From a combined total of 37 years in the STO role the sample 
population reported only 1520 uses which were broken down into 6 firings, 2 drive-stun applications 
and 6 incidents of red-dot compliance.  
 
There is further evidence to suggest that CEDs are operationally effective devices (Kaminski et al., 
2013; White & Ready, 2007; Mesloh et al., 2005; Mesloh et al., 2009). For the most part, these 
assertions have been validated by this research. Of the 14 disclosed CED uses only 2 proved 
ineffective. This demonstrates that in many cases the use of a CED will result in the swift resolution 
of a potentially dangerous encounter.  
 
The capability of the device to prevent officers experiencing grievous harm at the hands of a violent 
attacker is exemplified by P12 who made the following observation after being asked what would 
have happened if he was not in possession of a CED.  
 
“He wasn’t fighting us to get away. He was fighting us to do damage … he had more than 
enough opportunity to run out of the house if he wanted to. . . . I thought he had fractured 
my cheekbone, that’s what it felt like. I’ve got no doubt we would have ended up with at 
least three or four officers in hospital.” (P12) 
                                                          
20 In total, fifteen Taser uses were disclosed by the sample population. However, only fourteen could be 
discussed in this thesis. One incident was redacted in line with ethical guidelines because it related to an active 
criminal investigation.   
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A sobering account which validates research by Kaminski (2009); Kaminski et al. (2015); Lin & Jones 
(2010); MacDonald et al. (2009) and Smith et al. (2007; 2009) and highlights the capacity of CEDs to 
reduce rates of injury to both officers and suspects during a forceful encounter. Where injury to 
officers did occur this was predominantly attributable to the device being used in the later stages of 
an encounter where the officer had already been assaulted. This points to the operational benefit of 
using CEDs at an early stage. Something which should be highlighted more during initial training.  
 
The tactical value of the mere presence or production of a CED, during the course of a potentially 
coercive encounter has been discussed in the literature (see ACPO & COP, 2013; Home Office, 2014; 
NPCC, 2016). The operational use of the red-dot function was specifically highlighted as a useful 
means to compel acquiescence. The value of this standalone tactic was supported by survey data 
(see Appendix B) and is further validated qualitatively by the research sample.  
 
 “. . . . The red-dot is there for a reason, so you know where you’re aiming on the chest  . . . 
because that’s where the top probe will technically go.  And if they see that, then they know 
it’s live . . .” (P4) 
 “In my experience, the red-dot, sorts people out. If it's backed up with the correct verbals…” 
(P6) 
“I pulled the Taser out. Red-dotted him on the chest, and he instantly dropped, just went 
straight to the floor, put his hands behind his back. Complied.” (P11)  
 
CEDs and less-lethal force predictors  
The above section has focused on the use of a CED as a standalone force option. From the reflective 
observations provided by the sample population it appears that the devices are being used broadly 
in congruence with training guidelines and organisational expectation. That being said, coercive 
encounters are by-nature dynamic and unpredictable so CEDs may also be deployed in a manner 
that falls outside of standardised practice, sometimes out of sheer desperation and in unideal 
circumstances. The following section provides a balanced empirical snapshot of operational CED use 
by setting the research data specifically against the suspect, officer and encounter characteristics 
identified in key literature. This process allows for the identification and exploration of predictability 
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in CED use. In a unique approach, relevant qualitative observations are used to provide a layer of 
explanatory depth to the findings.    
 
Suspect characteristics 
Gender 
There is clear evidence to suggest that male subjects are more likely to have less-lethal force applied 
to them than females. From the instances of CED use disclosed by the sample population not a single 
recipient was female. This supports the conclusions drawn by Croft (1985); Garner et al. (2002; 
2006); McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline (2005); McCluskey & Terrill (2005); Millar (2010); Terrill & 
Mastrofski (2002); Terrill & Reisig (2003); Terrill et al. (2003) which commonly ascribed statistical 
significance to males being more likely than females, to experience force at the hands of the police. 
A possible, albeit juxtaposed explanation for this divulgence is discussed in the gender as an officer 
characteristic section below.   
 
Demeanour  
Paoline & Terrill (2004); McCluskey et al. (2005); McCluskey & Terrill (2005) and Terrill & Mastofski 
(2002) all report that a suspect using foul and abusive language towards a police officer is no more 
or less likely to experience a less-lethal force measure. Engel et al. (2000); Garner et al. (2002) and 
Kaminski et al. (2004) disagree. These inconclusive results are mirrored by this research. Some 
officers certainly experienced rude and abusive behavior prior to using Taser, but others did not.  
 
This inconsistency could be explained by CED use as a preemptive and dynamic dominance tactic, 
effectively ending conflict before it has a chance to begin, and thereby limiting the opportunity of a 
subject to elevate his behavior to abusive, threatening or aggressive levels. A seemingly effective 
tactic which should arguably be highlighted more during initial training.   
 
“We had keys to the flat. Made entry. I had the Taser . . . on as we went in. We went through 
the door, found him in bed, pulled the covers off. I kept the red-dot on him until we got him 
secured. No hassle.” (P11) 
 
Intoxication 
Similar results prevail when intoxication is considered. Engel (2015); Engel et al. (2000); Kavanagh 
(1997); McCluskey et al. (2005); McCluskey & Terrill (2005); Morabito & Socia (2015); Terrill & 
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Mastrofski, (2002) Terrill et al. (2003) and Terrill et al. (2008) all claim that intoxication is strongly 
linked to the use of less-lethal force. However, Crawford & Burns (1998) and Doerner (1997) found 
no significant relationship. Inconclusive results which are again reflected by this research, which 
disclosed that intoxication was a factor in several Taser uses, but was not a consistent presence.  
 
Mental Health  
Morabito & Socia (2015) declare that mental health alone is not a statistically significant force 
predictor. A presumption supported by this research. Mental health was a factor in three of the 
fourteen examples of Taser use, but on each of these occasions, the subject was also in possession 
of a weapon. A fact which instantly predisposed them to a heightened risk of being subject to Taser. 
Whilst STOs are prepared to show due sensitivity to persons with such conditions, they still feel that 
if a weapon is presented then Taser use remains justified.  
 
“. . . don’t be afraid to Taser somebody because they have got . . .  special needs or are a 
child. I mean it's not ideal to do it, but if it's your only option . . .” (P6) 
   
Ethnicity 
On the subject of ethnicity, various academics aired the concern that ethnic minority citizens are 
over represented by Taser use statistics (Gau et al. 2010; Oriola et al. 2012; Ryan, 2008; Shaw 2015).  
An assertion that is not supported by this and other research which finds no concrete relationship 
(see Freidrich, 1980; McCluskey & Terrill, 2005; McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline, 2005). From the 
disclosures made by the sample population, a Taser was used on only two persons of ethnic 
minority, one of whom was brandishing a knife during the encounter. Whilst this may appear to be a 
somewhat unremarkable finding, the fact that Westshire Constabulary serves a relatively low 
proportion of ethnic minority residents, should not be overlooked. Neither should the fact that the 
initial Taser training standards do very little to proactively counter what is relatively well publicised 
societal risk.  
 
Officer characteristics 
Gender 
Paoline & Terrill (2004); McCluskey & Terrill (2005); McCluskey et al. (2005); Paoline & Terrill (2007); 
Terrill & Mastrofski (2002); and Terrill et al. (2008) all report that an officer’s decision to resort to 
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force is not affected by gender. A stance which is clearly contrary to the position of this research, 
which did not disclose a single Taser firing or instance of red-dot compliance by female officers.  
 
Whilst the limited number of female participants cannot be overlooked, the evidence accrued from 
this qualitative study, strongly suggests that male officers are more likely to use a CED than their 
female counterparts. A position supported by Garner et al. (2002).     
 
P14 suggests that low Taser use figures could be attributable to the greater preparedness of females 
to engage a subject in Tactical communication, or the predominantly male based target population, 
being unwilling to resist or assault a female officer.  
 
“Communication skills always comes first. Always talk. And I think being a girl sometimes, 
maybe that’s why I haven’t used my Taser yet. Because, I will always go for the talk and if a 
man sees a female, most of the time, they are not quite as violent . . .” (P14) 
 
An intriguing conceptual explanation and a potential avenue for further research.     
 
Encounter Characteristics 
Suspect use of a weapon 
In the majority of Taser uses disclosed by the research sample, the subject was in possession of a 
potentially lethal weapon such as a knife or metal bar. The use of a weapon is a statistically 
significant predictor of force according to Terrill (2007); McCluskey et al. (2005) and Paoline & Terrill 
(2007). Findings which are supported by this research. STO’s are highly likely to use Taser when a 
weapon of any description, but in particular a knife or bladed article is produced or otherwise 
involved in the encounter. STO’s unanimously feel under these circumstances that the use of a CED 
is a justified, proportionate and necessary means of resolving the encounter.  
 
“But if someone’s got a knife on them, a hammer, a sledge hammer, a baseball bat, and 
they’ve not dropped it, that’s when you go: “Okay, you’ve made your choice, game on!” (P4) 
 
“If the person had a weapon, and they weren’t dropping it, then you know, Taser would be 
coming out.  (P15) 
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“If somebody has got a weapon, then I would be using it . . .” (P6) 
 
“I think if there is a weapon involved, I am more likely, to go for the Taser, but every situation 
is going to be different . .  .” (P15) 
 
Suspect resisting arrest or otherwise confrontational  
Garner et al. (1996); Kavanagh (1997); McCluskey & Terrill (2005); McCluskey et al. (2005);  Paoline 
& Terrill (2007); Terrill et al. (2003) and Terrill et al. (2008) all confirm that a suspect who is resisting 
arrest, is more likely to experience force. Whilst officers may elect to use some degree of force on a 
purely resistant subject, they will seldom resort to a CED.   
 
“If the person is just being aggressive, and hasn’t got a weapon then I probably wouldn’t 
necessarily draw Taser.” (P15) 
 
However, if the level of resistance escalates to a more serious level or if there are other aggravating 
factors present during the encounter then Taser use will become more likely. For example, on each 
occasion that Taser was fired by the sample population and in the majority of cases where one was 
used, the subject was either violently resisting arrest or in the act of assaulting the attending or 
other officer(s), often with a weapon.     
 
The preceding chapter has provided a qualitative overview of CED use by a small number of STOs 
employed by Westshire Constabulary. Whilst the results are not necessarily generalisable 
countrywide the examples of operational use indicate that CEDs are usually applied within the 
parameters of training guidelines, predominantly when a knife or other weapon is involved in the 
encounter or when officers are facing serious aggravated resistance. For the most part, the device 
appears to be operationally effective, however this is not always the case and caution against 
complacency is needed. In addition, untrained officers who may be unaware of the capability of 
CEDs have the potential to increase the risk of serious injury to all parties involved in a coercive 
encounter. This presents a case to suggest that untrained officers should be given a practical input 
on how to comport themselves during a CED led encounter.  
 
CED recipients will generally be male. If a suspect is confrontational, intoxicated or in possession of a 
weapon, the likelihood of use increases dramatically. Male officers are more likely to use Taser than 
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females. Perhaps because female officers have better communication skills? Or, maybe because 
male subjects are more likely to comply with, and less likely to assault a female? This research found 
no evidence of disproportionate Taser use on vulnerable population groups, but general under-
representation within the force area should not be overlooked. More research focusing on domestic 
violence as a standalone encounter characteristic would also be interesting, as there certainly 
appears to be a connection between this force correlate and an increased likelihood of Taser 
application. The following chapter will address the operational use of NDM, the position of CEDs 
within the force hierarchy and the protection of vulnerable citizens.  
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Chapter ten 
Decision making and the protection of vulnerable population groups 
 
The following chapter focuses on use of the NDM in the training and operational environment. The 
COP has directed that officers should use the NDM to elect and justify every decision they make, 
including the use of force. This position has effectively negated the requirement for officially 
recognised force continua. The following chapter will explore whether this is a sound and logical 
advancement. Chapter ten also addresses the position of CED’s within the force hierarchy and in-so-
doing, evidences a concerning variation in operational opinion. This current chapter closes by 
critically assessing the extent to which CED training standards proactively protect society’s most 
vulnerable and “at risk” citizens from unethical or over-exposure to CEDs.   
 
The National Decision Model  
As part of the interview process, officers were asked about their decision making strategy for the use 
or non-use of a CED during a potentially coercive encounter. Similar questions were asked of STO’s 
who had used the device in operational circumstances. It is perhaps unsurprising that the sample 
population commonly cited use of the NDM, in combination with relevant legislation (often referred 
to as use of force powers or similar) as their primary guidance tools.  
 
“. . . . they [the instructors] want to make sure that you are . . . using the National Decision 
Model, and make sure that you can rationalise that, and explain it, because after every 
scenario, you may not have used [Taser], you may have decided to use something else, like 
just talking or pushing them back, or, whatever it is that you decide to do. So they want you 
to explain how you have used the NDM, with the use of force legislation, and why you would 
use Taser.” (P7) 
  
“Well it’s always . . . the National Decision Model isn’t it, that’s what it was all about.”(P3) 
 
“Massively using the NDM” (P6) 
 
“You are using . . . your use of force powers, your National Decision Model.” (P9) 
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From these reflections, it appears that STO’s are aware and have at least a basic understanding of 
the NDM. However, they do not appear to be using this tool in its entirety to fortify the election of a 
CED as a force measure. Rather they appear to be using a rudimentary personal risk assessment in 
combination with a level of pre-existing tacit knowledge. 
 
“You want to get the situation ended with as quickly as possible, without anyone getting 
hurt, so yeah you go through your NDM, in your mind . . . is Taser going to be the first thing 
that comes to mind or . . . am I going to go for spray first? Is that going to be a better 
situation? I think, I think if there is a weapon involved, I am more likely, to go for the Taser, 
but every situation is going to be different. Am I going to get the shot on? What clothing are 
they wearing? Has he got a massive puffer jacket on? There is no point in getting, getting the 
Taser out because it's not going to get through the jacket, am I going to be better with, 
baton and spray?” (P14) 
 
“It's a threat assessment, on what, what that person is doing, so the surroundings, what, you 
know . . . I suppose in theory yeah you are, maybe not in the right order but you do go 
through the National Decision Making Model, because I am thinking, what's this person got? 
. . . How can I take him down? Do I need to Taser? If I do Taser, what's the risk with that, or if 
I hit him, what's the risk with that? And then you sort of, you play it out like that. So I 
suppose inadvertently, it's a natural cycle that you do the National Decision Making Model. 
It’s good like that. It is quite simple isn’t it? It's, a box and it's easy.” (P11)  
 
In the light of these observations, it is important to reaffirm that the NDM is a cyclical, multi-stage 
model of reflective practice. Intrinsic to this model are a number of facets which are clearly 
overlooked by officers, including, but not restricted to, the initial formulation of a viable working 
strategy, effective contingency planning, consideration of the Code of Ethics and a process of critical 
reflection after the fact. None of which were specifically cited by the sample population as factors 
relevant to their force decisions.  
 
Professional knowledge acquired by practitioners over a number of years can be a valuable asset, 
often resulting in effective situation resolution (Eraut, 1994; Polyani, 1962). However, there are 
drawbacks with this approach. Particularly, if officers become overly reliant on previous experiences 
and fail to make best use of the professional training and guidance they are given (Bacon et al., 
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2000). A risk  that is manifested through this current research, specifically the premise that 
experienced police officers do not need to refer to decision making tools because conflict resolution 
is a fundamental part of their job and not something that requires individual or distinct 
consideration.    
 
“Yeah [the NDM] is good, because it is all stuff we do naturally, or you should be doing 
naturally.” (P15) 
 
“. . . forming a, a sort of spur of the moment decision based upon [The NDM]. You know? It  . 
. .  kind of comes naturally I think once you’ve been in the job a little while . . . you do it 
subconsciously, you subconsciously use that without really thinking about it too much.” (P3) 
 
“I find with the NDM, I don’t sit back and go, right, I am going to go through each point, 
point by point. I find I work my way round that automatically.” (P6) 
 
Furthering the constructive critique of the NDM as an effective decision making tool, officers 
consistently point to issues of pragmatic constraint when using a multi-stage model of reflective 
practice to formulate an effective response to a dynamically unfolding incident.  
 
“I wouldn’t look at it, because, typically in my role on response, I am not going to have the 
chance to get my paperwork out and have a look at the NDM. I am going to do that 
naturally.” (P7) 
 
“I think it's just a fancy way of writing down what we do, because you do do it. It's just a way 
of writing it down and validating it . . .  it's one of those things that, policing, or someone has 
made into a picture gram.” (P8) 
 
It is apparent that the NDM is not being used to the fullness and extent intended by governing 
authorities. Particularly, when STO’s are at the point of contact with a subject during a coercive 
encounter. On a positive note, the NDM does appear to be well-used after the fact to assist officers 
with the retrospective justification of force. It is frequently used as a template for force recording 
purposes or as a structural guideline for the written formulation of official court documents. 
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“I can describe what I am doing quite confidently, but if I then want to know, actually, how is 
that fitting into which heading of the model then I need to have it sort of in front of me, to 
actually, yeah, to write a decent statement about it.”(P9) 
  
“I just find, when it comes to writing statements, you can sort of peg [the NDM] in . . . .” (P6) 
 
Whilst there does appear to be a place for the NDM in operational policing, the above evidence 
shows that it is not an effective, all-encompassing guidance tool and possible alternative measures 
should be explored. One such possibility is the immersive interactive training simulator Hydra / 
Minerva™ which uses unfolding scenarios to test the decision making and operational capability of 
emergency service practitioners (Hydra Foundation, 2016, para. 2). 
The advantage of this technology is that it provides a mechanism whereby officers can use their 
natural reliance on professional judgement in a more constructive way. Officers are expected to 
participate in synthetic training scenarios, then reflect upon real-time performance in a relatively 
comfortable training environment. A more evidence-based process which appears preferable to the 
current overreliance on a paper-based reflective model such as the NDM.  
In addition, Hydra / Minerva is more versatile than the current decision making provision. It is web-
based, so can be used anywhere with web connectivity and can be linked regionally, nationally and 
even internationally. It is also cost effective because the Hydra Foundation is committed to providing 
this technology to police and fire services free of charge. At the time of writing, 21 UK police forces 
have adopted this technology primarily, to develop prospective senior officers in critical incident 
management strategies (Hydra Foundation, 2016a, para. 5); albeit its’ potential value to the CED 
training environment is also apparent.  
The continuum perspective 
The subjective interpretation of the position of CEDs within the force hierarchy was identified as an 
interesting theme during data analysis. Of particular significance is the evident disconnect and 
general lack of consensus between STOs. Because the COP has not ascribed to a force continuum the 
onus of CED use rests squarely with the individual officer who is answerable to the courts. A fact that 
is stressed during training.    
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“Well they made it pretty clear from the very start that there is no right and wrong answer. It 
is your decision, and you’re going to have to justify it. . . . Worst case scenario you’re in court 
for assaulting someone with a Taser. You’ve got to justify why you’ve done it. So they don’t 
say, ‘Oh right so you’ve got this scenario here, yes you can Taser someone . . . It is literally 
open to interpretation. So it’s good in some respects, but I wouldn’t want to be the one stood 
in the dock having to justify it, you know, thinking that I’d done it right.” (P3) 
 
Whilst this unique approach offers a degree of organisational benefit whereby the officer is not 
rigidly constrained by a pre-set resolution and the relevant force can distance itself from an 
erroneous application of force, the lack of specific organisational guidance does leave individual 
practitioners both open and vulnerable to criticism. Criticism which will reflect vicariously on the 
relevant organisation if the officer is eventually charged or convicted of a criminal offence. This 
appears to render any organisational protectionist benefit arguably Pyrrhic in nature; particularly if 
the force application is a borderline case in terms of justification and reasonability.  
 
The lack of official guidance has left officers confused as to where CEDs sit or should sit, within their 
armoury. This is manifested in both the training and operational environment where disparity reigns. 
For example, some STO’s are of the opinion that CEDs are a higher level use of force option: 
 
“Getting a Taser out is way up there . . . with the use of force. It's a big thing. Firing it. Using 
your Taser is a big deal, really big . . .  and it's going to have to be something really serious to 
use it.” (P9) 
 
“I was never under any delusion that it was less than captor. It was clearly demonstrably a 
lot higher than captor.” (P5) 
 
“I would personally say it would come above Captor . . .” (P15) 
 
“Well everybody says it's like one of the lower uses of force, but I still think it's quite serious, 
but I think arresting someone is quite serious. I think some people are quite frivolous with 
things like that, I think using force is quite serious . . .” (P8) 
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“Taser now seems to have gone back up the use of force to, I suppose really now being just 
below the use of a firearm.” (P12)   
 
 
Whereas other officers are of the opinion that CEDs should be positioned at the lower end of the 
force spectrum: 
 
“It's certainly, lower use of force than both spray and baton.” (P11)  
 
“We have all carried a spray and a baton, but actually it's not as much use of force as a 
baton.” (P7)  
 
“It’s not particularly high . . . I would use Taser before baton and in some scenarios, I would 
use Taser before spray.” (P14)  
 
“I think it's, probably the lowest use of force, other than handcuffs that I have got on my 
belt.” (P6) 
 
From these reflective observations, there exists a clear and evident disconnect in officers’ 
interpretation of exactly where CEDs lie, and indeed ought to lie, as a tactical option, and the flexible 
provisions allowed by the NDM, do little to clarify or help the situation.  
 
The potential consequences of murkiness in this is key area are numerous and far reaching (Dymond 
& Rappert, 2014). Notwithstanding, the evident lack of organisational direction, the extant polarity 
in individual understanding could lead to inconsistency in operational use on national scale. As a 
result, some officers will elect to use the device in less or indeed more grave circumstances than 
others. More importantly, the decision will be guided, not by policy or recommended professional 
practice, rather a subjective interpretation of the position of CEDs within the force framework. 
Clearly not an ideal circumstance.      
 
Unambiguous operational guidance from governing organisations such as the Home Office, COP or 
NPCC is urgently required (Amnesty International, 2016). In theory, this could be provided by the 
introduction of a nationally agreed use of force continuum displaying exactly where CEDs (as well as 
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other tactical options) sit within the force hierarchy. In order to select an appropriate position the 
empirical evidence could be considered.  
 
For example, a growing consensus in the USA supports a minimum level of active resistance from the 
subject before a CED is used (Braidwood Commission, 2015; Millar, 2010; Thomas et al., 2011; 
QCMC, 2013). A position supported by Kleinig (2007); Oriola et al. (2012) and Sprague (2007) who all 
oppose the use of CED’s on any lower level. 
  
Alternatively, and perhaps more in keeping with the consent-based policing a more conservative 
approach could be considered. For example, the position proposed by Jenkinson et al. (2006) 
recommends placement of CEDs at the higher end of the use of force spectrum, second only to use 
of lethal-force. An option which appears more appropriate given the presumption that CEDs are the 
weapon of choice if the subject is in possession of an offensive weapon.   
 
Whichever option is chosen, the information must be fully transparent and made publicly available 
through open source means. It must be relayed as a core component of the training curriculum, and 
must leave prospective STO’s in no doubt as to the nationally agreed position of the device within 
the force hierarchy. To do so will add much needed clarity to a currently abstruse situation and will 
help to ensure uniformity and consistency in CED use. A development such as this would also be a 
further step towards New Public Management oriented policing whereby officers can be confident 
that the ultimate accountability for the consequences of CED use will rest with the organisation as 
opposed to the individual. Conversely, any negative consequence (provided the device was used 
ethically and in line with training) will be regarded as a learning rather than a blaming opportunity “. 
. . lessons from mistakes are fed back into future good practice, informing policy through learning. 
Learning from mistakes contributes to a portfolio of good practice incorporated into future policy 
implying that, henceforth operations premised on appropriate and validated standards will ensure 
greater public satisfaction.” (Squires & Kennison, 2010, p. 49)  
 
Vulnerable population groups 
The robustness of the protection measures afforded by CED training, to society’s most vulnerable 
citizens, emerged as an important sociological concern during the literature review. This was 
recently manifested in the UK, by a multi-agency recommendation for a public inquiry into the police 
use of CEDs, focusing on use of the device on ethnic minorities and those suffering with a mental 
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illness (Amnesty International, 2016). The following chapter makes a valuable contribution to this 
sensitive area by addressing the training standards as they relate to these specific concerns.  
 
Black and ethnic minority citizens 
Academics are concerned that CEDs are being used disproportionately on Black, Hispanic and other 
non-white citizens (Amnesty International, 2004; 2016, Cornege, 2011; Engel et al. (2002); Gau et al, 
2010; Kleinig, 2007; Oriola, et al., 2012; Ryan, 2008; Shaw, 2015; Sprague, 2007). Certain researchers 
have suggested that this may be due to members of an ethnic minority being more likely to commit 
crime or resist arrest (Black & Reiss, 1967; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; MacDonald, 2010) whilst others 
suggest that this is attributable to police officers holding a pre-existing racial prejudice (Engel et al., 
2002).   
 
Despite compelling research, there is little evidence to suggest that the COP has taken proactive 
steps to mitigate the risk or perception of racial prejudice as it relates to CED use. In short, it appears 
that more could and should be done. 
 
“I don’t remember it being discussed. I know there’s the perception that some ethnic 
minorities are targeted . . . or more force is used against them . . . but I don’t remember that . 
. .  coming up at any time in training.” (P5)   
 
Officers receive no input on the sensitive issue of race relations during classroom sessions, neither 
do they receive training on the implicit or counter-bias theorem. And, at no stage during Taser 
training, are prospective STOs deliberately faced with non-Caucasian stooges.  
 
Question: “Do they use stooges with an ethnic minority?” 
 
Answer: “Not that I remember.  Yeah, not that I remember at all anything like that, it was 
about their perception, so it was a mental health sort of thing, rather than an ethnicity sort 
of thing . . . (P5) 
 
As a result, officers could leave Taser training unaware of any unconscious biases they may hold and 
perhaps more importantly, untrained in the use of controlled responses to counter them. The 
sociological consequences of this omission are potentially very serious. If left unchecked, the 
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historically fractious relationship between law enforcement and non-white citizens could worsen 
(Gau et al., 2010; Oriola et al., 2012). There could be a further erosion of consent based policing and 
at worst, a complete breakdown of law and order such as that which occurred during the London 
Riots of 2011. A risk which would be particularly heightened in the immediate wake of a CED 
associated death. 
 
A simple alteration to the course structure could pay dividends here. For example, room could be 
made for a short theoretical input on unconscious biases (including the implicit and counter-bias 
theorem), which if nothing else, would make officers consciously aware of the concept. Officers 
could also be coached on controlled responses which could allow them to overcome these biases 
(for successful examples of this see Devine, 1989; Monteith, Arthur & Flynn, 2010; Monteith et al., 
2002).  
 
These valuable sociological concepts should be tested theoretically as part of the written 
examination and practically during scenario based role-play exercises. Potential stooges could be 
selected because of their membership of an ethnic minority and unfolding scenarios could be used 
to test an officer’s judgement for example, by the stooge producing a mobile phone rather than a 
weapon or a weapon rather than an inanimate object. If the acquisition of suitable stooges was 
problematic for some police forces, technology such as Hydra / Minerva could be considered. This 
technology has been offered to police forces free of charge and it could conceivably be used to 
inform threat perception during CED training.  
 
The purpose of this specialised training is not to spotlight prospective STO’s. Rather to make them 
aware of any unconscious biases they may have and crucially, to set mechanisms in place whereby 
officers can consciously overcome them. To do this would help protect vulnerable population groups 
from unethical exposure to CEDs and could potentially reduce the risk of officers being assaulted in 
the course of their duty by failing to act decisively when to do so would have been entirely justified.   
 
In summary, there is clear and unambiguous empirical evidence which suggests that ethnic minority 
citizens are disproportionately represented by CED use statistics on a worldwide scale. Conversely, 
there exists a growing base of academic evidence which offers possible methods to help alleviate 
both the perception and operationalisation of this risk. Under the circumstances it would appear 
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politic for governing authorities to include such strategies as a fundamental element of initial CED 
training. This is certainly a key recommendation of this current research.  
 
In the shadow of the above observations, this chapter will now explore the extent to which the CED 
training standards protect the mentally impaired, another vulnerable population group who are 
purportedly over-represented recipients of operational CED use (Oriola et al., 2012 
 
The mentally vulnerable  
It has been suggested that the police service does not have adequate strategies in place to deal with 
people suffering with a mental illness. As a result, there is a perception (albeit unsupported by the 
admittedly limited body of empirical research) that more and more severe force is being used against 
them by police officers (Engel, 2015; Morabito & Socia, 2015). The theory-based stages of CED 
training provides little if any, input on the symptoms of common mental illnesses, but it is 
encouraging to note that mental health concerns do feature in certain scenarios.  
 
Whilst, the suspicion or confirmation of a mental illness will not automatically render CEDs an 
unavailable tactical option, officers must show an early awareness of the possibility of such a 
condition and they are expected to adjust their force mindset accordingly. If it is thought that the 
officer has not identified the presence of a pre-existing mental illness (or other related vulnerability) 
then stooges will respond in a manner that is likely to have a marked and detrimental impact on the 
officer’s ability to resolve the situation clinically.  
 
However, if a degree of sensitivity is shown during synthetic training, then this will invariably lead to 
effective situation resolution, without the need to resort to a CED. This is shown by P4’s response to 
scenario involving symptoms consistent with an Obsessive Compulsive disorder. 
 
“[The scenario was] a gentleman . . . acting strangely by a bus stop . . . . He couldn’t fathom 
that the road was blocked . . . . So it was just a case of just talking to him on that one as well . 
. .  I just walked him up the road and said, ‘Right, come with me and we’ll walk up the road’, 
again I didn’t need to use my Taser on that one.” (P4)  
 
The election of nothing more than light physical contact combined with tactical communication, is 
clearly a commendable police response given that the officer was taking part in a CED training 
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scenario. Not only, does P4 quickly recognise the possibility of a mental vulnerability but he also, 
shows due sensitivity in his interaction with the subject. This results in scenario resolution without 
the need for any level of force at all. In the operational context this would clearly be a highly 
desirable outcome.     
 
Whilst the COP has clearly directed that officers should show due sensitivity when interacting with 
members of the public who appear to be suffering with a mental illness, there are still occasions 
where CED use may still be justified. For example, if the subject is in the act of causing harm to 
themselves with a knife or razor blade. Under these circumstances an STO’s may well recognise the 
symptoms of a mental disorder, but they are expected to prioritise the immediate safety of the 
subject, themselves or the general public, over the longer-term psychological risk of CED exposure. 
 
“The chap on the bus self-harming had . . . mental health problems . . . but don’t let 
somebody get away with something or, hurt somebody because you are concerned about it . 
. . if you are dealing with a situation and you have to use the Taser to protect yourself or 
someone else, then do it . . . (P6) 
 
As ever, there is no prescriptive response to any given scenario. It is the prerogative of each 
individual officer to decide on an appropriate resolution to a coercive encounter. Some officers will 
still refrain from CED use even if the subject is self-harming with a knife.  
 
“. . . there was one [scenario], it was all to do with mental health that was inside, and it was 
a chap and he . . . had a knife . . . and he . . . was cutting himself up. I didn’t Taser him, but 
everyone else did, and it should have been. I felt a little bit sorry for him . . .  I  . . . ended up 
just bundling him on the bed and getting the knife off of him, you know? You need to make 
your own decision don’t you?” (P14)   
 
Although P14’s response to this scenario is commendable, it does pose officer safety concerns. It is 
at best inadvisable for an officer to physically engage with an emotionally disturbed male who is in 
the act of self-harm with a knife and it is patently dangerous for the encounter to result in a close- 
quarters altercation for control of the weapon. On reflection, P14 is arguably correct in her assertion 
that Taser use would have been a more appropriate tactical option under these circumstances.  
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Interestingly, P14’s decision not to use a CED could have been a manifestation of her counter-bias 
response. Specifically, an unwillingness to engage a mentally ill person with a CED for fear of the 
wider societal consequence (James, Vila & Dartha. 2013; James, Klinga & Vila, 2014; James, Vila & 
James, 2015). Alternatively, this response could be attributed to the decreased propensity of female 
police officers to use a CED (Garner et al., 2002). Whatever the reason, P14’s seemingly isolated and 
disparate response to this scenario is an undoubtedly interesting outcome from an analytical 
perspective!    
  
On balance, the COP appears to have recognised the increased risk of CED application to the 
mentally vulnerable and it is encouraging to see that they are mitigating this concern to some extent 
during training. However, organisational focus appears predominantly attributed to instances of self-
harm with a knife or razor blade, acts which are not necessarily, directly ascribable to a medically 
recognised mental illness. Rather, symptoms of a personality disorder or actions of a vulnerable 
individual in need of support. In these situations the presumption is clearly towards the use of a CED 
to defuse the situation because of the presence of a weapon during the encounter.  
 
Perhaps more theory input could be included in the initial stages of training. Prospective STO’s could 
be introduced to certain distinct characteristics of common mental health illnesses which could be 
(and often are) mistaken for acts of aggression. High spectrum autism and epilepsy being distinct 
examples. These symptoms could be mimicked by stooges during the scenarios with the expectation 
that officers recognise these traits, and work to de-escalate the situation using tactical 
communication rather than force. The same principle could be applied to other situations where a 
weapon is involved, unless there are immediate safeguarding concerns.  
 
The introduction of such measures would show due recognition of these social concerns by 
governing organisations, who could in turn, show demonstrable efforts to mitigate the incumbent 
risk. Conversely, by facilitating a slight alteration in initial approach, the number of overall CED 
deployments would naturally reduce. Undoubtedly, a desirable sociological outcome. 
 
The preceding chapter has addressed operational decision making using the NDM and the position 
of CEDs within the use of force hierarchy. The outcomes indicate that whilst officers are, for the 
most part, aware of the NDM but they do not use this model effectively when electing and justifying 
the use of force, instead, they tend to rely on a basic risk assessment in combination with 
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professional judgement. There exists, a clear and evident disconnect in officer’s opinion of the 
position CEDs within their armory. Some believe that CEDs are a lower level force option and others 
rigidly oppose this position. The potential sociological consequences of this disparity were critically 
analysed and some suggestions for improvement were made. This chapter has also focused on the 
protection afforded to black and other ethnic minority citizens as well as citizens suffering with a 
mental illness or impairment. From the data available there appears to be little evidence to suggest 
that the standards of CED training have adequately mitigated the risk of pernicious exposure to 
ethnic minority citizens. Prospective STOs receive no input on unconscious or counter bias theorem 
and are not faced with ethnic minority subjects during simulation training. Whilst the mentally ill 
appear to be afforded a more enhanced level of protection, there is still room for improvement. The 
following chapter will conclude this research.  
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Chapter eleven 
Conclusion 
 
The following chapter concludes this thesis, firstly by discussing its limitations, the most significant of 
which is generalisability. Chapter eleven then uses the evidence provided by this research to offer a 
number of predictions and recommendations to the field. It concludes with a reflective summary.   
 
Research limitations 
Whilst this thesis has provided a unique contribution to knowledge by dissecting the content and 
delivery of initial CED training and exploring CED operationalisation from the first-hand perspective 
of current serving STO’s, it is unequivocally accepted that this current research is a localised and 
small scale study. Thus generalisability is an issue. Westshire Constabulary is only one of the 43 
police forces in England and Wales and it is also one of the smallest. It is situated in a relatively 
affluent region of the country with comparatively low crime rates and levels of ethnic diversity. The 
sample population represents only a tiny proportion of the country’s STO’s, so their viewpoints are 
not necessarily representative nationwide. Similar could be said of the content and delivery of the 
initial training course, the makeup of which may differ from force to force. The research itself was 
conducted over a limited time period by a single researcher who is employed by Westshire 
Constabulary and outranked all the research participants. Although every effort was made to avoid 
any potential conflict of interest, the position and seniority of the researcher could have had an 
adverse impact on the data disclosed (Bartunek & Louis, 1996; Weatheritt, 1986)  
 
Future direction 
As a direct result of this current research, a number of potential future paths the Taser phenomenon 
may take can be identified. Firstly, the issue of wider availability, where there appears to be a sense 
of inevitability. It is likely that CEDs will eventually become routinely available to all uniformed front-
line officers. On balance, it would perhaps be politic for initial officer training to incorporate safe use 
of CEDs, so that all probationary officers naturally commence their service in possession of the 
device.  
 
A position such as this would be akin to recent developments in New Zealand which is one of few 
institutions who, like the UK, do not routinely furnish their officers with firearms. On 31st July 2015, 
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the head of the New Zealand Police Service, Commissioner Mike Bush announced that CEDs would 
be issued to all front line officers (Hunt, 2015). It is possible, if not likely, that this situation will 
eventually be mirrored in the UK. At present, there does not appear to be a legitimate business case 
for, or current move toward, total armament. Incidentally, several commentators have pointed to 
the heightened terror threat as justification for increased availability (e.g. Dodd, 2015). This is an 
inappropriate position. CEDs are not an effective tool to combat terrorism and should not be viewed 
as such. Counter terrorism resolution requires distance and lethal capability. Neither of which are 
offered by a CED.   
 
Whilst there would likely be a degree of resistance to such a development (most notably from 
Human Rights protection groups such as Amnesty International) it would be broadly supported by 
governing organisations such as the Home Office, the COP and the NPCC. It would also be strongly 
supported by the Police Federation and would have the backing of the wider public (Morton, 2010; 
Police Federation, 2017). Barriers to this technological development in the UK would be 
bureaucracy, time and most importantly, cost. Routinely arming even just front-line officers would 
be an incredibly expensive endeavor which could be delayed in the short and longer term by ongoing 
austerity measures (Police Federation, 2017b).   
 
Regardless of when, and indeed if, CEDs become widely available, the number of officers carrying 
them is likely to increase. This could lead to an increase in the number of recorded firings and other 
associated uses. This increase will be tracked by the Home Office and disclosed in open source 
forums.  A small increase in CED use is not necessarily a societal problem, provided the devices are 
used ethically and in accordance with policy and training guidelines. With increased CED availability, 
there is also likely to be a general decrease in rates of officer and subject injury during forceful 
encounters. Unfortunately, these statistics will be more difficult to quantify because they are not 
routinely disclosed at regular intervals by the wider police service. It is the responsibility of the 
academic community to assist here and the implementation of a national use of force database 
which can be readily accessed is of paramount importance (Dymond, as cited by Amnesty 
International, 2016).    
 
Secondly, and on a less positive note, it is possible that there will be an increase in the number of 
CED associated deaths which is often a by-product of more widespread availability and use. This 
could pose a serious risk to society, particularly if the victim is black, suffering with poor mental 
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health or otherwise vulnerable. In order to prevent adverse consequences, relevant governing 
organisations must take positive measures to prevent such events and crucially, they must be seen 
to be taking such measures.  
 
The doctrine of policing by consent using the least intrusive methods of law enforcement should be 
maintained as (albeit subject to gradual erosion) this altruistic principle remains a coveted hallmark 
of our liberal and pluralistic society. The starting mantra for the police service must be that “. . . in a 
police operation the only acceptable casualty rate is zero” (Greenwood, 1979, p. 59). A CED should 
not be used unless it is absolutely necessary in order to achieve a legitimate police objective. 
Officers found to be using such devices wantonly or unethically should be identified and disciplined 
accordingly.  
 
Conversely, if a CED is used in legitimate circumstances and the worst case scenario occurs, New 
Public Management theory dictates that ultimate accountability should rest with the organisation 
and not the individual officer. Regardless of outcome, a robust review of the incident must take 
place and any opportunity for learning and future improvement must be seized “. . . learning lessons 
and making instrumental changes is par for the course in the New Public Management arena.” 
(Squires & Kennison, 2011, p. 51)  
 
The ethos of New Public Management theory is crucial when it comes to the police use of CEDs 
because associated deaths invariably receive a heightened level of media attention, which focuses 
heavily on the device itself as opposed to other situational or organisational characteristics relevant 
to the encounter. After all, if a death occurs as a result of a police pursuit, media attention seldom, if 
ever, focuses on the make or model of the police vehicle involved. Likewise the Heckler & Koch 
G3621 never receives public backlash for causing death following a police shooting. Why then do 
media headlines and concomitant public scrutiny invariably focus on the brand of CED? A fascinating 
anomaly of the Taser phenomenon but one that governing organisations must remain continually 
mindful of.  
  
Finally, it is highly likely (perhaps inevitable), that the Taser X26 will soon be replaced by the Taser 
X2 which has been tested by SACMILL (2017) and approved by the Home Office (Police Federation 
                                                          
21 The Heckler & Koch G36 is the primary weapon routinely carried by AFOs in the UK. The G36 is a semi-
automatic long barrelled weapon which fires 5.56mm ammunition.   
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2017a). The X2 has a higher maximum power output, a separate laser sight for top and bottom 
probe, a 25 foot maximum operating distance (as opposed to the 21 feet offered by the X26) and a 
warning signal when the 5 second cycle is approaching completion. Crucially, the X2 allows arcing 
with the cartridges attached and gives the operator the option of an immediate second shot in the 
event of a miss. Under these circumstances, the top and bottom probe of either cartridge can evoke 
NMI, provided the spread is sufficient (SACMILL, 2017). The Taser X2 will likely be trialed initially by 
AFOs before it is pushed out to non-specialist officers.   
 
The police service are obliged to explore new technologies (Neyroud & Disley, 2008; NPCC, 2016) 
and it is right that a potential upgrade to the Taser X26 has been explored. This advancement does 
however hold wider implications for the police service. For instance, the initial training course will 
need to be altered to accommodate the change as the two devices vary in specification. The Taser 
classification and procedure for drive-stun application are two areas which will need to be altered. 
Current STOs will also require additional training and may have to fight against muscle memory to 
become familiar with the new device. This makes unintended or negligent discharge an increased 
risk factor which will need to be closely monitored moving forwards (SACMILL, 2017).    
 
Notwithstanding the true operational value of the Taser X2, it is a little disappointing that due 
consideration does not appear to have been afforded to other possible alternatives. The PhaZZer 
Enforcer™ for example, is a new CED concept which offers portable battery charging (which the X2 
does not) as well as a range of additional less-lethal options such as a pepper ball, pepper powder, 
paint and a rubber extenuating energy projectile. All of which can all be fired from the device in 
addition to a standard probe deployment.22 The PhaZZer Enforcer is reportedly a complete less-
lethal weapons system which offers considerable value for money and significant operational 
benefit. This particular model was tested by SACMIL and CAST but ultimately discounted (SACMILL, 
2017). It would be interesting to assess the rationale for this decision, as it appears at first glance to 
be questionable.   
 
Suggested implementations 
In the light of this research there is at least an arguable case to suggest that officers who have 
attended and passed the initial training course are in a strong position to safely carry and operate 
                                                          
22 A comprehensive demonstration of the various characteristics and technical specifications of the PhaZZer 
Enforcer CED is freely available on open source forums such as UTube.   
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CEDs. There also appears to be sufficient capacity to increase the number of STOs in line with 
government and NPCC recommendations. However, there is caveat to this presumption. 
Improvements to the curriculum are needed and should be implemented as quickly as possible. CED 
training urgently requires more emphasis on the protection of vulnerable population groups, 
particularly black and minority-ethnic citizens. There should be an input on the potentially disastrous 
consequences which could befall a single instance of poor judgement in this sensitive area. Officers 
should be informed of the unconscious, implicit and counter-bias theories and should be provided 
with mechanisms whereby they can overcome these mindsets using controlled responses. Their 
comprehension in this area should be subsequently scrutinised through the use of scenario based 
role play exercises.  
 
In making this representation, it is accepted that the training schedule is tight. Space for such an 
input could be made by completion of the written examination prior to course attendance, through 
an e-learning package or similar. To do so would not detract from the quality or robustness of the 
initial course because the written test is apparently somewhat of a formality and the content is 
comprehensively covered during CED training. In theory, little would be lost by this approach but 
there could be much to gain by the inclusion of these additional components.  
 
In the spirit of complete openness and transparency, Authorised Professional Practice should be 
updated to reflect this development. The NPCC should add this information to their online Taser 
Question and Answer section, or otherwise publish it in open source forums. This will maintain 
complete public transparency in police CED use. 
 
Clarification on the exact position of CEDs within the use of force hierarchy is urgently required. The 
NDM does provide an organisational safety net but for the individual officer confusion abounds. This 
manifests in an evident disconnect in officer’s interpretations of where CEDs lie and ought to lie as a 
tactical option. A national use of force continuum should be formulated and introduced by a 
governing organisation with strategic oversight of this area (such as the COP or NPCC). The 
continuum need not replace the NDM, rather be used alongside it. Officers should be in no doubt as 
to the official positon of CEDs within the force hierarchy, but should also remain confident that the 
NDM provides a mechanism facilitating use of the device at any stage of a forceful encounter, if this 
action is justified proportionate and necessary in the circumstances.  
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The COP should explore other decision making aids which are technologically superior to the NDM.  
The Hydra Minerva system is one such example. This software has been offered free of charge to 
police services, so is a financially sound option. It is also pragmatic, given that unfolding encounters 
are recorded, and can be visually reflected upon after the fact. 
 
Operationally, STO’s could be better informed about the limitations of the device and made aware of 
the  factors that will increase the likelihood of CED use, such as the presence of a weapon, the use of 
aggressive resistance or the fact that officers are attending a domestic dispute. Officers could also be 
provided with better follow up support after they have fired the device. There is a tendency for the 
organisation (and by consequence the officer) to normalise traumatic incidents and not expect any 
physical or psychological aftercare. A referral to an occupational health service should be 
automatically offered to an STO after a CED is fired. This should be followed by regular, auditable 
supervisory contact to ensure longer term mental and physical well-being.  
 
Avenues for further research 
The Taser phenomenon is a dynamic entity. This research was incepted and materialised by 
academic request. It stands by nature unique and in isolation, but it is also a benchmark, a platform 
for future research; prime for both national and international comparison. In this vein, it would be 
fascinating to set the results of this research into context with other municipal police forces in the 
UK, particularly the larger ones. This would test the true extent of nationalisation in CED training and 
delivery. Qualitative data from the COP could also be used to chart organisational policy, as it relates 
to core training requirements and further research could explore any variances (or consistency) in 
how these standards are initially interpreted and subsequently delivered at force level.  
 
From an international perspective, it would be useful to compare UK training with the shorter 
programs offered by certain overseas jurisdictions such as the 1 day courses offered in the USA. It 
would also be beneficial to compare UK based training with the courses offered by more analogous 
policing environments such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. By doing so, the true strength of 
UK training would be reliably ascertained.  
 
This research is a snapshot in time and the Taser movement is developing swiftly. The X26 is likely to 
be soon replaced by the X2. This will have a marked effect on Taser-related policing. Likewise more, 
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if not all, response officers will eventually carry one. Again, there encumbers wider political and 
sociological implications, to which academics should maintain pace through timely research.  
Finally, the general use of force literature could be further enriched with CED-specific academia. For 
example, this research highlighted a strong relationship between CED use and the investigation of 
domestic abuse. An encounter correlate not widely researched, but testable for statistical 
significance as a force predictor in its own right and a topic certainly worthy of further exploration.      
 
Conclusion 
The primary aim of this research was to examine the content and sufficiency of CED training and 
operationalisation from the first hand perspective of 15 current accredited STOs employed by a 
single police organisation. Thus filling an academically cited gap in knowledge and providing both a 
benchmark and a platform for future comparative research. This thesis has comprehensively fulfilled 
this mandate and in-so-doing has provided an original contribution to knowledge. Through the 
exploration of secondary research questions, this current study has also disclosed a series of 
somewhat intriguing results. Most notably, an alarming variance in officers’ interpretation of CEDs as 
a use of force option and the deficiency in provision for the protection of the most vulnerable 
members of society. In-line with the research objectives, it is hoped and anticipated that the results 
and recommendations embodied in this research will be valued as evidence-based and used as a 
tool to facilitate prompt organisational improvement on a local as well as national scale. 
 
The operationalisation chapter has identified a number of strong connections between CED use and 
the existing scientific data on the use of force. Of note is the increased likelihood of exposure if a 
suspect is intoxicated, violent or in possession of a weapon. Likewise, if the STO is male or if the 
encounter involves domestic violence.  
 
In conclusion and considering the data gathered in the course of this current research, it appears 
evident that CED training is currently robust in construction and delivery but certain improvements 
to the curriculum can and should (if not must) be made. The Taser phenomenon is an area of high 
liability for the police service. Research has shown that when CEDs are used, deaths can occur and 
this risk inevitably increases when CEDs are made more available and used more often. Governing 
organisations have considered the evidence-base and appear to have made the decision that the 
operational benefit CEDs bring to law enforcement outweighs the risk they pose to society. This is 
why overall numbers are increasing. It is the prerogative of each individual or organisation to decide 
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whether this position is socially acceptable and to voice their opinion accordingly. It is also the 
responsibility of governing organisations to pay heed to pertinent objections and if it is found that 
they are not doing everything in their power to mitigate risk, then they should be challenged.  
 
This research presents a rebuttable business case for the continued use of CEDs in the UK. A position 
primarily attributable to the exigent standards of robust training which furnish officers with the core 
skills they need to handle such devices safely. However this standpoint is caveated with the need for 
certain changes to the current training curriculum, which must be attended to as a priority.  
 
Clarity on the position of CEDs within the force hierarchy is needed, as officers are confused. 
Alternative decision making processes should be investigated, as the NDM is not all-encompassing. 
And, most importantly, vulnerable population groups should be better protected. By taking positive 
steps, in the light of evidence-based research, governing bodies may not be able to prevent 
occasional improper use, or isolated instances of CED associated death. But, they can justify 
retention and proliferation of such devices by showing a clear desire to continually identify, address 
and mitigate societal risk wherever humanly possible. A regime of incessant and ongoing affirmative 
action may help prevent outbreaks of serious public disorder, and will help to galvanise the 
consensus of public antipathy towards continued safe operationalisation of CEDs moving forward. 
Clearly a desirable and ultimately achievable sociological, cultural and political outcome.  
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Appendix A– Initial survey 1: ‘Tactical Options’ 
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Appendix B – Initial survey 2: “Red-Dotted!”  
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Appendix C - Interview schedule 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Head of Department: Dr Phil Clements 
                                                                                             Tel: 02392 843926 
Interview Schedule 
 
Title of Project: ‘Red Dotted!’ A case study analysing how the national Taser training standards are 
received interpreted and operationalised by specially trained officers. 
Name and Contact Details of Researcher: William Keating-Jones Email: UP751811@myport.ac.uk 
Name and Contact Details of Supervisor: Paul Smith Email: paul1.smith@port.ac.uk 
 
Introductory Questions:  
 
Tell me about your police career to date  
Describe your current role within the organisation including a brief summary of your skill set. 
Tell me why you decided to apply to become an STO 
Describe to me the process of applying to become a specially trained officer 
 
How the Initial Taser course is received by officers 
 
Tell me about day 1 of the Taser course 
 
How many people were on the course?  
Where was it held?  
How many instructors? 
What input were you given? 
What were you taught?  
What did you have to do / demonstrate?  
What feedback were you given by instructors? Was this of use? 
How did you feel during the day? 
How did you feel at the end of the day? 
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Tell me about day 2 of the Taser course 
 
What input were you given? 
What were you taught?  
What did you have to do / demonstrate?  
What feedback were you given by instructors? Was this of use? 
How did you feel during the day? 
How did you feel at the end of the day? 
 
 
Tell me about day 3 of the Taser course 
 
What input were you given? 
What were you taught?  
What did you have to do / demonstrate?  
What feedback were you given by instructors? Was this of use? 
How did you feel during the day? 
How did you feel at the end of the day? 
 
 
Tell me about day 4 of the Taser course 
 
 
What input were you given? 
What were you taught?  
What did you have to do / demonstrate? 
What feedback were you given by instructors? Was this of use? 
How did you feel during the day? 
How did you feel at the end of the day? 
 
Upon completion of the course: 
 
Tell me about how you felt at the end of the course? 
How effective was the training? 
Did you feel confident carrying Taser operationally?  
Explain how the Taser course compares to other police training courses you have undertaken?  
What feedback were you given at the end of the course? 
What would you change about the course? 
Is there anything else you would like to add about the course, any more thoughts? Comments? Ways 
it could be changed or improved? 
 
How the content of the Initial Taser course is interpreted by Officers 
Tell me about your expectations of the course prior to starting? 
Power point presentations 
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Tell me about the power point presentations you were given. 
Tell me about the relevance of the presentations concerning the device, nomenclature operating 
systems etc. How does this information relate to you as an STO? 
From the power point presentations what is your interpretation of when Taser can be used? 
From the power point presentations what is your interpretation of when Taser can be used? 
 
Handling, live practice and the classification shoot 
Tell me about the safety and handling drills.   
Tell me about the live weapon drills and practice you received prior to the classification shoot? Was 
this sufficient?  
Tell me about the classification shoot.  
What do you think of the classification requirements? How do they relate to you as an operational 
STO?  
Scenarios  
Tell me about the scenario based assessments. How many did you do? 
What were you faced with?  
What was your thought process?  
How did you resolve the situation? 
Did you apply the training you had received?  
What feedback were you given? 
On reflection would you have done anything different? If so Why?  
Overall what was your interpretation of the content of the initial Taser course? What changes would 
you make? 
 
How the content of the Initial Taser course is operationalised by Officers 
Describe how your day to day role has changed since completing the STO course?  
Tell me about a situation when you have used Taser 
What were the circumstances? What did you do? Was this proscribed in the training? Was the 
deployment effective? 
How did you feel after the fact? What support did you receive?  
On reflection what would you have done differently?   
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Appendix D – Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Head of Department: Dr Phil Clements 
                                                                                             Tel: 02392 843926 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of Project: ‘Red Dotted!’ A case study analysing how the national Taser training standards are 
received interpreted and operationalised by specially trained officers. 
Name and Contact Details of Researcher: William Keating-Jones. Email: UP751811@myport.ac.uk 
Name and Contact Details of Supervisor: Paul Smith. Email: paul1.smith@port.ac.uk 
Thank you for volunteering to assist with this important research. You are being asked to participate 
in an interview which will be conducted at your place of work either shortly before or shortly after 
your rostered shift unless this is impracticable whereupon other arrangements will be made.  
The purpose of my research is to gather information on the content of the Taser training course and 
to establish how this training is received, interpreted and applied operationally. In order to do this I 
will be conducting interviews with 15-20 STO’s. The interview will be approximately 30-60 minutes in 
length and will be audio recorded. It will also be transcribed verbatim so that the data can be fed 
into thematic analysis software. 
The data you provide will be used as part of my thesis which will be submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the award of Doctor of criminal Justice at the University of Portsmouth.  Before you partake in the 
interview I am obliged to ask for your signed consent which must be fully informed. This is the 
purpose of this document.  
Participation in the interview is entirely voluntary and anonymous. Your personal details will not be 
disclosed at any point. The interview discs and consent form with your personal details on it will be 
stored securely at all times until they are destroyed and unauthorised access will not be permitted. 
You are free to withdraw from the research at any point up until the thesis is submitted to the UOP.  
The request to participate is being made by the researcher in his capacity as a student at the UOP. It 
is not being made as a police officer and is not a direction or an order. 
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The data you provide will be used for the purposes of this research project only and a summary of 
the results will be presented at an academic conference and may eventually be published. It will not 
be used for any future research. Sussex police will be provided with a summary of the research 
findings but as stated above your personal details will not be included in this. The data collected 
could be requested and looked at by regulatory authorities whose access to the data may identify 
you however your confidentiality will be respected.   
During the interview I will ask questions about Taser training and deployments. You WILL NOT be 
asked and MUST NOT discuss any incident which is currently under investigation in ANY capacity, 
internal or external civil or criminal including any finalised cases still within relevant appeal periods.  
If you are receiving treatment for PTSD or any other form of mental stress or feeling such symptoms 
you MUST NOT take part in the research. If such symptoms present during the interview the 
research will stop immediately.  
If during the course of the interview ANY criminal or disciplinary offence which has not been 
reported is disclosed I will be duty bound to stop the interview and report the matter. Please do not 
participate if you intend to make such a disclosure.  
If you have any further questions or queries please raise them now. If you do not please find 
overleaf the signed consent form which I respectfully request that you initial and sign where 
indicated prior to the interview commencing. You will be provided with a copy of both documents.  
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you again for your participation in this research and I 
look forward to our interview.  
 
Kind Regards, 
 
William Keating-Jones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209 | P a g e  
 
Appendix E – Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Head of Department: Dr Phil Clements 
                                                                                             Tel: 02392 843926 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: ‘Red Dotted!’ A case study analysing how the national Taser training standards are  
received interpreted and operationalised by specially trained officers. 
Name and Contact Details of Researcher: William Keating-Jones Email: UP751811@myport.ac.uk 
Name and Contact Details of Supervisor: Paul Smith Email: paul1.smith@port.ac.uk 
Ethics Committee Reference Number:   
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study. I have had  
       the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time prior to 
the research being submitted to the UOP without giving any reason. The request to participate is 
being made by the researcher in his capacity as a student at the University of Portsmouth not as a 
Police Officer. The request to participate is not a direction or an order.   
 
3. I understand that data collected during this study, could be requested and looked at by regulatory 
authorities. I give my permission for any authority, with a legal right of access, to view data which 
might identify me.  Any promises of confidentiality provided by the researcher will be respected. 
 
Please 
initial box 
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4. I understand that the results of this study may be published and / or presented at meetings or 
academic conferences, and a summary of the research findings may be provided to Sussex Police 
Service. I give permission for my anonymous data, which does not identify me, to be disseminated 
in this way. 
5. I understand that this research may involve questions about Taser deployments and I must not 
discuss any incident which is currently under investigation in ANY capacity, internal or external civil 
or criminal including any finalised cases still within relevant appeal periods. 
 
6. I am not currently receiving treatment for PTSD or any other form of mental stress.   
 
7. I understand that if I disclose details of ANY criminal or disciplinary offence which has not been 
reported the researcher is duty bound to stop the interview and report the matter. I do not intend 
to make any such disclosures.  
 
8. I understand that I must not disclose any personal details of instructors, colleagues, subjects or 
locations when discussing my role as an STO. I will discuss any training or operational incident in 
general non identifiable terms only.  
 
9. I understand that the interview will be recorded in visual and audio form and that it will be 
transcribed verbatim for the purpose of data analysis.  
 
10. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
Name of Participant:     Date:  Signature: 
 
Name of Person taking Consent:    Date:  Signature: 
 
Note: When completed, one copy to be given to the participant, one copy to be retained in the study file 
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Appendix F – Confirmation of a favourable ethical opinion from UOP 
 
  
 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Head of Department: Dr Phil Clements 
                                                                                              Tel: 02392 843926 
 
Ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk 
21st April 2016 
Dear William Keating-Jones 
Study Title: ‘Red Dotted!’ A case study analysing how the national Taser training standards are 
received interpreted and operationalised by specially trained officers. 
 
Ethics Committee reference: 15/16:26 
 
Thank you for submitting your documents for ethical review. The Ethics Committee was content to 
grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis described in the application 
form, protocol and supporting documentation, revised in the light of any conditions set, subject to 
the general conditions set out in the attached document. 
There is no need to submit any further evidence to the Ethics Committee; the favourable opinion has 
been granted with the assumption of compliance. 
Requirement: that data should be stored more securely and that participants should be clear that 
they can withdraw at any point without penalty. 
The favourable opinion of the EC does not grant permission or approval to undertake the research. 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host organisation, including 
University of Portsmouth, prior to the start of the study. 
Documents reviewed: 
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The documents reviewed by The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee. 
Document Version Date 
Application Form 2 07/04/2016 
Participant Information Sheet 1 07/04/2016 
Consent Form 1 07/04/2016 
Invitation Letter 1 07/04/2016 
Research Data Management Plan 1 07/04/2016 
Survey Instrument 
1 
07/04/2016 
Interview Questions / Topic List 
1 
07/04/2016 
Questionnaire 
1 
07/04/2016 
Other – Proposed Thesis Contents Page 
1 
07/04/2016 
Other - Sussex Police Application to Conduct Research Form 
1 
07/04/2016 
Other - Sussex Police Research Code of Conduct Form 
1 
07/04/2016 
Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements set out by the 
University of Portsmouth 
After ethical review 
Reporting and other requirements 
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The enclosed document acts as a reminder that research should be conducted with integrity and 
gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
 Progress reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
Feedback 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the Faculty Ethics 
Committee. If you wish to make your views known please contact the administrator ethics-
fhss@port.ac.uk 
Please quote this number on all correspondence – 15/16:26 
Yours sincerely and wishing you every success in your research 
***************** 
Chair 
Dr Jane Winstone 
Email: ethics-fhss@port.ac.uk 
Enclosures: 
“After ethical review – guidance for researchers” 
Appendix 1 
After ethical review – guidance for researchers 
This document sets out important guidance for researchers with a favourable opinion from a 
University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Please read the guidance carefully. A failure to follow 
the guidance could lead to the committee reviewing and possibly revoking its opinion on the 
research. 
It is assumed that the research will commence within 3 months of the date of the favourable ethical 
opinion or the start date stated in the application, whichever is the latest. 
The research must not commence until the researcher has obtained any necessary management 
permissions or approvals – this is particularly pertinent in cases of research hosted by external 
organisations. The appropriate head of department should be aware of a member of staff’s research 
plans. 
If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study beyond that stated in the application, the Ethics 
Committee must be informed. 
If the research extends beyond a year then an annual progress report must be submitted to the 
Ethics Committee. 
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When the study has been completed the Ethics Committee must be notified. 
Any proposed substantial amendments must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for review. A 
substantial amendment is any amendment to the terms of the application for ethical review, or to 
the protocol or other supporting documentation approved by the Committee that is likely to affect 
to a significant degree: 
(a) the safety or physical or mental integrity of participants 
(b) the scientific value of the study 
(c) the conduct or management of the study. 
A substantial amendment should not be implemented until a favourable ethical opinion has been 
given by the Committee. 
Researchers are reminded of the University’s commitments as stated in the Concordat to Support 
Research Integrity viz: 
 maintaining the highest standards of rigour and integrity in all aspects of research 
 ensuring that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional 
frameworks, obligations and standards 
 supporting a research environment that is underpinned by a culture of integrity and based on good 
governance, best practice and support for the development of researchers 
 using transparent, robust and fair processes to deal with allegations of research misconduct should 
they arise 
 working together to strengthen the integrity of research and to reviewing progress regularly and 
openly 
In ensuring that it meets these commitments the University has adopted the UKRIO Code of Practice 
for Research. Any breach of this code may be considered as misconduct and may be investigated 
following the University Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research. 
Researchers are advised to use the UKRIO checklist as a simple guide to integrity. 
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Appendix G – Ethics Review Checklist (FORM UPR16)  
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Appendix H – Confirmation of permission to conduct research from Westshire Constabulary  
 
 
 
